Skeptikos III

15/05/07
Tractatus 5 continued from Skeptikos II.


5.46. If we introduce logical signs properly, then we should also have introduced at
the same time the sense of all combinations of them; i.e. not only 'p v p' but '~(p v -q)'
as well etc. etc. We should also have introduced at the same time the effect of all
possible combinations of brackets. And thus it would have been made clear that the
real general primitive signs are not 'p v q', '($x). fx' etc. but the most general form of
their combinations.


the idea being that a primitive sign such as 'p v q' is a propositional argument that has
general application - universal application -

yes this is the idea of such propositional arguments - it is the idea of such a logic

in fact any logic must have a generality to it - even let us say one that denies such an
application

the point of logic is the universal behind the particular

and what we are talking about here is conception

it is if you will the form of consciousness given to the world

(the world outside of consciousness is without form)

so the point is that the proposal of generality only has foundation given consciousness

and this is to say it has no foundation

the point of such nevertheless is that it organizes thought and enables action

this again is a fact of consciousness - human consciousness

the thing is - 'the general form of their combinations' is already given prior to the
introduction of the logical signs

it is given in the idea of such

the idea of it - the theory as such is presumed initially - it's detail - the fleshing out of
it is matter of analysis and labour - only then can you say 'then we should also have
introduced at the same time....'

that is there is no magic moment -

there is no actual sub specie aeternitatis


NB.


one assumption underlying this whole argument of Wittgenstein's and indeed most
theories of logic and language is that signs signify a reality

this is the substantial theory of logic

what we also need to consider here is the possibility that signs only signify signs

that the assumption of a reality - a substance that signs point to is no more than a
fiction

the idea here is that signs signify signs - other signs -

let us say a specific sign i.e. points to a larger signs - that is a sign that has more
generality

the picture that emerges here is that the world itself is a sign

that our knowledge is only of the relations of signs

that beyond signs is nothing we can speak of

that is - if a reality - it is unknown

that all signs finally and ultimately signify the unknown

in the meantime we make surface connections

and produce surface arguments


5.461. Though it seems unimportant, it is in fact significant that the pseudo- relations
of logic, such as v and É, need brackets - unlike real relations.

Indeed the use of brackets with these apparently primitive signs is itself an indication
that they are not the real primitive signs. And surely no one is going to believe that
brackets have an independent meaning.


v and É are rightly seen as operative signs - signs of basic logical operations

let's be clear there is nothing essential about the notion of primitive signs

primitiveness is an operating decision that one should strictly speaking take with a
grain of salt

the idea can be useful in certain structures - it can be pointless in others

brackets to my mind signify focus in a series of propositional signs

it can be argued I think that they represent - or point to the dimensional reality of
propositional language

that is they point to constructions within a propositional structure

it is not so much that brackets have a meaning - they are - or their use is the sign of an
operation

I would say in propositional signs they are a sign of an operation inside the
proposition - which is to say they point to propositional depth


5.4611. Signs for logical operations are punctuation marks.


firstly

this is to define signs or logical operations in terms of other signs

these other signs are signs of a more general type to the ones (logical operations)
being defined

the point is - and it is worth repeating - signs can only be defined in terms of other
signs

and that they must have a relation of particular to general

but on what basis is one class of sign defined in terms of another?

how does this connection get made?

well it only gets made if there is seen to be some need to make it

it is really like painting a picture - having a central figure - and painting in some
background - and perhaps even some foreground

here I am suggesting it is an aesthetic issue

nevertheless - the point is crucial - signs never leave the realm of sign

always yes - there is the assumption that the sign signifies something outside of the
realm of sign

this is not so much a metaphysical reality that is being proposed

it has more to do with the very purpose of the sign - its point

that it does signify something else

now I am arguing that this is not the case

however I am sure this is the point of signs

so what we really have is the issue of the psychology of signs

the need - if you like that signs meet

and this need is the belief that we signify something independent of consciousness

I say of this that it is best understood as the unknown

and here by unknown I mean a genuine reality - a category of the world

consciousness in the world brings into being its opposite - its negation if you like - the
non-conscious

the non-conscious - by definition is unknown

however it is no less real for this fact

it is the dominant reality of conscious human beings -

secondly -

marks are marks - one presumes they have meaning - this is the presumption -

and this is true of any mark - i.e. a mark in the non-conscious as well as the conscious
world

clearly though a mark has meaning because of consciousness

the making of the mark and the making of the meaning are always one in the same

still we can distinguish the two dimensions of the act - for analytical purposes

and there is of course a natural distinction in the non-conscious realm

a mark of nature - does only have meaning once it is given by consciousness

what is the meaning of a mark?

I would suggest it is in essence to stop the flow of time - or at least to create the
illusion of this

a punctuation mark for time?

now to this punctuation theory of the signs for logical operations

I think this idea is Wittgenstein being cute - and tricky

the idea being let's create a pretty vicious circle for signs - signs - punctuation marks -
punctuation marks signs - has the advantage of cosiness - but really its bad thinking

and even if you give him the benefit of the doubt here - i.e. he is saying something
important instead of being flamboyant with the truth - does it fit well with logical
operations

I think not

an operation is not a punctuation -

a punctuation is a reading of -

operations are acts - and it really doesn't matter what sign or symbol one uses to
identify - just so long as the identification is clear well formed - established even - and
certainly accepted

but I still say - even so an operation is not a punctuation

though it is indeed true that a punctuation is an operation

what counts as punctuation marks is - let's just get off the merry-go-round here - is
simply a matter of lexiographical convention -


5.47. It is clear that whatever we can say in advance about the form of all
propositions, we must be able to say all at once.


An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself. For 'fa' says
the same thing as '($x) . fx . x = a'.

Wherever there is compositeness, argument and function are present, and where these
are present, we already have all the logical constants.

One could say the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very nature,
had in common with one another.

But that is the general propositional form.

if a logical theory is complete it will contain all the known logical operations

that is all the operations required for the task of logical analysis - as it is practiced

the point is though - practice does not make perfect - practice makes imperfect

meaning what we do - our practice reveals - problems and ways of going - which may
not have been forecast - in such cases theory must adjust - and new variations
developed - therefore new operations performed

my point is we cannot say all at once

it is the delusion of omnipotence to suggest so

completeness is strictly speaking a false concept

how can it ever be known that a state of affairs is complete?

of course you can decide this by fiat

but that is not to settle the issue - it is to negate it

the proper place for the notion of completeness is in the definition of practice -

a job is complete if certain tasks are performed

of course we my revise the plan - and as a result the job is deigned to be incomplete -

that is its definition is changed

so completeness is at the service of task

task itself is never absolutely fixed

the world is never fixed

what is it that all proposition have in common?

well that they are proposals - this is my suggestion

and I argue against Wittgenstein that there is a propositional form

my idea instead is that the propositional form is empty - is emptiness - if we are to
speak of 'the' propositional form

a proposal is consciousness' imprint on the non-conscious

it is thus a relation between two dimensions of being

how it is expressed - is rather a matter of circumstance - contingency

form is possibility


5.471. The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition.


the essence of the proposition is unknown

there is no propositional form as such

the idea that the propositional form is that which the proposition and reality have in
common - is to say nothing

yes everything has something in common - i.e. that it is real

however what the commonality is - is an open question

and it only has any real significance or value in terms of organizing tasks -

that is it is a heuristic concept that comes into play in the organization of action

of course it is legitimate to speculate on the ultimate nature of reality -

but once this question is raised - another must be -

and that is - why is the question raised - what is the point of it the purpose of it?

so it is not to be understood as an essentialist matter - rather as an issue of function

here too lies the clue to the question of form

form is function


5.4711. To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all
description, and thus the essence of the world.


yes the essence of anything is the essence of everything - no news here - and no use
here

there is no point in this line of argument

the suggestion seems to be that to understand the nature of a proposition is to
understand the nature of everything - a very handy short cut - and one that really
removes the need for any further thinking -

an outlook that is used by epistemological authoritarians and those with an anti-
science agenda

logicians with such views are better described as priests


5.472. The description of the most general propositional form is the description of the
one and only general primitive sign in logic.


this is philosophical fishing

if you want to go down this path - the essentialist road - then yes by definition there is
something at the end of it - and that will be 'the one and only primitive sign in logic'

to this point Wittgenstein hasn't given this discovery at the end of the yellow brick
road a sign a pictorial representation

why is that I wonder?


5.473. Logic must look after itself.

If a sign is possible, then it must also be capable of signifying. Whatever is possible is
also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is
no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to
make an arbitrary determination. and not because the symbol, itself, would be
illegitimate.)

In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic.


the fact of consciousness in the world - and however you wish to describe this -

is the foundation of logic - it is the fact out of which logic emerges

the fact - the only fact it addresses

logic is based on this relation - consciousness and the non-conscious

and therefore logic is just this - the theory of relations

what relations can and cannot hold

and this - the theory of this - is no more than - is just a description of what is - of the
world -

from the inside (of the world)


5.4731. Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable
in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake - What makes
logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.


everything that exists is self-evident

description always fails - it always leaves everything out -

what is described is thus absolutely problematic

the description of the relation consciousness and non consciousness can never be
stable or objective

logic must confine itself to paper work - while the war goes on

the point is not that nothing can be decided - it is rather that everything else must be
put in brackets

logic operates within its own description


5.4732. We cannot give a sign the wrong sense.


any sign can hold any sense

the sign is just packaging for sense - sense can be wrapped in any number of ways

there is a metaphysical anarchism at the heart of this

it is the window of true freedom that is at the heart of any sign

the day to day reality is that we fit in with what is there - at least initially

what is there is there for a reason - if it stays in play it is of use

nothing is unrevisable - but by the same token there is never good reason to revise
everything - or to think that you can

here is the origin of politics


5.47321. Ockham's maxim is of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is justified
by it's success in practice; its point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean
nothing.

Signs that serve one purpose are logically equivalent, and signs that serve none are
logically meaningless.


so what decides necessity?

either a sign signifies - has a function or it does not

if not it is not a sign in the language being used

and purpose?

the only purpose is signification

the purposes of signification may be many and varied

the fact that a sign signifies does not mean that it has a purpose

signs do not serve purposes

(they signify - signification is a logical relation - purpose is not)

if a logically meaningless sign is one that does not serve a purpose

then all signs are logically meaningless


5.4733. Frege says that legitimately constructed propositions must have a sense. And I
say that any possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and, if it has no sense,
that can only be because we have failed to give meaning to some of its constituents.

(Even if we think that we have done so.)

Thus the reason why 'Socrates is identical' says nothing is that we have not given any
adjectival meaning to the word 'identical'. For when it appears as a sign for identity, it
symbolizes in an entirely different way - the signifying relation is a different one -
therefore the symbols also are entirely different in the two cases: the two symbols
have only the sign in common, and that is an accident.


the issue of practice is not some incidental addendum in this matter

in practice signs come with meaning

the meaning logically speaking in general is given prior to the sign - as a sign in itself
has no meaning it is a mark

the issue of failing 'to give meaning to some of its constituents' characteristically
occurs when one language user is not familiar with the specific use of a string of
symbols - though he may identify the idea of use and some of the constituents

it's just about being in the loop

perhaps poets can be accused of constructing a propositional strings that hitherto have
not appeared - and prime facie have no meaning -

the same could be said of other artistic productions

the point here - or the focus here is not the signs - but rather the state of the artistic
endeavour or dialogue

to know what is meant one will have to be introduced to some extent into the artistic
argument that the unknown propositional string is an outcome of

i.e. perhaps a propositional string may have some significance when understood as a
reaction to a current fashion or practice

yes so always the issue of giving meaning to signs

the point though is that the giving of meaning is always connecting with a community
usage

a case in point is the example given above - 'Socrates is identical'

Wittgenstein uses this proposition as an example of a meaningless proposition to
illustrate is theory of logic -

therefore in this context and against the background of his argument - the proposition
has sense

Wittgenstein seems to think language occurs in a logical vacuum -

that its appearance in the world is some mystical / magical act - that it all happens as
he says 'all at once'

his argument is that in the case of symbols having the same sign in common - what we
have is an accident

strictly speaking there are no accidents in nature

no accidents in the world

the issue is always a question of understanding

and what this points to is that there are no meaningless propositions

it is always a question of knowledge - why and how such a usage has emerged

it is a matter finally of science


5.474. The number of fundamental operations that are necessary depends solely on our
notation.


once the parameters of discourse are set - i.e. a sign language is proposed - then
what is possible within that framework (the operations) is set by the sign language

this is a decision of discipline - the decision to work within a framework -

it is an attitude -

not I would suggest the philosophical attitude

it is more in the line of a craftsman's or tradesman's approach to the world

be that as it may - it is not a matter of logic - that we regard logical systems in such a
way

but in all truth the argument of 5.4744 is arse about

operational signs are developed out of the desire to represent operations

that is the operation is proposed in thought - and given physical expression in a sign -
a mark

a system of logical signs can only be regarded as a the basis of thought or
understanding if it is decided that it is to have such a function

that is logical systems - like the signs that are contained within them only have
meaning if the meaning is given


5.475. All that is required is that we should construct a system of signs with a
particular number of dimensions - with a particular mathematical multiplicity.


constructing an ideal language -

the notions of dimensions of a language and its range of sign functionality -

it is in general a theory of language that is being put here

on what is such based?

clearly the idea is that all languages have these capacities

therefore

we can use these characteristics - dimensions - sign functionality (mathematical
multiplicity) - as characteristics of any language - natural or artificial

the use of language suggests these characteristics

and then the question of purpose

why is such a language required - what end does it serve?

what is the purpose of logic?

we might answer this by saying logic is about being clear about what is being said

and another question - not often asked - are we really talking about a language when
we speak of logic?

is not logical analysis just what does occur in language use -

and what we term logic - like a supplementary that can enable us to cut to the chase -
if that is required?

so it is really just a way of thinking about language

thinking about it from the inside

and to do that in a definitive and forceful manner we develop a script a short hand -

which if precise enables such a task to proceed expeditiously

logic on such a view is a subset of natural languages

its bases and its operations and its theories come from the practice of natural
language

logic is reflection within language about language


5.476. It is clear that this is not a question of a number of primitive ideas that have to
be signified, but rather the expression of a rule.


what we are dealing with here is primitive operations

ideas in this context are really dead in the water

now as to rules

a rule is a description of an operation

an operation is a composite act or event

that is it can be analyzed

a rule as a description is a direction

a rule can be based on authority or knowledge

that is you can be directed or direct yourself to follow a rule that you don't understand

you may understand the reason for it

nevertheless such is an action in ignorance

or you may know a rule and follow it

that is you may understand the operation independently of its description as a rule

in such a case the rule is irrelevant

in Wittgenstein's terms it is in the same class as unnecessary units in sign language

the rule has no place in logic

the best you can say is that it is a shorthand (description) of an operation

if you already understand the operation - it has no place

if you don't understand the operation it is of no use

the only basis for rules is authoritarianism - which is an anathema to reason

there is no doubt that rules in certain contexts function - but their basis is always
insufficient

rules are signs of the lack of development


5.5. Every truth-function is a result of successive applications to elementary
propositions of the operation

'(-----T)(x, ....)'.

This operation negates all propositions in the right-hand pair of brackets, and I call it
the negation of those propositions.


all very well but this does not elucidate negation - it simply states that negation is
represented in this way - and even here at the level of representation we could ask
why?

Wittgenstein wants us to see logical operations in terms of depiction - pictures of
signs

it is the kind of approach that is useful if you don't actually know what is behind the
pictures - that is what they represent

it is a picture book account of reason

and in this case the golliwog is on the right hand page


5.501. When a bracketed expression has propositions as its terms - and the order of
the terms inside the brackets is indifferent - then I indicate it by the sign of the form
''. 'x' is a variable and the bar over the variable indicates that it is representative of
all its values in the brackets.
(E.G. if x has the three values P, Q, R, then = (P, Q, R).)

What the values of the variable are is something that is stipulated.

The stipulation is a description of the propositions that have the variable as their
representative.

How the description of the terms of the bracketed expression is produced is not
essential.

We can distinguish three kinds of description: 1. direct enumeration, in which case we
can simply substitute for the variable the constants that are its values; 2. giving a
function fx whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be described; 3.
giving a formal law that governs the construction of the propositions, in which case
the bracketed expression has as its members all the terms of a series of forms.


this is to represent propositions - as a sign (x) - and then further to represent the
propositions (P,Q,R) as all the propositions to be considered by a sign i.e.

this is an argument of notation - or just definition -

and as Wittgenstein says how these stipulations are produced is not essential

that is the signing for propositional representation is arbitrary -

the argument for these signs - for this syntax is contained in the proposition(s) of
5.501.

this proposition (like all propositions) is a description of use - in this case how certain
logical syntax is to be understood

the signs have no meaning outside of their 'underlying' propositional argument

the three kinds of description listed are arguments for this kind of propositional
construction

these function as the theory of stipulation of propositions that have the variable as
their representative

the point is logic like any other construction has sense in terms of the use that it is to
be put

it's theory (if it is constructed correctly) is tailored to this end

the literal value of a theory lies in its fitting a desired or premeditated end or usage

the difficulty in assessing logic - even once such a view is accepted - is that the end
really only has definition in terms of the theory proposed

that is there is no objective - or extra-theoretical way of determining the value of the
theory

i.e. if the end is 'clarity' - how do we know if the theory serves this end?

what is to count as clarity is not given before the theory is proposed

no doubt there is some idea - that is not the point - the point is what this 'some idea'
comes to

only the theory advanced has that solution

we can look at the theory in terms of construction - bases - argument - consistency etc.

but all this finally is 'in house' - or internal

and where does this leave us?

proposals put forward and developed with passion and intelligence

the object of these proposals - is just what these proposals dress

the appropriateness of the dress may be a question we ask - but it is not a question the
world answers

if there is any answer it is silence

the world in itself as the object of consciousness is always unknown

the answer of the unknown is silence

here though we are dealing with things on a meta level

Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with the articulation of a theory of logic

and though what I have said regarding ultimate foundations finally applies here too

Wittgenstein in the development of his theory of propositional signs is really dealing
with the construction of a language or system of signs in the context of pre-existing
(natural) language

I think he wants to say the foundation of his theory of logic is the theory of logical
marks that is his system of propositional signs

this would be to put that logic is founded on its depiction - on its signs - on its pictures

and that amounts to saying the foundation of logic - is its expression

this is to give no foundation - no bases to logic

it is either a clever idea that fails - or a cover for putting one's head in the sand

Wittgenstein does not I think address the issue of the foundation of logic

perhaps because he understood it has no foundation but itself

to run with this requires blind courage - and not a bad thing either -


5.502. So instead of '(-----T)(x,....)', I write ''.

is the negation of all the values of the propositional value x.


this is quite OK

it is just the making of decisions regarding propositional operations and how they are
represented

what needs to be pointed out here is that propositional representation signifies
propositional dimensions -

that is i.e., brackets within a propositional statement essentially point to the internal
dimension of the proposition - or logic is not a flatline theory

even his own theory of propositional signs points to the fact that propositional
thinking is dimensional

that is it represents fundamental meta dimensions

the internal and the external

and the infinite number of combinations of expressions that these dimensions can
generate


5.503. It is obvious that we can easily express how propositions may be constructed
with this operation, and how they may not be constructed with it; so it must be
possible to find an exact expression for this.


the point is negation has already been introduced as the primitive propositional
operation - or operational possibility

any argument begins on this understanding

is Wittgenstein still going to say there are no primitive ideas in logic?

all logic - all formal logic derives from negation

and negation itself from the given relationship of the conscious and the non-conscious

negation is a fundamental awareness

we can only operate - move in this world given the understanding of negation

therefore language of course natural and artificial - if it is to have any power reflects
this primitive fact of logic - of human (self-conscious) reality

as far as I can tell Wittgenstein gives no account of negation

it simply appears in his system

it is like the unknown parent that you know is always there somewhere - and one day
there is a knock on the door - as if from nowhere

Wittgenstein denies primitive ideas of logic - and tries to account for everything in
terms of his sign language - as some kind of substitute for argument - meta argument

which is all very well in my view so long as you understand that in putting such a
view you are arguing the sceptics understanding of the matter


5.51. If x has only one value, then = ~p (not p); if it has two values, then
= ~p . ~q (neither p nor q).


it is difficult to see the point of x

x is a variable whose values are the terms of the bracketed expression

somewhere the terms of the bracketed expression (e.g. P,Q,R) have to be stated

the thing is a variable is just that - anything and everything -

the variable is in terms of propositional logic - the unknown

which is all very well

I have argued that then propositional form is actually an empty logical space

the variable I suppose is a sign of this

but what is its use?

except perhaps to show that ultimately there is no logic to this theory of logic -

or perhaps more correctly - no content

that's OK too but what of Oakum's principle - is not this 'variable' (x) in fact an
unnecessary sign?


5.511. How can logic - all embracing logic, which mirrors the world - use such
peculiar crotchets and contrivances? Only because they are all connected with one
another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror.


mirroring the world -

an image of the world - via what?

what is the mirror? - that is the first question -

language you say

the difficulty here is that language is not outside of the world

so how is it to be a mirror?

and for the matter of that - unless you have some Platonistic like metaphysic (which is
that the world is not the world) - what could function as a mirror of the world?

putting it in a somewhat Spinozistic manner - what is outside of the world?

any mirror in the world will only reflect a part thereof

reflections occur in the world

the world is not mirrored in anything

to suggest such is to misunderstand mirrors and / or the world

an image of the world would have to correspond to the world but it could not be
outside of the world - therefore no correspondence

so to logic - all embracing logic -

how do we know logic is all embracing?

one would think again that you would need to be able to hold the world as an object

that is be outside of it - for it to be embraced - by anything

and to cut to the chase here -

the world?

presumably the totality - yes we have terms to describe

but what do they point to?

they point to what it is we do not know

that is all

that is the world

it is logically speaking a negative concept

and it is as negative as you can get

this fact is really where mysticism comes from

and it is the concept out of which religion has emerged


p.s.


from a linguistic point of view what this tells us is that language - terms - words -
concepts - do not in order to function necessarily have a referent

a sign that is does not necessarily signify - in a positive sense

and perhaps if a positive sense of signification is all there is to one's theory of signs
then

a sign does not need to signify to be meaningful

does a sign have to have sense to signify?

if you signify what you do not know - what in fact is the sense of your sign?

how does one answer that?

well - to say the unknown has sense - yes

but the other possibility is just as valid - that the unknown is the unknown because it
does not have sense

signs without sense -

propositions without sense?

who would have thought?

(anyone but a philosopher)


5.512. '~p' is true if 'p' is false. Therefore, in the proposition '~p', when it is true, 'p' is a
false proposition. How then can the stroke '~' make it agree with reality?

But in '~p' it is not '~' that negates; it is rather what is common to all the signs of this
notation that negate p.

That is to say the common rule that governs the construction of '~p' ,'~~~p', '~p v ~p',
'~p .~p', etc. etc. (ad infin.). And this common factor mirrors negation.

(a)

first up in the case put above the stroke '~' does not make it (~p) agree with reality

strictly speaking any well formed proposition (in my view) can agree with reality - so
what I am suggesting is that the terms 'true' and 'false' are not about agreement with
reality - what they refer to is a decision of utility

and that decision will be circumstantial - i.e. 'p' is T - that is we can use or work with
this proposition under these circumstances (whatever they are) - or 'p' is F - i.e. the
proposition has no applicability under this set of circumstances

agreement with reality is a question of the right fit at the right time and place

the general logical point is that no proposition can be constructed that is 'outside of
reality' - for this is the only legitimate sense of 'not agreeing with reality'

all propositions reflect some aspect of reality - the question is what?

really at the basis of any propositional assertion is the unknown - that is the question
what place does this proposition have in any view of reality?

'any view of reality' - will of necessity be a propositional argument - and the subject
proposition will have its place within this argument

that is to say the sense of a proposition in question is to be found in the propositional
argument of which it is an expression

given this view it is clear that the sense of a proposition can and does change given
the circumstances of its application

and given the possibilities for flexibility within the propositional argument -

and this ultimately leads to the arguments within arguments - finally really
metaphysics - world views

nothing though is ever fixed or stable it is all fluid - and the possibility of collapse is
ever present - what puts the fix in is decision

and it's interesting - decision is really that moment of understanding when we do not
know but we have to proceed - and we proceed definitively - without knowing

we like to think decisions are firmly based on something - and indeed in practice you
will find this asserted confidently - but the logic of decision is quite different matter -

and the truth is logic does not provide any basis at all - what it does is point to the
absence of basis

here is not despair (although some have thought so) - rather what you have here is
possibility

possibility you will see cannot be fixed

(must not be - that's a philosophical joke ha ha)

and it is the necessary underpinning for action - for action (human action) is never
predetermined at the level of consciousness

in fact it is only possible given the absence of determination

such is the reality of mind in the world


(b)


negation -

Wittgenstein says it is a rule that governs the application of the negation sign

this is just not a good analysis - it is weak

in the use of logical signage and syntax - rules can and are applied

this is just the practice of the art

the question though is really to do with the nature of negation

and Wittgenstein has absolutely nothing to say here

nothing about the origin of this sign - this operation

and for that matter nothing about the origin of any other sign -

and hence ultimately no theory of logic

(what you have with Wittgenstein is the 'magical appearance' of logic and then its
discussion - no account of its bases)

so negation -

I think negation is the primitive concept of logic

that is it is fundamental

not to say that it is primary -

negation is only possible given assertion

but assertion has no significance without negation

this is the fundamental of negation

the fact that it is the underlying source of an assertion's significance

and this is true of all assertions - elementary existential and universal - and all
combinations

the whole of mathematics - number theory is based on the operation of negation

OK

so what do we make of negation?

what is it?

I say it is essentially an expression of the relation of consciousness and non-
consciousness

consciousness and the world

its a construction of consciousness - about consciousness - and its relation to the non-
consciousness

consciousness recognizes itself and its outside

that is consciousness recognizes itself as internality and contrasts this with externality

this is where we begin - with this recognition

beyond this there is no explanation - this is the base line

what is outside of consciousness is what it is not

what is inside non-consciousness is what it is not

negation is the primitive term of any account of the nature of human reality

without negation - there is no description -

without negation there is no reality as we know it

negation is the essential concept of human consciousness

now finally the point is - we don't know

we can't go beyond this in our analysis

what we do know though is that we can and do operate with negation

it is the fundamental operation of conscious life

and it enables us to operate as conscious operators

how the world is - is how it operates

operation is reality


(c)


Wittgenstein is keen on the idea of a mirror and the idea of reflection - the thing is his
account has no mirror in it - it is non-existent - there is no explanation of the mirror -
just the use of the idea - and the reason for all this is just that he does not - for
whatever reason want to acknowledge the place of mind - of consciousness in the
world


NB.


the negation sign refers to what?

it refers to - points to difference

the difference between x and that which x is differentiated from

negation refers to differentiation in the clearest terms

that which is different from x is that which is not x

negation in logic precisely defines the difference

which is to say it draws the difference sharply

we cannot really avoid an ontological dimension here

entities are being differentiated

though this is not to say anything at all substantial about what is being differentiated -
just that there is a differentiation -

the entity here is really a form I suppose

the negation sign '-' separates forms

separation and differentiation are the underlying notions here - but negation is a
precise application

it is precise simply because it has no content - and doesn't really point to any content

it is just a sharp drawing of the line

it is strictly a formal act

a formal act I would suggest reflects a metaphysical reality

and that is the reality of consciousness in the world

consciousness - awareness

and awareness in this case is human awareness which is self-awareness

that is awareness of and awareness of not

this is the initial state of consciousness

it is the origin of binary logic

negation is the principle of awareness

the fundamental principle of consciousness


5.513. We might say that what is common to all symbols that affirm both p and q is
the proposition 'p . q'; and that what is common to all symbols that affirm either p or q
is the proposition 'p v q'.

And similarly we can say that two propositions are opposed to one another if they
have nothing in common with one another, and that every proposition has only one
negative, since there is only one proposition that lies completely outside it.

Thus in Russell's notation too it is manifest that 'q: p v ~p' says the same thing as 'q',
that 'p v ~p' says nothing.


does 'p v ~p' say nothing?

yes - however it is not without sense

such a propositional statement in fact reveals logical space

it is a way of revealing logical space

which is to say it points to - or even states the ground of propositional logic

it is a statement of what is possible and it says nothing about what exists

it is a statement of modal logic


5.514. Once a notation has been established, there will be in it a rule governing the
construction of all propositions that negate p, and a rule governing the construction of
all propositions that affirm p or q; and so on. These rules are equivalent to the
symbols; and in them their sense is mirrored.


yes rules are just descriptions of operations

if you understand the operation you know - or have no use for the rule

the rules being refereed to here in my view have no logical significance at all

Wittgenstein I think wants to base his theory on some kind of essentialism

and so rules (he thinks) have some significance in negotiating essence

the fact of it is propositions are operations

and their relationship operational

this you might say is a far more pragmatic view of the matter

and to my mind far more 'hands on' and without a lot of metaphysical obscurantism


5.515. It must be manifest in our symbols that it can only be propositions that can be
combined with one another by 'v', ' .', etc.

And this is indeed the case, since the symbol in 'p' and 'q' itself presupposes 'v' '~'. etc.
If the sign 'p' in 'p v q' does not stand for a complex sign, then it cannot have sense by
itself; but in that case the signs 'p v q', 'p . p' etc., which have the same sense as p,
must also lack sense. But if 'p v p' has no sense, then 'p v q' cannot have sense either.


what sense is there in 'p v q'?

'p v q' - in the context of this logical argument - one assume represents a logical
operation -

the operation of disjunction

it is a statement in syntactical form of what disjunction is

a representation of it

it is to say we can legitimately place propositions in the relation of disjunction

it is this assertion

so 'p v q' then expresses the possibility of a state of affairs in propositional logic

'p' and 'q' (in this argument) represent propositions - different propositions

'v' - tells us that these propositions can be placed in a relation of disjunction

so 'p v q' really is a statement of a ground of sense

the sense that is being proposed here is 'logical sense' (which is the ground of actual
sense)

so yes logical sense is presupposed in any statement or proposition of sense

'p v q' here is a statement - a proposition of that logical ground

it refers to such a logical state of affairs - it states the possibility

the syntactical representation has little or nothing to do with the issue

the point could be made in any language


NB.


there is no such thing as a proposition free proposition - that is a proposition will only
have sense in terms of the propositional argument (the system of propositions) it
represents

and what it represents - will depend on how it is used

i.e. if your interest is logic - the logical analysis of a proposition will involve logical
propositions

if it is empirical then empirical propositions will be contained in it - for it's
comprehensive elucidation

look it depends really on where you point the proposition

that is it is a question of direction - meta direction if you like

the possibility of sense is given in structure

the nature of sense is to be found in the direction that structure is used in - the
direction it is pointed in

therefore the sense of a proposition is never to be found in the proposition - in its
structure - it is only found in its use


5.5151. Must the sign of a negative proposition be constructed with that of the
positive proposition? Why should it not be possible to express a negative proposition
by means of a negative fact? (E.g. suppose that 'a' does not stand in a certain relation
to 'b'; then this might be used to say that aRb was not the case.)

But really in this case the negative proposition is constructed by an indirect use of the
positive.

The positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative
proposition and visa versa.


one can always apply the '~' sign to negate a proposition - this is an operational issue

the positive proposition does not presuppose anything

it is an assertion

also not sure about the idea of a negative fact -

my instinct here is to say the world is made of facts - that is positive facts -

the assertion of a so called negative fact is just the assertion that a positive fact does
hold

that is - it is not as if we are pointing to a negative fact - a non-fact and saying 'there -
that (non-existent state of affairs) exists'

the denial of a positive fact is not an assertion of a negative fact -

the world is not lacking - so there are no absences to point to

a negative assertion - asserts what?

that a positive fact does not hold

that is a negative assertion is an assertion not about the world but about a (positive)
proposition

if this is so then continents of European metaphysics disappear overnight

what is clear though is that positive and negative assertions are not of the same type

a negative denies a positive assertion - that is proposition -

a positive proposition asserts a state of affairs

the negative proposition is an operation on the positive proposition

it has no content - it does not assert - it is a propositional operation

but what is it to deny?

it is to perform the most fundamental logical operation

negation enables the generation of propositional strings and propositional forms

it is as I have put above the essential awareness -

the primary awareness of consciousness

it is the operation of consciousness that gives us self-consciousness

'I am' can only be determined by it's negation

it's negation is the world -

what underlies this though is a metaphysical reality -

the actual being of consciousness

and consciousness is not like anything else

and here it is seen - that this is how consciousness is defined - in terms of what it is
not -

the non-conscious

the existence of these opposites is the foundation of logic


5.52. If x has as its values all the values of a function fx for all values of x, then
= ~($x).fx.


if x represents all the values of fx - then - denies that x is a function

in the argument here Wittgenstein avoids the universal (all) and argues the case in
terms of the existential (there exists)

you could say the denial of the existential - covers the issue of the denial of a
universal - i.e. - the result is the same

what about the universal assertion - 'all' and 'every'?

I really don't know how any such a statement can be made - at least in an empirical
context

different matter when we are dealing with the finite number of members of a set

anyway


5.521. I dissociate the concept all from truth-functions.

Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or sum.
This made it difficult to understand the propositions '($x).fx' and '(x).fx', in which both
ideas are embedded.


Wittgenstein puts that the concept of all is not to be associated with truth functions

this makes sense - truth functional analysis is the calculation of truth values for
elementary propositions

the concept of 'all' does not appear in any such operation and is not relevant to it

generality and sum or logical product -


(a)


I really don't see why you can't dispense with sum or logical product in the
interpretation of the above proposition

the universal proposition need not be regarded as an expression of sum or logical
product

that is 'all' can simply refer to 'the state of affairs'

that is the universal in an ontological sense


(b)


(i) there exists an x such that x is a function

(ii) for all x - x is a function

very different propositions -

the universal proposition asserts effectively that fx is a member of a class and that all
members of this class are functions

different to saying x exists and is a function

in this case x is left undefined

the universal gives definition

the existential leaves its subject as undefined


5.522. What is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it indicates a logical
prototype, and secondly, that it gives prominence to constants.


yes the generality indicates a basic conceptual category

the point is that the universal has no power outside of its manipulation with constants
- that is it is essentially an operative concept - its assertion only begs the question of
what is to happen

the existential on the other hand does not invite operation

that is it is complete in itself

I think we need to regard the universal as a purely operative notion

a concept that we can get some work done with

the existential on the other hand is the work done

an operative view of the universal and universal sign might just be the best way to
understand it

that is the view that the universal does not signify

it just operates - it's a conceptual operation - that is clearly useful in a deductive
context - that is a 'top down' analysis - where the field of variables is decided - for the
argument


5.523. The generality sign occurs as an argument.


well not quite -

it's more in the line of a tool that is a tool for arguments

or perhaps we could say an argument form

that is a form in which a certain kind of argument can proceed

but even so it is a logical tool that enables certain logical processes - and thus
outcomes


5.524. If objects are given, then at the same time we are given all objects.

If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time all elementary propositions
are given.


a sign for an object - is a sign for all objects -

'object' is a universal concept - a logical sign reflects this fact

the same is true of elementary propositions

it is clear isn't it that such signs are signs of concepts

and if you wish to follow the trail -

signs of consciousness?

consciousness at work

and it is clear that we really cannot separate our understanding of concepts from what
they are conceptions of

we may for analytical purposes distinguish consciousness from its object(s)

however the reality is an indissoluble unity at the level of the given

(Kant put this much better as 'the unity of aperception')

in my view the proposition represents this unity

and the really extraordinary thing is that outside of analysis - this unity can only be
described as unknown


5.525. It is incorrect to render the proposition '($x).fx' in the words, 'fx is possible', as
Russell does.

The certainty, possibility, or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a
proposition, but by an expression's being a tautology, a proposition with sense, or a
contradiction.

The precedent to which we are constantly inclined to appeal must reside in the symbol
itself.


'fx is possible' might be seen as a broad view

existential statements are very focused

a proposition asserts

and what is it to assert?

it is to say that the proposition covers a state of affairs

that something - exists -

it is to say nothing about the nature of the state of affairs -

just that - for whatever purpose it is being asserted

how is this different from an assertion of possibility

in a logical sense - I see no real difference

it's just that it comes with the rider that the state of affairs may not in fact be

why would we have such a qualification?

what point is served here?

does not such undermine the 'positive' character of the proposition?

possibility points to what?

it points to the question of existence

in a Platonic sense to its form -

in general existential statements as I understand them are definitive

and possibility statements are not - at the existential level

still you might say the possibility statement contains the existential - without the
commitment

an open existential statement?

perhaps this was Russell's point

and as I have put earlier on I do not go with the idea that a tautology is a statement of
possibility - or that a contradiction is a statement of impossibility

tautologies and contradictions I have argued are useless propositional strings

so I do not think the key to these notions is a propositional form -

the symbol is not the precedent


5.526. We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalized
propositions, i.e., without first correlating any name with a particular object.

Then, in order to arrive at the customary mode of expression, we simply need to add,
after an expression like, 'There is one and only one x such that...', the words, 'and that
x is a'.


(a)


describing the world completely -

the god delusion -

'a fully generalized proposition' is only functional if the domain of the generalization
is already set - that is determined for the argument

this means though that we must be able to think both sides of the definition - for the
definition to be put in place

and so the point is that all our conceptions are within domain

'the world' as such cannot be conceived - it is not a domain -

it is in fact the absence of domain

or if you like the place of domain

best described as the logical space of domains

it follows from this we cannot sensibly say 'we can describe the world completely'


(b)


'there is one and only one x and that x is a'

this is a definition - of definition

that is it is a theory of what a true definition looks like

it is a meta statement

the point is it is not a definition of anything as such

and really isn't this just exactly what logic is - the account - the theory of definition

the theory of forms - in the sense of - i.e. this is what a true definition looks like or
this is what a proposition is etc.


5.5261. A fully generalized proposition, like every other proposition, is composite.
(This is shown by the fact that in '($x, f) . fx' we have to mention 'f' and 'x' separately.
They both, independently, stand in signifying relations to the world, just as is the case
in ungeneralized propositions.)

It is a mark of a composite symbol that it has something in common with other
symbols.

what needs to appreciated is that a proposition in it's given mode reflects the analysis
that led to it

therefore a fully generalized proposition will reflect its composition

that is we can inspect it and see the separate mentions

this however I think is only one view of the proposition - legitimate definitely

however we can transcend this reading and regard the generalized proposition as just
that - generalized

the point of such a proposition is its universality -

this I would say is the sense - the true sense of the proposition

the fact that it points to - the non-composite view of reality

here though we see the great utility of the proposition -

it's structure reflects its making and goes beyond this

it really is not necessary to come down on one side or the other -

both possibilities are revealed

and what I say in general here is that the analysis / composition is a way of seeing the
proposition

in fact without the analytical view - what we have is an unknown reality

the analysis / composition of the proposition is the handle we have on it


5.5262. The truth or falsity of every proposition does make some alteration in the
general construction of the world. And the range that the totality of elementary
propositions leaves open for its construction is exactly the same as that which is
delimited by entirely general propositions.

(If an elementary proposition is true, that means, at any rate, one more true elementary
proposition.)


(a)


a proposition as a fact about the world - like any other fact -

and by 'fact' here I really mean an 'epistemological region' -

is like any other fact in itself - neither true nor false

truth or falsity is a matter of action in terms of a proposition

the proposition is a focus for - 'veritable action'

that is in general we know the truth status of a proposition in terms of its use or not

this means of course that one in the same proposition can be true or false depending
on circumstances and use or not

the action in relation to the proposition alters the fact of the world

the proposition itself - but for its appearance - has no effect

and again - in itself - has no truth value


(b)


the construction of the world - the human world - is that construction that results from
the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness

that is how we construct in terms of this fundamental relation

the world (the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness) is simply the
primitive fact of human reality

such a world prior to any construction of it is essentially unknown

any construction is just the fact of the need for organization and structure - and this
need is best understood as a product of self-consciousness


(c)


there is no totality of elementary propositions

an elementary proposition is an expression of primary focus

primary focus has no unique place and time

therefore it is without number


(d)


a general or universal proposition is an expression of the absence of primary focus

that is it is not an elementary proposition - and its basis is the denial of the elementary
proposition

that is the connection - denial

though the denial is hidden in the assertion

it is strictly speaking the basis of it

and so it is the case that 'the range that the totality of elementary propositions leaves
open for its construction is exactly the same as that which is delimited by entirely
general propositions'


5.53. Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign of
identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs.


identity of object - identity of sign -

tricky business -

logic does not identify object

a propositions refers to object

refers to the fact of object

and the fact of object in a state of affairs

it asserts the fact of object

therefore a proposition is an assertion of a state of affairs

the assertion of object is the base element of any proposition

identity -

we can have identical expressions in the sense that they assert the same thing in
different ways

identity of object?

there is no identity of object -

unless you think it makes sense to say an object is identical with itself

if x is an object and y is an object it follows x is not identical to y

or x and y are not objects

that is the essence of object is just that it is not identical with -

the concept of identity does not apply to object

two objects if they are objects - are - not one object

identity of sign is identity of reference - not identity of object

the point is we do not need to have different signs for different objects

objects just are different

different signs are different expressions

and yes it does follow from this that language does not identify

or propositional language does not identify


5.5301. It is self evident that identity is not a relation between objects. This becomes
clear if one considers, for example, the proposition '(x):fx. É .x =a'. What this
proposition says is simply that only a satisfies the function f, and not that only things
that have a certain relation to a satisfy the function f.

Of course it might then be said that only a did have a relation to a; but in order to
express that, we should need the identity sign itself.


the above proposition is really an exercise in substitution of symbols

it is to say that we can use the right hand side of the '=' sign for the left - or visa versa

the above proposition is really just a definition of signs - of usage

this has nothing at all to do with identity of objects

and as I have suggested above the notion of identity of objects itself is ridiculous

it really only has a place in the metaphysics of confusion

the '=' sign does not signify -

in the strict sense of signify something outside of the sign

what it does is define use of sign


5.5302. Russell's definition of '=' is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say
that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never
correct, it still has sense.)


this is where Wittgenstein gives the game away

Russell is correct

and the point I argue is that the '=' signifies translation - and use

it is not objective

to say that we can still speak as if the '=' is object-ive - even though it is incorrect

that it still makes sense -

is just confused - sloppy thinking

and a little worrying

the real concern is what this says for sense

if sense is adrift from logic - it has no sense

we may as well just start again


5.5303. Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and
to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.


roughly speaking -

'roughly speaking' is not good enough for a logician

it might work fine in a bar room -

and really what is up here?

it looks like Wittgenstein wants to have it both ways -

to nod to the metaphysical reality that there are no identity relations

and yet still proceed as if identity relations are real

prime facie it all seems rather incredible

and at the very least without integrity

we will see -


5.531. Thus I do not write 'f(a,b).a = b', but 'f(a,a)' (or 'f(b,b)'); and not 'f(a,b). ~a =b',
but 'f(a,b)'.


f(a,a) and f(b,b) -

the point is isn't if you have given up on identity - then there is no need for these
expressions at all - they are mistaken - and no amount of rewriting or translating will
change the fact -


5.532. And analogously I do not write '($x,y). f(x,y).x = y', but '($x).f(x,x)'; and not
'($x,y).f(x,y). -x = y', but '($x.y).f(x,y)'.

(So Russell's '($x,y). fxy' becomes '($x,y). f((x,y).v . ($x).f(x,x)'.)


'(Ex).f(x,x)' seems unnecessary - that is the f(x,x)

and in the same way Russell's notation seems far more elegant and to the point - that
is without the fiction of f(x,x)


5.5321. Thus, for example, instead of '(x): fx.É x = a' we write '($x).fx É.fa: -
($x,y).fx.fy'.

And the proposition, 'Only one x satisfies f( )', will read '($x). fx: ~($x,y).fx.fy'.


yes I see no point in using the '=' sign - it can be successfully eliminated from notation

but the resultant notation is just as useless if the point is the same - that is if an
identity relation between objects is being posited -


5.533. The identity sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual
notation.


perhaps matters can be made clear if we just make the point that the identity sign only
signifies - syntactical equivalence

that is - when used it says one expression can be translated into another

and this is not a proposal for translation - it states the fact that - given whatever
definitions - the expressions are translatable

what this means - if accepted is that the '=' sign would not have any dynamic role to
play

and it really makes clear that we are not in using the sign asserting identity relations

the '=' is a translation sign


5.534. And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-propositions like
'a = a', 'a = b. b = c.É a =c', '(x). x = x', '($x).x = a', etc. cannot even be written down.


so yes - what we say is that the '=' is not a propositional sign - therefore not correctly
used in propositions

its correct use I argue is as a translation sign

it is a sign for the manipulation of propositional expression

it is therefore outside of propositional logic


5.535. This also disposes of all the problems that were connected with such pseudo-
propositions.

All the problems that Russell's 'axiom of infinity' brings with it can be solved at this
point.

What the axiom of infinity is intended to say would express itself in language through
the existence of infinitely many names with different meanings.


yes it is correct to identify propositions that contain an objective identity sign ('=') as
pseudo

Russell's axiom of infinity is the argument that there is a set with infinitely many
individuals as members

this proposal depends on the definition of set

if a set is that which contains a plurality of members - and there cannot be a set of one
member only - you avoid the problem of the set of infinite sets

for such a concept renders set theory useless

the same is true of the null set

to propose such is to indulge in a theoretical excess that renders the notion of set as
pointless

at the same time is it not necessary within set theory to allow for a set of sets?

here sets are regarded as members

if so one could argue that we cannot properly distinguish sets and members of sets

and as a result the idea of the set is rendered valueless

set theory does avoid the issue of identity ('=') - with an argument of inclusion

what needs to be realized is that inclusion only works if it is understood that it -
inclusion cannot be included in the argument

which amounts to saying in mathematics you cannot have a complete theory

you can only operate with a hierarchy of theories -

which I think was the idea of Russell's theory of types


5.5351. There are certain cases in which one is tempted to use expressions of the form
'a = a' or 'p É p' and the like. In fact this happens when one wants to talk about
prototypes, e.g. about proposition, thing, etc. Thus in Russell's Principles of
Mathematics 'p is a proposition' which is nonsense - was given the symbolic meaning
'p É p' and placed in an hypothesis in front of certain propositions in order to exclude
from their argument-places everything but propositions.

(It is nonsense to place the hypothesis 'p É p' in front of a proposition, in order to
ensure that its arguments shall have the right form, if only because with a non-
proposition as argument the hypothesis becomes not false but nonsensical, and
because arguments of the wrong kind make the proposition itself nonsensical, so that
it preserves itself from wrong arguments just as well, or as badly, as the hypothesis
without sense that was appended for that purpose.)


' 'p' represents a proposition in what follows' -

is a meta statement - a definition of how signs are to be used - what they signify

it is best if such statements - meta statements are not put in symbolic form -

at the very least it confuses

and if as Wittgenstein says in the Principles of Mathematics Russell does give his sign
definition in symbolic terms - then at the very least - we don't know what that
expression is to mean - it just appears

however the point is that 'p É p' signifies a relation between propositions - it doesn't
tell us that 'p' is to represent propositions

what we have here - surprisingly from Russell is a confusion of types

the more interesting question - and this might be at the core of Russell's idea is just
what status we are to give the statement 'p is a proposition'?

is this statement to be regarded as a proposition -

the answer is yes -

but for it to be 'yes' - we have to recognize we are talking about a different theory of
proposition to that of Wittgenstein

'p is a proposition' is a proposition that defines the logical sign of a proposition

it is a meta proposition

look the fact is you cannot just begin with symbolic logic -

there has to be translation rules

'p is a proposition' is one such rule

what Wittgenstein wants to avoid is a hierarchy of languages

his whole effort is to establish one sparse pristine language as the basis of all

the dream is philosophically naive

(it is the naiveté that is essential to genuine philosophical inquiry)

the - dare I say - 'bottom line' is that there is no language that is self justifying

no philosopher's stone here

yes we have to accept the logic of infinity here

just a fancy name for the lack of intellectual foundation

an important matter to understand

it is not a tragedy - it is the nature and origin of freedom

so why not despair that like Zeno we cannot move?

the thing is we do move despite the lack of logical foundation

and indeed I would argue - it is the deep reason for why we do move

action does not depend on a ground for consciousness


5.5352. In the same way people have wanted to express, 'There are no things', by
writing '~($x).x = x'. But even if this were a proposition, would it not be equally true
if in fact 'there were things', but they were not identical with themselves?


what counts as a thing?

- that which exists

if there are no things that exist - then there are no propositions - or whatever else you
want to call them - 'statements asserting' perhaps -

so yes the assertion - or that particular assertion is ridiculous - if only because if it is
true then it - the assertion does not exist - cannot exist -

the only other way to go is to put it like this:

'"x ($x É ~$x)'

and this is to assert a contradiction

or we can say a proposition is not a thing - rather that which asserts the existence of a
thing

on this view - if there are no things - there cannot be any propositions asserting the
fact

it seems to me the issue of identity is irrelevant to this matter

that is - whether a thing is identical to itself or not has nothing to do with whether it
exists or not

and I just make the point again that the notion of identity makes no sense

the idea of thing being identical with itself - is really just a fall back position once you
realize no thing is identical with another

what then of identity?

perhaps we can make sense of it by speaking of 'self-identity'?

but the problem with this is that identity - if it is to have any sense is identity between
unique entities - that is it is a relation between

there can be no sense in the idea of a thing being in a relation with itself

there is no relation

there is no relation between

there is no between - in the case of a unique entity

what all this points to is that propositional signs can only make sense if they reflect
reality - any use that attempts to show that reality is non-existent - is an invalid use of
propositional logic

(this is not to say of course that it is invalid to assert that particular entities do not
exist - rather that any wholesale rejection of reality is without sense)

logic is reflected in the proposition

the proposition itself - propositional logic - is not based on propositional logic

it is not self-justifying

propositional language reflects

the basis of propositional logic is outside of propositional logic

relative to propositional logic - its basis is meta logic

here we are dealing with pre-propositional logic

what we can say is that logic - however we characterize it is reflected in - whatever
forms are being presented

and I would suggest that pure logic cannot be stated outside of the forms it is
represented in

this is really to suggest that logic -

is really a given

the given before the given of presentation

we are that is faced with it in every experience

and how to characterize this?

it will depend on other considerations

but we can say that in general any characterization will point to the reality of assertion
and denial

(the ancient Greeks used the notion of opposites as the universal characterization)

and embedded in this is the law of the excluded middle

and even deeper - the law of non-contradiction

my point though is that whatever characterization is used

the truth of logic is finally what is given

and as to its origin - its source - this is not a matter we can know

we can of course speculate and create around the fact of it

and this is indeed a fruitful enterprise

but is ultimately characterized by freedom

that is the absence of finality

this fact allows for the expression of the manifestation of this 'given' in such forms as
propositional logic


5.54. In the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only
as bases of truth-operations.


complex propositions can contain other propositions - other complex propositions
as stated propositions

of course analysis will always reveal other proposals that give or can give sense to the
propositions displayed

internal analysis of what is presented can reveal the world

in practice we do not proceed to totality - not that in fact the limit is ever reached -
however much can be discovered if you look and look with specific purposes in mind

in fact such a venture may reveal other purposes

there has to be a point - no matter how artistic one's temperament - when you need to
stop

you stop not because you come up against some logical wall

but rather the day is coming to an end and a neat black Jack (on ice) comes to mind


p.s.


the question of the foundation of thought - the foundation of logic

is not settled by thought

thought is not its own foundation

the issue of foundation is settled by non-thought

it is settled by action

action is the foundation of a thought process

that is the decision to stop analysis and proceed

action is without foundation

action does not require foundation


5.541. At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in
another in a different way.

Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes p is
the case' and 'A has the thought p', etc.

For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some
kind of relation to an object A.

(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have
actually been construed in this way.)


a proposition standing in a relation to an object -

the relation is the question here

the link between a proposition and an object

how is this set up?

well we as it were translate the object into a proposition

that is represent the object propositionally

and then the matter is straightforward

but in a general sense - the proposition in common use is 'placed against an object or
state of affairs'

what this amounts to is that a relation has been asserted

though the assertion of the relation is rarely made explicit

this happens in propositional analysis

and is the point in a way of propositional analysis

'A believes p' - is a proposition within a proposition

'A has the thought p' - is a proposition correlating objects - or - depending on your
ontology - correlating mental states

('A has the thought p' is in logical terms rather primitive)

we can give complete propositional analyses of these statements - but it requires some
sophistication

this is the only issue


5.542. It is clear, however that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A has the
thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a
correlation of a fact with an object, but rather a correlation of facts by means of the
correlation of their objects.


'"p" says p' - that is the proposition 'asserts' a proposition -

'A believes that p' etc. - asserts that the proposition 'p' is held

it asserts a fact about the proposition - that it is believed

'p' here is a proposition 'encased' in a proposition

'A believes that p' is a proposition asserting a proposition about a proposition
'that p is 'held' '

correct it does not assert a correlation of a fact with an object

unless we regard - and why not - the proposition held - as object?


5.5421. This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. as it is
conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.

Indeed a composite soul could no longer be a soul.


'A believes that p' is on my analysis a proposition that contains a proposition

what this reflects is internality

you can if you like use this as a metaphor for consciousness 'in' the world

the world 'containing' consciousness - as all this suits me fine

but it is only a metaphor

and my argument is that consciousness is contained in the world - is in fact the 'inside'
of the world

however in saying this I am not arguing that consciousness is simple entity or a
complex entity

my view in fact is that we cannot say what it is

and I would advance this view against Wittgenstein's strange view that the soul - the
subject - consciousness - which he is arguing does not exist - must be a simple - non-
complex entity -

an each way bet I guess


5.5422. The correct explanation of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must
show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense.

(Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)


the correct explanation of the proposition 'p' must show that 'p' makes sense

judgement is a question of place

of placing the proposition

a sensible judgement shows that the proposition can be placed in the place (the meta
place) chosen

that is to say a sensible judgement does not place a proposition regarding e.g. musical
theory - in the context of - let us say geological theory

whether the proposition proves to be useful in its appropriate context is another
question

that is the question of its truth value

a piece of nonsense -

would be statement that masquerades as a genuine proposition and is placed in the
wrong context to boot

such a proposition would not necessarily be rendered valueless

again it becomes a question of placement

in a nonsense rhyme it may give delight

that is the invalid 'proposition' and its incorrect original proposition

are placed in another context - replaced

and this context - let us say the context of the absurd - is a context that gives the
'proposition' sense

this replacing is a judgement that results in sense


5.5423. To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to
one another in such a way.

This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure


as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.

(If I look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then the
a's appear to be in front, and via versa).


what this illustrates is the indeterminateness of form

the fact that an apparently defined state of affairs is open to perspective

and if we were to ask what is the true analysis of the form?

we have to say - well if there is such - it is unknown

the form structures possibilities - that is all


5.55. We now have to answer a priori the question about all possible forms of
elementary propositions.

Elementary propositions consists of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the
number of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition
of elementary propositions


the question of meaning is not an a priori matter -

therefore it cannot be settled a priori

to say elementary propositions consist of names - is an a priori argument

I would have thought the question of composition is settled by such a claim

and that the issue of meaning is an issue of practice - of utility


5.551. Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decided by logic
at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado.

(And if we get into a position where we have to look at the world for an answer to
such a problem, that shows that we are on a completely wrong track.


a priori is what?

knowledge given prior to experience

consciousness reflects on consciousness and its relation to the world

this kind of reflection can reveal the limits of (conscious) knowledge

that is what is possible and what is not

it is not as if we work both sides of the fence

it is rather that in logic we define useful and useless conjunctions

a useful conjunction asserts and does not in its assertion deny itself

a useless assertion does

it's a question of whether you indeed have a tool or not to take to experience

a contradiction is not open to experience - it closes off experience

we therefore adopt the rule that a contraction is useless

we can recognize a contradiction in purely formal terms

it does not - in fact cannot - depend on experience

an a priori proposition thus asserts the possibility of experience

and so when all goes as it should the a priori is not to be seen

it only appears on the question of possibility

and in normal circumstances that is a slam dunk


5.552. The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something
or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however is not an
experience.

Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so.

It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?'


'...but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.'

yes - but it is not really that something is - but that something can be

'something' of course seems to presuppose what 'can be' or in Wittgenstein's terms 'is'

let us say any assertion presupposes the world

and this is really just a condition of assertion - but one need not get too excited here -
we are just making the point that an assertion is of and in the world

(and for it to go forward to get off the ground it cannot block itself by denying itself or
what amounts to the same thing - it's ground - the world)

logic prior to experience?

well I think I would prefer to say logic is embedded in experience

logic is the assertion of the possibility of experience

the assertion only has any sense if seen as inside experience

the idea of 'prior to' is really just a trick of reflection

the reflection is of the object reflected - and yet we can view it as apart from

this is what happens with the a priori - we step back - more for organizational
purposes than anything else

so perhaps there is reason to drop the term 'a priori' altogether

and instead think of the principles in experience that articulate its possibility


5.5521. And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in this
way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a
logic given that there is a world?


the world is not experience

the world is not logic

the world is revealed in experience

the world is revealed in logic

experience is the world represented

logic is the world represented

the unity of experience and logic is the known world

experience and logic are related to each other in terms of depth

experience is the surface of the known world

logic its heart


5.553. Russell said there were simple relations between different numbers of things
(individuals). But between what numbers? And how is this supposed to be decided? -
By experience.

(There is no pre-eminent number.)


there is no pre-eminence per se

nothing is distinguished unless we distinguish it

and any metaphysical theory or world view will have its favorites

clearly in different mathematical theories and traditions different numbers may be
given different status - and this will be determined by the goal or function of the
theory

if by different numbers of things is meant different classes of things - then there are
simple relations obtaining if the different classes are placed in relation to each other

so too with things - things are related by act -

the act of placement

i.e 'a' may be included in X and not in Y - thus what defines X in relation to Y is 'a' -

where it is placed

if 'a' is a member of both X and Y - there is no distinction - there is only one class -
that which 'a' is a member of

'experience' or utility - action - in short - will determine membership -

however the concept of membership is given in logic

we can say experience has no form without logic

and logic no content without experience

logic and experience define reality and enable us to work with it

they are concepts of utility - meta concepts

without these concepts it is not that reality is unknown (it always remains so) it is
rather that it is unworkable - non-negotiable

human consciousness in the world brings these categories - logic and experience to
reality

the logic of experience is the human world


5.554. It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form.


yes it would be completely arbitrary

and the reason is we straight out face the unknown

any form given is relative to this knowledge base - arbitrary

the arbitrariness is mitigated - and in fact disappears in the face of necessity

the necessity to act -

requires the decision to determine in a manner that defies arbitrariness

of course it never does

and here lies the truth of acting


5.5541. It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the question whether I can get
into a position in which I need the sign for a 27-termed relation in order to signify
something.


we cannot answer this question

for as stated it leaves the experience (the situation) as an unknown

you cannot know what you would do in an unknown situation

(in such a circumstance you could very well whistle Dixie as use a 27 termed relation)

the question makes no sense

it is asking can I know a priori what I would do in an unknown circumstance

one could not give an answer a posteriori to such a question

is it possible to get into a situation?

yes

that is the best we can say here

if you wish to speculate on what you might do in a situation you have to have
something in mind

that is you have to have before you a description of a possible state of affairs

then you can hypothesize responses

to talk of a response to an unknown situation is ridiculous

it is a case of the grin without the Cheshire cat

a consequent without an antecedent

bad logic though inspired fantasy


5.5542. But is it really legitimate to ask such a question? Can we set up a form of a
sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to it?

Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can be the case?


it is possible to have a sign for the unknown - but this does not alter the argument
above - as in such a case we do know what it corresponds to

does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something is the case?

it is not that such a postulation does not make sense - the question is in what context
does it make sense?

clearly such a postulation has no value for dealing with what is - for in this case we do
not know what is - and therefore nothing follows

however such a postulation is indeed a principle of imaginative fiction - and so it's
appropriate use is imaginative

this point bears only on the question of sense - just what is to count as sensible?

does the imagination have a place in Wittgenstein's world?


5.555. Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite apart from their
logical forms.

But when there is a system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is
important for logic and not the individual symbols.

And anyway, is it really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I
can invent? What I have to deal with is that which makes it possible for me to invent
them.


'a concept of elementary propositions' is a form - a form in which other forms will be
found - can be generated

the distinction between symbol and system can only be an organizational distinction

a system has no content without symbol

a symbol has no value without system

one is the expression of the other

that which makes it possible to invent forms -

this is not the issue

it is rather what is invented

the ground of forms

what makes forms possible

is fair and square unknown

being reminded of this is for the better

makes for a healthy outlook and life

it is the origin of sense and humility


5.536. There cannot be a hierarchy of forms of elementary propositions. We can
foresee only what we ourselves can construct.


the construction of form is not an empirical matter

that is it is not a surface awareness

it is an internal exploration

the objective world is not altered one iota by formal construction

our understanding of the world is


5.5561. Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes
itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.

Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.


objects are a function of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious dimensions
of reality

objects are therefore experienced -

the limit of experience cannot be set except by fiat - arbitrarily

to suggest that the empirical world is only the world of objects is without justification

what appears in the phenomenal realm has as much reality - as much status as what
does not

what appears is not to be equated with what is experienced

the ground of appearance - though not object-like - is experienced

nothing is independent of reality

there is no sense in the notion of the totality of experience

therefore - elementary propositions - however we construe them - cannot be added up

propositions do not stand outside of experience

they are experienced

they are reflections of experience - and in this sense constructions of experience

even so they may be regarded as data - in as much as anything is data

and everything is

propositions are functions of the relation of human consciousness and its relation to
non-conscious reality

it is to be remembered that 'reality as such' has no characterization -

outside of consciousness and particularly human consciousness reality is unknown


5.5562. If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary
propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalyzed form
must know it.


what we know is that if you have a certain conception of the structure of the
proposition - and that conception involves the idea of elementary propositions then
anyone who understands that conception will understand the idea of elementary
propositions

the argument that one's theory is the only account possible and therefore everyone
must know it - is epistemological totalitarianism and the philosophical origin of
fascism


5.5563. In fact all propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand are in
perfect logical order. - That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is
not a likeness of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety.

(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)


logic as a theory of what actually happens

this suggests there is no reason at all for logic - apart from having a description of
what goes on

on such a view the truth is just what happens

and I would think it follows that no theory of truth can really be formulated

for any such theory is in the mix and therefore cannot account for itself - there is no
stepping out of reality

therefore no so called universal account is possible

what we can do is describe - if required - what we do -

and recognize that any description is as ephemeral as our actions

the idea that we can determine the truth in its entirety is logically ridiculous

unfortunately though it is not innocent or without consequence

such a view is a description of the logical origin of insanity

it is pathological


5.557. The application of logic describes what elementary propositions there are.

What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.

It is clear that logic must not clash with it application.

But logic has to be in contact with its application.

Therefore logic and its application must not overlap.


the application of logic is an empirical event

logic is applied to a state of affairs

logic cannot clash with anything -

logic is its application

logic and its application cannot overlap


5.5571. If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are, then the
attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense.


of course the whole concept is up the creek

we cannot say independently of experience anything about experience

so called a priori statements are mis-named

any statement that makes any sense is a statement of experience

the propositions of logic are simply accounts of what is possible in experience

experience gives us these propositions

they come as a result of reflection on our action - on our practice

descriptions of experience i.e. 'this is red' are surface descriptions

the law of the excluded middle is an internal description

it tells us reflectively (internally) what is possible on the surface

it is a proposal for the structure of experience

experience has depth - the so called a priori indicates this

the a priori is description of experience beneath its surface

experience - human reality has an internal and external dimension

consciousness reflects this reality

the unity of the internal and external is only revealed in these dimensions

it underlies and is expressed in these dimensions

'in itself' - it is unknown


5.6. The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.


the limits of my world are the limits of human consciousness

that is the limits of my awareness

consciousness exists in the world

the concept of limit (or limitlessness) does not in fact apply to the world outside of
consciousness

consciousness imposes limits - requires limits

language is such an imposition


5.61. Logic pervades the world; the limits of the world are also its limits.

So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and
this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of
the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so we cannot say what we cannot say either.


(a)


the non-conscious world (that is here - the non-human world) would be just as it is
without logic

logic is just a theoretical construction of consciousness

consciousness pervades the human world - the limits of the human world are the
limits of consciousness

human consciousness is in the world - that is in the non-conscious world

consciousness is the internal dimension of this world - the non-conscious the external
dimension

we can only see what we see from the inside - there is no outside view

limits are a construction of consciousness

consciousness requires the idea of limits to function in the world

our world - as such - cannot be objectively viewed - that is from the outside

there is no such view - no such place to view from

all limits are rightly placed inside - all limits are internal

that is any idea of the limits of the world is a construction of consciousness

the limits of consciousness are the limits of function

logic describes these limits

logic is the description of the domain of possible function


(b)


logical knowledge is not surface empirical knowledge

it does not describe what exists in the external world

what exists in the external world exists or does not exist independently of logic

logic describes how we can think about the world

in this sense it is about the world

that is it is an empirical inquiry - but one that is internal to the empirical world

our world is two dimensional - conscious and non-conscious - internal and external

what is thought and what is thought about

for human beings there is only the experienced world

experience is unified

experience is two-dimensional -

we only know the unity through its dimensions

the internal and the external

logic defines how we can think about the outside world

that is it is a theory of unity - of the unity

logic prescribes a domain of reason for consciousness

this domain is the ground of human function

it prescribes the limits of human function within human existence


p.s.


a theory of logic is quite unnecessary really

we can't do what we can't do

and that is the essence of logic

and

we do what we do

therefore

whatever we do is logical

the activity of logic is intellectual delight

delight is its only content

it is simply a pleasure - but most exquisite


(c)


we cannot think what we cannot think

we cannot say what we cannot say

and

we cannot do what we cannot do

that's it

that is all there is to logic

logic therefore is simply the statement of the obvious

the obvious of human experience

it does not state limits

but it recognizes them

a new born child can do this


5.62. This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in
solipsism.

For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself
manifest.

The world is my world; this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that
language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world.


(a)


manifest to whom?

the solipsist makes himself manifest to himself?

good argument

consciousness does manifest itself

it manifests outside of itself

if there is manifestation of the self - a non-self exists

the self as experienced - is experienced

it is not made manifest in itself

consciousness manifests itself in the reality outside of itself

without a reality outside of consciousness there can be no self-consciousness

self - is defined by what it is not

that is by the non-conscious reality

so the paradox of solipsism is that without a non-self it cannot even be formulated

it's garbage -

sad really - for it is clear that it is a theory designed to defend against the world

the impact of the world

it is the source of psychological denial - the philosophical basis of withdrawal


(b)


we can ask though what is the function of such an argument?

if I am right about its psychological status - the argument for withdrawal

we can ask is it just a mis-application of the '~' sign -

that is a mis-application of negation -

that is the application of negation - outside of the logical / propositional context?

also

we might suggest that solipsism is really the origin of the concept of denial

that is - the idea out of which negation emerges


(c)


the world is the world

I exist in the world

'my world' is really just my existence and experience in the world


(d)


my use of language is the best we can do here

it is possible that my use of language may only be understood - by me

that is it is possible that when I speak I have a different understanding of what I say to
the understanding that those who hear my words have of my words

(any married man will know what I am talking about here)

so it may be that no one knows what anyone else is talking about

nevertheless language functions

its function is not understanding

its function is use

and use - a public matter

I can know how something is used without having access to the understanding of the
user

that is all that matters

and that is the point of language - its utility - what it enables us to do

knowledge is really an after thought - a luxury - an irrelevance

a maybe it is and a maybe it aint

at the heart of all so called knowledge is uncertainty


5.621. The world and life are one.


the unknown and life are one


5.63. I am my world. (The microcosm)


I am aware of the world

and aware of my awareness



5.631. There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

If I were to write a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a
report of my body, and should have to say which parts are subordinate to my will, and
which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing
that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in
that book.-


true The World as I found it - if this prescription was followed to the letter - only that
which is outside of the self would be mentioned

and if Wittgenstein was being very strict (and really how else can you imagine him) he
could not coherently claim ownership of such a work

and furthermore

would not be able to recognize it

Wittgenstein it seems has no concept of the inner life

he regards only what is outside of himself as real

very Platonic really - perhaps even more Platonic than Plato

he is right in this respect - there is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains
ideas in the world of objects - the surface world

that is correct

however it is a great mistake to think that the surface world contains all that there is

to deny consciousness - self-consciousness - is a self-contradiction

and a failure to understand that the world has an inside


5.632. The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is the limit of the world.


again Wittgenstein's lopsided view of reality - his view that the world is surface - that
there is only an externality and no internality

if he had said the self does not belong to the surface of the world he would be correct

the idea of limit is an action of consciousness - it is ideal

if the self does not belong to the world we cannot speak of it or of the idea of limit (or
limitlessness)

what is clear also is that consciousness is in the world

and this dimension I argue is not co-extensive with the objective surface of the world

consciousness exists as a point

individual consciousnesses exist as points in the world

the idea of limit is a construction of consciousness necessary for it's relation to the
outside world

the external world is neither limited or limitless

it does not have ideal properties

so let's speak of dimensions of the world - and the world as such as the unknown


5.633 Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be found?

You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really
you do not see the eye.

And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.


it is in the world that the metaphysical subject is to be found

it is not to be found on the surface of the world

that is the whole point

the eye is a feature of the surface of the world

the visual field is a function of the surface of the world

the eye can see itself in reflection

a surface reflection

consciousness is the inside of the world

the internal dimension of the world

consciousness is aware of itself

as being in the world

awareness is reflective

which is to say awareness is aware of awareness

in this respect all awareness is essentially the same

your awareness - my awareness

what distinguishes one point of awareness from another is its place in space and time

that is all


5.6331. For the form of the visual field is surely not like this



the argument here is that the eye is not included in the visual field

strangely enough Wittgenstein doesn't seem to understand mirrors


5.6344. This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same
time a priori.

Whatever we see could be other than it is.

Whatever we could describe at all could be other than is.

There is no a priori order of things


there is an order of things prior to experience

knowledge of this is not prior to experience

knowledge of this is experience

experience reveals the necessity of conditions prior to experience

having experienced we know experience depends on conditions that are not
experienced

these conditions - conditions of experience - are the ground of experience

the ground of experience is what is not revealed in experience

it is the unknown at the heart of every experience

the unknown that is necessary for any experience


5.64. Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without
extension, and then remains the reality co-ordinated with it.


while experience is had - it is also given

solipsism confuses the gift with the possession

the possession as possessed is known

the gift as given is not known

experience is only possible given consciousness

consciousness is the ground of experience

the world as given (pure realism) is only given in consciousness

that is it is the internal reflection of the external reality

the self is inside the external world

there can be no self unless there is a non-self

the external world - the world of the surface

is the non-self - the non-conscious reality

thus the self is best understood as the condition for experience

the ground of experience

it is the unrevealed (as in non-external) dimension of experience

consciousness exits in extension

it is thus intension -

that which is inside extended reality -

and thus that which is the inside of extension

the inside co-ordinates with the outside

points of consciousness reflect the world outside

the outside world reflected - is reflected in a point of consciousness

the reality beyond such a reflection is unknown


5.641. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the
world - not part of it


my consciousness is the internality of my world

it is an internality (among the countless) of the world

the world that contains consciousness

the world that contains consciousnesses

consciousness only has existence in the world


04/07/07
Tractatus 6


6. The general form of a truth function is


This is the general form of a proposition.


truth functional analysis is a particular analysis and use of a proposition - that's all

the form of a proposition is determined by its event

we cannot determine prior to use the form a proposition

what we can say is that the proposition is a proposal

but what this amounts to formally is to be found out in practice

the general form of the proposition is unknown

if we are to go further - deeper and ask what is a proposal?

we can say in general it is an act


6.001. What this says is just that every proposition is a result of the successive
applications to elementary propositions of the operation .


yes - if your theory of the proposition is that it is a structure based on elementary
propositions - that is the proposition is either an elementary proposition or the
conjunction /disjunction of elementary propositions - 'propositional strings' is my term
- then you can say that structurally speaking the operation that enables such a
construction is the successive application of the negation of all values of the
propositional variable x - as laid out in 5.51. - 'If x has only one value, then = -p
(not p); if it has two values, then = -p. -q (neither p nor q)'.

so what we are talking about here is a kind of proposition - and its logic - its structure
outlined -

we have here at least a type of proposition and propositional analysis

to suggest it is the only account of that proposition - that it displays the logic of all
propositional action is at the very least ambitious


6.002. If we are given the general form according to which propositions are
constructed, then with it we are also given the general form according to which one
proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation.


yes if the form of the proposition is fixed in a sense all variables are therefore
controlled

and so from the template of such a form all propositional possibilities can be
generated

and indeed at some point in this kind of inquiry in practice decisions are made as to
how to proceed

that is it is the way of it to take a view of the general form

certainly within the tradition that Wittgenstein operates in

and it makes perfect sense given the tasks he is attempting to complete

this is meta pragmatics

it is possible just because there is no general form to propositions

that is there is no form existing independently of practice

epistemologically we cannot pre-determine practice

therefore we cannot pre-determine form

but for issues of practice - of proceeding - it is necessary to assume that such is
possible

and what we have from Wittgenstein is one such theory worked out in detail

it is just that the claims he makes for this tool - for the 'substance' of it - the 'origin' of
it are fanciful

it is to claim that what we do can be determined a priori

the a priori dimension of knowledge is only ever an after thought - never a fore
thought


6.01. Therefore the general form of an operation W'(ñ) is

This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.


any operation on any set of propositions is the negation of that set

the transition from one proposition to another is an operation

an operation is a negation

a proposition asserts - an operation alters the proposition

any alteration involves negation - for without negation there is no change in the
assertion

OK but is this an account of the form of the operation?

indeed every operation alters that which it acts upon

this is only to say the operation effects

and this is all there is to say of the nature of an operation

that it is - in whatever context - an act upon

if so it seems it has no particular form

the operation is formless - it is simply pure act


6.02. And this is how we arrive at numbers. I give the following definitions

x = W°' xDef.,
W' Wn 'x = Wn+1 'x Def..

So in accordance with these rules, which deal with signs, we write the series

x, W' x, W' W' x, W' W' W' x, ...,

in the following way

W°' x, W°+¹'x, W°+¹+¹'x, W°+¹+¹+¹'x, .....

Therefore, instead of '[x,x,W'x]',

I write [W°' x,'Wn 'x, Wn+¹'x]'.

And I give the following definitions

0+1 = 1 Def.,
0+1+1 = 2 Def.,
0+1+1+1 = 3 Def.,
(and so on).


the idea of an operation involves the concept of a series

a single operation can be performed that is not part of a series

however that is really just a decision to negate the series

and that negation can be undone

so the idea of series underlies that of operation

given a series in which operations are performed

the performance will always be successive

therefore it is operations on operations etc.

the marking of this activity is number theory

that is the signs (integers) are signs of successive operations within a series

operations on integers (constants) signify essential or basic - repeatable operations

what we are doing in mathematics is signifying and marking actions in a proposed
series

definitions of number simply state rules of practice

that is rules of operational signification

mathematics - operational theory - is based - is founded on succession

succession is time - the order of things

this metaphysical foundation though is not relevant to the practice of mathematics

it the ground mathematics flies above


6.021. A number is the exponent of an operation.


exactly correct

a number is just a sign for an operation in a series


6.022. The concept of number is simply what is common to all numbers, the general
form of a number.

The concept of the number is the variable number.

And the concept of numerical equality is the general form of all particular cases of
numerical equality.


(a)

this idea that 'the general form' is that which is common to all instances of number -
is just logical verbosity

metaphysical superfluousness

there is no need to postulate a form

the number is simply an operation in a series represented by a sign that signifies the
place of the operation in the series

the number is an expression of an operation

if we know this we have no need to ask what is common to numbers

it is not a relevant or useful question

all you do by answering such a question is speak about numbers in a non-functional
manner - and what is the point of that?

this general form issue is really only of interest to people with some hankering for a
mystical interpretation of number - it is Pythagoreanism

(b)

forget the concept of number

what you have is a sign of an operation - an action - in a series of (successive) actions

(c)

numerical equality is a correspondence of signs between two or more series

it is operational correspondence


6.03. The general form of the integer is [0, x, x + 1].


operations signed as numbers - that is marked as successive operations within a series
are used to indicate in any other such operation - this is a decision based on economy
and utility

the whole number - the integer - is a sign of a class of operation


6.031. The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics.

This is connected with the fact that the generality required in mathematics is not
accidental generality.


classes are not superfluous in the sense that operations need to be distinguished

the generality in mathematics is an operational generality

that is the operation performed in one series can be performed in any number of other
series

this fact is operational function

everything is 'accidental' until the decision to place it within a series

decision is the key to mathematical generality

and it is finally the decision to perform a kind of operation

the theory of classes is just the theory of operational types

there is no necessity in this nor is there any accident


6.1. The propositions of logic are tautologies.


the propositions of logic are functions

the so called tautology is a misuse of logical function

it is a senseless combination in that it has no function

the point of an operation is the end point

the end point is a decision

the success of the operation (it's truth value) is a decision to stop or proceed

we operate entirely in the unknown

knowledge is a pragmatic decision

any value it has is simply decided value

that is there is no basis at all to any operation but the operation itself

and any operation is performed within a larger operational context

the utility of which must be assumed for the particular operation to proceed


6.11. Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic
propositions.)


the propositions of logic are an operational record

they say what operations have been performed

they say what has been done


6.111. All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false.
One might think, for example, that the words 'true' and 'false' signified two properties
among other properties, and then it would seem to be a remarkable fact that every
proposition possessed one of these properties. On this theory it seems to be anything
but obvious, just as, for instance, 'All roses are either yellow or red', would not sound
obvious even if it were true. Indeed, the logical proposition acquires all characteristics
of a proposition of natural science and this is the sure sign that it has been constructed
wrongly.


the overall assumption here is that we can separate out propositions of logic from
propositions of fact

this assumption is what needs to looked at and questioned

every statement of fact can be read as a proposition of logic

in that form what is being revealed is the operations that make up the proposition

in pure logic or mathematics - yes the focus is the theory of operations

and so given that focus it is practical to simply look at the issue of function

and the statements of empirical science form the simple observational to the highly
theoretical are indeed concerned with the facts of the world

this is not to say that such statements do not have a functional dimension

just that in empirical science that is not usually the focus

the thing is what we are dealing with in regard to propositions is both dimensions

the functional and empirical

a proposition per se is both

a so called 'logical proposition' is the functional dimension of a proposition

the so called 'empirical proposition' is the substantial dimension of a proposition

that is any proposition has an operational dimension and an empirical dimension

that we might choose to look at either dimension separately is not the point


6.112. The correct explanation of the propositions of logic must assign to them a
unique status among propositions.


I think it is best to drop the terms 'proposition of logic' 'proposition of fact'

the former is really just the functional /operational dimension of a proposition

the latter its empirical dimension

and so the proposition is a proposal that has these dimensions

its truth or falsity is a misnomer too

a proposition is neither true nor false

'true' and 'false' are decisions of use

and so what do we say of truth function?

truth function is the combining of elementary propositions

i.e. 'if p then q'

when p is true - we are saying it has utility

if 'p' is false that it has no utility

utility or its absence are the values of T or F


6.113. It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they
are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of
logic. And so too it is a very important fact that the truth or falsity of non-logical
propositions cannot be recognized from propositions alone.


the argument here is that logical propositions are tautologies - tautologies are always
true

this is a fundamental mistake

tautologies are useless propositional strings

the propositions of logic are operational propositions - that is they set out the
operations that can be performed in propositional assertion

and thus any well formed proposition will reflect an operational structure

logical propositions in this sense are projections of structural possibilities

and to the question of truth

truth as I have defined is utility

the question of truth - of utility is a response to a proposition

a proposition does not assert its utility or lack of it

truth is a decision of use

a logical proposition - or what I call the functional dimension of a proposition

is thus neither true nor false

a logical proposition is a description of the structure of a proposition

a structure determined by the operations that make it up

there is no question of truth or falsity at this level

a representation of an operation or operational possibilities is just a description of
operations performed or performable

it is a naturalistic account


6.12. The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal - logical
properties of language and the world.

The fact that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its
constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.

If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they
must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined
in this way shows that they posses these structural properties.


Wittgenstein here confuses the operational and substantial dimensions of the
proposition - and as far as I can tell so has everyone since at least Liebnitz

so called tautological truth cannot be explained in the same way as the substantial
assertion of a proposition

but all we are doing in laying out the logic of a proposition is showing the operations
performed that underlie the substantial dimension

and of course if you want to maintain the same standard in relation to the operational
dimension of a proposition as with the substantial dimension - yes you are left with an
absence of substance in logical propositions - and the resolution of tautology - a truth
with no substance

what I have argued above is that the tautology is not what it has been made out to be

a tautology is not a well formed proposition

a tautology is not a proposition

a tautology is a useless propositional string

that is not made less useless by giving it the status of a 'true'

which I hate to say has nothing to do with the proposition anyway

truth is matter of propositional response - propositional behaviour

what Wittgenstein calls truth function - if it is to have any use must be understood as
possibilities of propositional behaviour

the properties of language and the world -

in the first instance language is a response of consciousness to it's relation to that
which is outside of itself

in the second instance language can be a response to consciousness' relation to itself

language is in the world - that which is outside of consciousness is in the world

'the world' is just a description of all logical domains

so there is no relation between language and the world

or the non-conscious and the world

'the world' if you will - shows itself in language - shows itself in the object of
language

the world shows itself - everywhere

this is really to say Wittgenstein's idea of logical form is a metaphysical mis-casting

a deep confusion


6.1201. For example, the fact that the propositions 'p' and '~p' in the combination
'~(p. ~p)' yield a tautology shows that they contradict one another. The fact that the
propositions 'p É q', 'p' and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p É q) .(p): É
(q)', yield a tautology shows that q follows from p and p É q. The fact that '(x). fx: É
: fa' is a tautology shows that fa follows from (x).fx. Etc. etc. -


a tautology is so constructed that it amounts to leaving the assertion as it is

that is the apparent operation is no operation at all

a contradiction is a proposition in which the apparent operation is canceled

the result - there is no proposition - nothing has been asserted


6.1202. It is clear that one could achieve the same purpose by using contradictions
instead of tautologies.


a logical proposition is the operational dimension of a proposition

that is it charts the operations performed to make the proposition

it is a purely descriptive affair - the logical proposition asserts that such and such
operations have occurred

no different in principle to any scientific description of any complex event

tautologies and contradictions are the fantasies of logicians who would like to think
they have a foundation to their symbols that is outside of propositional behaviour

there is nothing mysterious or deeply significant about constructing a 'proposition' that
asserts nothing

the whole of modern logic is based on this mistake


6.1203. In order to recognize an expression as a tautology, in cases where no
generality-sign occurs in it, one can employ the following intuitive method: instead of
'p', 'q', 'r', etc. I write 'TpF', 'TqF', 'TrF', etc. Truth combinations I express by means of
brackets, e.g.




and I use lines to express the correlation of the truth or falsity of the whole proposition
with the truth combinations of its truth-arguments, in the following way





So this sign, for instance, would represent the proposition p É q. Now, by way of
example, I wish to examine the proposition ~(p. ~p) (the law of contradiction) in order
to determine whether it is a tautology. In our notation the form '- î ' is written as





If we here substitute 'p' for 'q' and examine how the outermost T and F are connected
with the innermost ones , the result will be that the truth of the whole proposition is
correlated with all the truth values of its argument, and its falsity with none of the
truth combinations.


constructing a tautology out of a proposition is essentially a waste of time that has no
operational and hence logical significance

recognizing a tautology is recognizing a waste of time

a contradiction likewise is a construction that shuts up all operational possibilities of
an 'embedded' proposition

as a 'proposition' the contradiction is pointless -

it is the denial of propositional operation -

which is to say it negates the proposition -

the result is that there is no proposition at all

that is there is nothing to work with

the situation here is thus pre-propositional

Wittgenstein wishes to argue that the logical status of a logical proposition is that it is
a tautology

that all logical propositions are tautologous

and in this lies their guarantee - their logical foundation

in taking this line of thought Wittgenstein is mistaking substantial propositions for
operational propositions

a logical proposition reflects the operation in thought reflected in language which
results in the given proposition

for all intents and purposes the logical proposition is simply a statement of a particular
use of language

it is a reflection of the mechanics of that use

it is not a proposition in the sense of a statement that asserts what exists

it is in fact that dimension of a proposition that reflects the operations performed to
make a proposition

a workable proposition is one that can be worked on

and yes you can waste your time making tautologies and contradictions - constructing
them out of perfectly well functioning propositions - but this is just pointless fantasy

there is no truth in a tautology

there is no falsity in a contradiction

both forms are non-operational constructions

truth and falsity are operational responses to a proposition

a proposition does not determine its operational responses

the possibilities though at base are twofold

you proceed (truth) or you do not (false)

truth and falsity are thus basic behavioural responses to a proposition or to it's parts

with this approach you can still use truth functional calculation

it is best to understand logic at this level as being projective

no surprise that the tautology should figure prominently in a theory of logic that also
proposes solipsism

a tautology is a mirrored image of a proposition that can be in principle repeated
infinitely


6.121. The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by
combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing.

This method could be called a zero method. In a logical proposition, propositions are
brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of the equilibrium then
indicates what the logical constitution of these propositions must be.


the great confusion here is between the functional and substantial dimensions of a
proposition

logical propositions are functional

so it is not the case that they say nothing

(does anyone seriously put forward this view of logic?

yes - and it shows just how ridiculous philosophers can be)

what logical propositions say is what we do in the construction of a proposition

that is they display the operations performed in the propositions

the operations that give it its structure and formal characteristics

if you are looking for the substantial content of a logical proposition -

you will of course find nothing

but this is just to say you are looking at the logical proposition in the wrong way

the substantive claims of a proposition are only possible given the operations that
underlie - that provide the formal setting for substance

the 'zero- method' Wittgenstein identifies is the method you apply when you have a
zero conception of the nature of logic

this is really scandalous

it is the height of philosophical deception

it is more than this - it is perverse

at the base of it is some sick notion that only what appears on the surface of the world
is what is real

it is quite unbelievable that philosophers should peddle such garbage


6.122. It follows from this that we can actually do without logical propositions; for in
a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties of propositions by
mere inspection of the propositions themselves.


yes - this is so

and further we can probably do without propositions per se

the fact of it is though that we don't because they are such useful tools

these 'formal properties' of propositions are in fact actions performed

you can depict these actions - that is the logical proposition -

or if you are not interested in the operations that create a propositional structure -
don't worry about it

the propositions is dimensional

in an ultimate sense it is unknown

in practice we identify a logical dimension and a substantive dimension


6.1221. If, for example, two propositions 'p' and 'q' in the combination 'p É q' yield a
tautology, then it is clear that q follows from p.

For example, we see from the two propositions themselves that 'q' follows from 'p É
q. p', but it is also possible to show it in this way: we combine them to form 'p É q. p:
É :q', and then show that this is a tautology.


if 'p then q' represents the inferential operation of material implication

it is an action

this operation is not tautologous - that is it is not superfluous

any logical operation can be constructed as a tautology

and this is just to reassert the proposition and mistakenly believe that the reassertion
guarantees the truth of the original

it is really no more than this

quite facile

what it hinges on is that the assertion and the re-assertion of a proposition have a
significant even special relation to each other

it is all done with mirrors


6.1222. This throws some light on the question why logical propositions cannot be
confirmed by experience any more than they can be refuted by it. Not only must a
proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible experience, but it must be
unconfirmable by any possible experience.


logical operations set up a proposition

these operations can be represented in logical propositions

these 'propositions ' are the operational dimension of a proposition proper

they are just a record of actions performed to set up the proposition

there is no question of confirmation or refutation of experience in this

the experience is the external dimension of the proposition

the logical operations - its internal dimension

together they make a proposition - its function and its substance

the structure of a proposition should not be confused with its appearance

just as the frame of a house is not the appearance of the house


6.1222. Now it becomes clear why people have often felt as if it were for us to
'postulate' the 'truths of logic'. The reason is that we can postulate them in so far as we
can postulate an adequate notation.


notation is a function of operation

logical operation is primitive operation

primitive operation and its variation

the primitive operation of consciousness is negation

negation is the sign of operation

all logical operation are expressions of negation

e.g. quantification can only occur given the idea of restriction or its absence

all inference is an operation of inclusion and exclusion

the essential operation of consciousness is discrimination

we generalize this function in logic

the general characterization is negation

the notion of negation covers all forms of differentiation

any postulates of logic will reflect the operation of negation

negation is not a truth of reason

it is a fact of nature

it is the general characterization of consciousness operating

you could argue therefore that any operation of consciousness is an act of reason and
an act of nature


6.1224. It also becomes clear now why logic was called the theory of forms and of
inference.


logic is more aptly termed - the theory of operations

possible operations is the subject of logical inquiry

and the basic platform of the theory of operations is the identity of indiscernibles

this is the pre-operational position

operation begins from here and is an act of discernibility

discernibility is a function of negation

or negation is the general sign of discernibility


6.123. Clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to the laws of logic.

there is not as Russell thought, a special law of contradiction for each 'type'; one law
is enough, since it is not applied to itself.


primitive operation is just that - however one characterizes it

any theory of primitive operation is simply a description of the basic operation

what we are describing - however we describe - is the operation of consciousness in
relation to non-consciousness

the dialectic - the relation of assertion and denial is the given

is the ground of consciousness

it is the action of discrimination

it is simply a fact of nature

given the existence of consciousness

itself a fact of nature

and so we are not talking of laws of logic

rather description of primitive operation

it makes no sense to ask does an operation apply to itself?

justification is not a problem of logic


6.1231. The mark of a logical proposition is not general validity.

To be general means no more than to be accidentally valid for things. An
ungeneralized proposition can be tautological just as well as a generalized one.


validity is a feature of argument

in so far as a proposition is an argument we can ask the question - is it valid?

validity is just a presentation

an arrangement of premises

it is nonetheless an operation

and as such an organization of what is to be included and what is not

how it is to be presented and how not

it is logic in the presentational mode

what Wittgenstein perhaps should have a called a picture

a very conservative one and classically drawn


6.1232. The general validity of logic might be called essential, in contrast with the
accidental general validity of such propositions as 'All men are mortal'. Propositions
like Russell's 'axiom of reducibility' are not logical propositions, and this explains our
feeling that, even if they were true, their truth could only be the result of a fortunate
accident.


validity is an argument - a presentation that reflects logic

validity is a product of logic

logic itself is not valid or invalid

logic is the operations that underlie human activity

that 'all x are y' is a template that can be applied

what it represents is a logical operation

that operation is an operation of consciousness

it is just a fact that consciousness performs this operation

in itself it has no special status

it is of a kind with the behaviour of any natural phenomenon

consciousness does perform this operation

it applies it to the empirical dimension

whether the application is correct or not

is just a matter of decision

simple as that

axioms are operational rules

an axiom of reducibility has a logical component

as indeed any action does

whether you wish to include it in a cannon of logical operations is neither here nor
there really

that is just a matter of defining domains

not an important matter really


6.1233. It is possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not
valid. It is clear, however, that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our
world really is like that or not.


logic is the theory of operation

and really there is not that much to the theory

we assert and deny -

these are the basic operations

all operations are expressions of this form

so

questions of content or substance are not the domain of logic

of operation

this is not to say they are not in the picture

for an operation to occur

something has to be operated on

yes

this though is not a question of logic

however the world is

so long as it is a world that has a place for operation

logic - or the theory of logic - proceeds

this does mean of course that for logic to have any sense or value

the assumption is that the world is operational

is this a metaphysical principle underlying logic?

yes and no

if you can't operate - perform operations -

if you can't act

then that is that

and I mean this in a metaphysical sense

in such a world the question of logic would not arise

and for that matter no question would

such a world - might I be so bold as to suggest

is world without consciousness

not recognizable to us

therefore of no import


6.124. The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they
represent it. They have no 'subject-matter'. They presuppose that names have meaning
and elementary propositions have sense; and that is their connection with the world. It
is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain
combinations of symbols - whose essence involves the possession of a determinate
character - are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some
things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. In logic it
is only the latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we
express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the
absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-
language, then we have already been given all the propositions of logic.


logic does not describe the scaffolding of the world or represent it

the propositions of logic describe the operations of consciousness or represent them

it is true they have no subject matter in one sense - nevertheless they express the
possibility of action

from a logical point of view - that is an operational point of view - names are
operational points

they have - from a logical point of view no substance or meaning - they are simply
logical points in a field of operation

that is one name can be substituted for another - for any other - the operation is not
affected

logic has nothing to do with substance - though it does presuppose it

the connection of elementary propositions to the world is another matter altogether - it
is not a question of logic

the tautology is logical hot air

tautologies indicate irrelevant - badly formed (structured) propositions

logic has nothing to do with truth

truth does not reveal itself to itself - this is the kind of bad thinking that is or ends up
as mysticism

mysticism is a retreat from the game - it is always a sign of rational defeat

the mystic though likes to take all his toys with him when he can no longer play with
the big boys

everything is arbitrary or it's not - that's logic

we have no need to involve logic in questions of freedom and necessity

it is not relevant

our symbols emerge from need - and their life is their utility

decisions we make about them are decisions on the ground

what stays what goes (that's logic again) is a question that can only be decided in the
act

logical syntax is always just an expression in one form or another of an operation

all operations are modifications of the negative

assertion and denial is the basic form of any set of operations

and thus all propositional syntax is an expression of this form

logical propositions are simply and only representations of actions performed or
performable

they are a record of moves made - under the appearance of the world


6.125 It is possible - indeed possible even according to the old conception of logic - to
give in advance a description of all 'true' logical propositions.


a true logical proposition -

a logical proposition expresses logical operations

the truth or falsity of a proposition is determined by how it is acted upon

assent signifies that the proposition is live

that is that it represents an operation or operations that can lead to further operations
- that is the proposition has utility

dissent stops it dead in its track - it is deemed not useful

the logical proposition simply displays what has or will occur

what operations have been performed or in a projective mode what it is anticipated
can occur

truth or falsity is not a characteristic of logical propositions

it is a characteristic of propositional behaviour


6.1251. Hence there can never be surprises in logic.


logic as the description of propositional operations is like any other descriptive
activity - after the fact


6.126. One can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the
logical properties of the symbol.

And this is what we do when we 'prove' a logical proposition. For, without bothering
about sense or meaning, we construct the logical proposition out of others by using
only rules that deal with signs.

The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process: we produce them
out of other logical propositions by successively applying certain operations that
always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only
tautologies follow from a tautology.)

Of course this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not at
all essential to logic, if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must
show without any proof that they are tautologies.


any proposition can be represented logically

there is no separate class of logical propositions

the signs of a logical proposition are the signs of primitive operations

there is no necessity to produce a logical proposition out of other logical propositions

any series of operations can be regarded as discrete

what is required is the syntax - the language of logical propositions

given this background any logical proposition can stand on its own

nothing follows from tautologies

tautologies are fake propositions


6.1261. In logic process and result are equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise).


the process of an operation can be seen as the result of an operation

(if you are looking for surprise - it's the bearers of propositions you need to engage
with -

facts are the ultimate surprise -

one is surprised by their ability to jolt one's way of thinking

a fact may just be spanner in one's metaphysical conception

why and how of course is beyond knowing

that's the surprise)


6.1262. Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of
tautologies in complicated cases.


it is clear that Wittgenstein's truth function theory here - rests on his argument for the
significance of the tautology

once you see through this argument

and understand that the tautology provides no basis at all for anything

that it is in fact a malformed proposition that should be disposed of - then the truth
function argument as put by Wittgenstein loses its force

we can still can use this method - on the understanding that 'T' and 'F' are responses to
propositions

that they are not - functions of proposition

yes we can still calculate - with the understanding that 'T' and 'F' are actions performed
on propositions -

the actions of assent or dissent and the their consequences - proceed or not -

however if you accept my argument the guts falls out of Wittgenstein's theory


6.1263. Indeed, it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that had sense
could be proved logically from others, and so too could a logical proposition. It is
clear from the start that a logical proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof in
logic must be two entirely different things.


for Wittgenstein a proof in logic is a tautology

the truth is that the tautology makes no sense

if you follow Wittgenstein proof is only possible given 'propositions' that make no
sense

and the fact is such 'propositions' are not propositions at all

they are deformities - harmless true - really in the category of idiocy

proof becomes on Wittgenstein's view nothing but the reassertion of a proposition

and the belief that such a reassertion has significance

when in fact all it is superfluity masquerading as a foundation

it comes from the desire to make propositions true independently of experience

it is clear to the proponents of this view that a tautology is not true or false relative to
experience

this fact is a logical cross road

either you face the fact that a tautology is without sense or significance

and that this is so because it is not a proposition

or you push on argue that there is a kind of truth that has nothing to do with anything

this is the bizarre result of thinking a senseless 'proposition' has sense


6.1264. A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its proof to
be so. In logic every proposition is the form of a proof.

Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs. (And one cannot
express modus ponens by means of a proposition.)


modus ponens is just a version of the tautology argument

A É B A
__________

B

the inference A to B

is already established in the conditional A É B

modus ponens when used correctly is just an illustration of inference

it shows that a conditional can be rendered syllogistically

it's really just an argument about possibilities of rendering

it is about logical usage -

of no great import


6.1265. It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is
its own proof.


yes - if the argument is that a proposition can be construed as a tautology and that
proof amounts to showing that a proposition is a tautology -

but seriously does anyone really think there is anything in such a proof but hot air?

a tautology just is the logic of solipsism applied to propositions

and proof only makes sense in relation to whiskey


6.127. All propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case that some of them
are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions.

Every tautology show that it is a tautology.


logical propositions represent the basic operations of consciousness - assertion and
denial and their modifications

and yes finally an operation is an operation - strictly speaking an assertive action has
no essential characteristic that distinguishes it from an action of denial -

an action is an action

context is the question - context in the broadest sense

and the relation of actions - which may just mean their sequence - what follows what -
decides what is to be assertion and what is to be denial

the truth about the tautology is just that you can understand logic very well without it

and even if you were to leave the tautology in - all you would have is a mirror image
or a duplication of what is already there

nothing is effected by the tautology

and it is the tautology I think Oakum had in mind - even if he didn't realize it


6.1271. It is clear that the number of the 'primitive propositions of logic' is arbitrary,
since one could derive logic from a single primitive proposition, e.g. by simply
constructing the logical product of Frege's primitive propositions. (Frege would
perhaps say then we should then no longer have an immediately self-evident primitive
proposition. But it is remarkable that a thinker as rigorous as Frege appealed to the
degree of self evidence as the criterion of a logical proposition.)


one's starting point and its description or representation is primitive

one's starting point is an act - an action of thought and what follows - it's expression
outside of thought

an act is never an original act -

any act is a response to - should be seen in the context of - other acts

the idea of the primitive is at best an organizing principle

at worst a belief in a first cause

in a sense all acts are self evident

in that the evidence of any act is the act itself

the idea that evidence for an act (proposition) could be outside of the act (proposition)
is a failure to see what is evident

the fact that one act or one proposition is held to be evidence for another is just not
seeing what is there

in relation to the question of evidence no act is related to another - no proposition is
related to another -

again argument is really just organization for action


6.13. Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world.

Logic is transcendental.


logic is a description of the operations of consciousness in the world

there is no mirror image of the world

logic is a description of operational function

it is a description that enables - that facilitates - certain other operations

an operational description of consciousness in the world is not the only description
possible

it is not the fundamental description

there is no fundamental description

a fundamental description would exhaust all possible description

possibility cannot be exhausted

any activity can be analyzed operationally

consciousness in the world is not just a matter of operational behaviour

logic is just an account of basic operations

transcendentalism in a Kantian sense is the fiction that necessary presuppositions to
knowledge can be established

this is really just a species of philosophical flight

flight that is from the reality of contingency

and the preposterous notion that knowledge is a non-natural phenomenon

that in some sense it stands outside contingent reality

this really comes back to not understanding the nature of consciousness

consciousness reflects

reflection is therefore a natural characteristic of consciousness

knowledge is reflection

reflection has no basis outside of the fact of consciousness in the world

logic is anything but transcendental

it is a description among many descriptions of what happens - what occurs


6.2. Mathematics is logical method.

The propositions of mathematics are equation, and therefore pseudo-propositions.


logic is the theory of operation

mathematics is a mode of operation

in so far as mathematical propositions are equations mathematics is the mode of
operation that is calculation

to calculate is to operate mathematically

calculations are genuine operations

equations are platforms for action

if x = y then x has the same utility value as y

such proposals are metaphysically false

x = x

the need to transact - a form of motion from a to b is the pragmatic basis of equation

mathematics is thus a denial of reality

a denial that is necessary if there is to be movement

if there is to be operation

action always defies reality - and in so doing - transforms it


6.21. A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought.


a proposition of mathematics expresses an operation

(the event of the proposition itself - is an operation)

the operation expressed is an operation or operations of consciousness

consciousness is thought

an operation of consciousness is a thought

a thought is an operation

an event - outside of consciousness is not an operation

i.e. an event in non-conscious nature is not an operation


6.211. Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never what we want. Rather
we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that
do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics.

(In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition
for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights.)


if we want to know how to get from one proposition to another a mathematical
proposition may be just what we do want

inference is a process of conscious life - it is the thought behind any movement of
body or soul

this idea of Wittgenstein that mathematics is not about 'real life' - is either a failure on
his part to understand what he is doing or it is a vain attempt to place himself and his
enterprise above others and their lives

philosophers are neither above nor below their fellow travellers


6.22. The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by propositions of logic, is
shown in equations by mathematics.


there is no logic of the world - logic is a purely human creation - and as such simply a
response to the unknown - tautologies are fool's gold

mathematical equations are assertions of equity

the world does not support any such assertion

human need demands equations

equations are constructs of consciousness

and necessary for its operations

consciousness like an eagle flies above the ground with an eye to the detail below


6.23. If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means
that they can be substituted for one another. But it must be manifest in the two
expressions themselves whether this is the case or not.

When two expressions can be substituted for one another, that characterizes their
logical form.


it is the assertion of equality that combines the two expressions

it is the assertion of equality that says they can be substituted for one another

the two expressions themselves do not manifest equality

equality is a proposal of relation between expressions

it is not a characteristic of the individual expression

when two expressions are substituted for one another that characterizes their use


6.231. It is a property of affirmation that it can be construed as double negation.

It is a property of '1+1+1+1' that it can be construed as '(1+1) + (1+1)'.


the fact that affirmation can be constructed as a double negation shows the essential
operational nature of logical propositions

a logical / mathematical proposition is an operation

propositional signs are the subject of logical operation

logical constants define the domain of logical operation

the basic operation of logical propositions is negation

all logical operations are forms of negation

the property noted above is an operational property

it indicates that the essential nature of mathematics is operational

that what we do in mathematics is perform operations

and that is all we do

mathematics tells you nothing about the nature of the world

only how we do and can operate in it


6.232. Frege says that the two expressions have the same meaning but different
senses.

But the essential point about an equation is that it is not necessary in order to show
that the two expressions connected by the sign of equality have the same meaning,
since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves.


two expressions can represent two operations that have the same result but are
different paths to that result

two expressions / operations connected with the sign of equality are because of that
sign determined to be operations with same result

it is the sign of equality that asserts the relation between the two

whether the relation holds depends on the result of the operations

therefore the equality sign is a proposal

yes it is asserted but its status is provisional

meaning is not the issue

the issue is function


6.2321. And the possibility of proving the propositions of mathematics means simply
that their correctness can be perceived without its being necessary that what they
express should itself be compared with the facts in order to determine its correctness.


in a sense any operation is true in itself

any statement of operation is a fact

the question is whether the operation performs as expressed in the statement

here the issue is one of argument

argument about the proposed end result

and argument about the relation of the operation to that end result

ultimately the issue is undetermined by thought or its expressions

there are always questions

we make decisions and proceed despite the indeterminateness of our knowledge

you could hence argue that knowledge is irrelevant

the thing is though we need propositions to get us into the game

they are finally only tools

and their appropriateness - whether they fit the task or not - is only settled by act

and even then doubts will remain

it is these doubts that are the source of further effort and creativity


6.2322. It is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two expressions. For in
order to be able to assert anything about their meaning, I must know their meaning,
and I cannot know their meaning without knowing whether what they mean is the
same or different.


this is indeed where it is clear the proper characterization of a proposition - and here I
mean any proposition - is that it is a proposal

first up the equals sign is a proposal to identify

it functions as an assertion

though strictly speaking no such thing can be asserted

but it functions as such and what this means is that it acts as such

now the success or failure of the action is what is up for grabs

is what is to be seen

the issue is entirely pragmatic

consciousness by its nature is indeterminate - that is it is not fixed - it is fluid

therefore it reach beyond the bounds of the given - or if you like the determinate

this is the point of it

the function of it

therefore its propositions are not necessarily reflections of the given

therefore in the non-given mode they are not assertions

when consciousness reaches beyond the given

its propositions quite plainly are proposals

proposals - not for what is but rather for what can be

what can be - can be determined by what is needed

equations are such a propositional bridge


6.2323. An equation merely marks the point of view from which I consider the two
expressions: it marks their equivalence in meaning.


an equation is a proposal for the two expressions - it is the point of view from which
they are considered

it is a proposal of function - it is the proposal for different approaches to the one result


6.233. The question whether intuition is needed for the solution of mathematical
problems must be given the answer that in this case language itself provides the
necessary intuition.


yes - this is so

language is the form of intuition

language is an operation

intuition is the knowing that the operation of language - of syntax - will reveal


6.2331. The process of calculating serves to bring about the intuition.

Calculation is not an experiment.


actually language is the ground of intuition

the intuition is thus prior to the calculation

the calculation - the operation - reveals

calculation is not an experiment

calculation gives ground to intuition

calculation shows us that intuition is in fact an operational outcome


6.234. Mathematics is a method of logic.


mathematics is an operational theory

the operational focus of mathematics is calculation

(not all operations are calculations

though any operation can be regarded as a calculation

hence the universal applicability of mathematics)

mathematical propositions are proposal of equality

equations are the mode of mathematics

equations bring ideality into the world in an operational form

the notion of equality is an ideal notion

that is it is not found in the order of things

it is always a proposal

the point of the proposal is transaction

it is the transference of one category of thought to another

such an act is always diabolical

that is it is always a challenge and reorganization of the natural order of things

it is nevertheless essential and necessary

mathematics imposes on reality

consciousness imposes on reality

mathematics is one of its tools


6.2341. It is the essential characteristic of mathematical method that it employs
equations. For it is because of this method that every proposition of mathematics must
go without saying.


equations are the form of mathematical discourse

mathematics is the description of the operations within this form

the equation is an ideal proposal

its point is utility - it's action is transformation

mathematics is the theory of fundamental motion


6.24. The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of
substitution.

For equations express the substitutability of two expressions and, starting from a
number of equations, we advance to new equations by substituting different
expressions in accordance with the equations.


equations are proposals

any two expressions can be related by the '=' sign

this is the bottom line -

there is no necessity in the equation relation

what is to be equated is a simply a decision

the idea of any such decision is that the expressions are to be substituted

that is to say it is proposed that the propositions equated express operations that have
the same result

the expressions are thus different paths to the one end

what I want to make clear is that always here we are dealing with a proposal

a proposal for action

there is - that is no certainty in any such proposal

and it may in fact be the case that in fact the expressions do not have identical
outcomes

the expressions may only have similar outcomes

this does not invalidate the equation

the equation is a proposal for identity -

even if that identity is never in fact realized

the operation is nevertheless of value from a heuristic point of view

it is that is the discovery of new ways

in any transformation something is lost - in order for their to be something gained

what this amounts to is that in reality there are no actual equations

what you have in the equation is a transformation proposal


6.241. Thus the proof of the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 runs as follows:




2 x 2 is an operation that has as its subjects operations ('2' and '2' repeated)

multiplication is the operation applied to the these operations

multiplication is an operation on operations

the result of this operation is signified by the sign '4'

'4' is an operation - or like '2' - a series of operations

in this context it is an operation that is the result of an operation

an operation that has as its subjects - operations

'4' thus becomes in this proposition the sign for the operation of '2 x 2'

2 x 2 is itself a sign for the operation of multiplication of '2' and '2'

multiplication is a method of addition

what this shows is that numbers have no significance as stand alone expressions

that is e.g. '2' or '4' only have value in an operational context

and operational here means propositional

'2 x 2 = 4' is a proposition that states that the expression to the left of the '=' sign is an
operation that can be expressed as the sign to the right of the equals sign

in this expression an operation is named

the operation '2 x 2' is named as '4'

the name thus is the operation signed

again the sign '4' has no significance outside of a propositional context

that is to say there are no such things as numbers


6.3. The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to
law. And outside logic everything is accidental.


the operation that is consciousness imposed on the non-conscious results in
propositions

propositions are expressions of the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious

propositions are operations

logic is a depiction of the operation of propositions - the internal relations and the
external (inter-propositional) relations

it is the representation of operations

and as such an operation or series of operations - in itself

the attempt to provide a theory of propositional operations

that is to describe the possibilities of operation -

is the attempt to provide a theory of logic

there are no laws outside of theory

there is no one theory of logic

that is logic like any supposed body of knowledge is open to question

this really should not need to be said

as to the accidental nature of things

being law governed only means being within the domain of a theory

that which is outside of theory is just not law governed within that theory

it has nothing to do with whether the phenomenon is accidental or not

an accidental state of affairs can well be covered by some theory

in physics quantum theory does just this


6.31. The so called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is
obviously a proposition with sense - Nor therefore, can it be a priori.


induction is an inference

whether it is regarded as a valid inference or not depends on one's epistemological
perspective

irrespective of this matter inductive inference is an operation

it is an operation that relates propositions

this is all that is required for it to be regarded as logical

that is it is a propositional operation

it is a logical action

whether it has sense - or is understood as a priori or not - is not an issue of logic

any action proposed (proposition) is a matter for logic


6.32. The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law.


the 'law' of causality is a proposal of external relations

laws of anything are the decrees of legislators

who has the authority to legislate?


6.321. 'Law of causality' - that is a general name. And just as in mechanics, for
example, there are 'minimum-principles', such as the law of least action, so too in
physics there are causal laws, laws of the causal form.


causality is an operation

how it is described depends on one's epistemology and ontology

it is general in the sense that we can speak of the operation that is causality in the
conscious (the operation of mind - idea to idea) and non-conscious (the operation of
nature - matter to matter) and even in the relation between the two (mind and matter -
mind to matter / matter to mind)

again - all this is metaphysically loaded

but the history of the use of the notion of causality demonstrates as a matter of fact its
general applicability

really it is a primitive way of relating events

it is a starting point for science and non-science

it is a primitive theory of operation


6.3211. Indeed people even surmised that there must be a 'law of least action', before
they knew exactly how it went. (There as always, what is certain a priori proves to be
something purely logical.)


'before they knew how it went' means prior to description - prior to formulation

what is 'known' prior to description is unknown

the very reason for description - for formulation is to give the unknown character - to
bring it out of the darkness

it is then we can say what it was we didn't know

the unknown is the ultimate source

Wittgenstein incorrectly names the unknown - 'a priori'

as if the absence of knowledge is some kind of certainty

very strange

it comes from not understanding the epistemological significance of the unknown

it comes from regarding it negatively - as 'not-knowledge'

this has been the way of things in western philosophy from Socrates onward

my view is that skepticism is a positive doctrine

that the absence of knowledge is a positive state of affairs

in that it is the force that underlies all attempts at knowledge

it is the reason behind all knowledge


6.33. We don have a priori belief in a law of conservation, but rather a priori
knowledge of the possibility of a logical form.


the law of conservation of energy or mass in its general or philosophical sense is an
explanation or hypothesis

it is an advance on the idea of the regularity of nature

it is designed to account for the possibility of action

that is it is a theory of the ground of operation

if it was a priori knowledge - it would be knowledge that exists - has currency
independent of any relation of the conscious to the non-conscious

for it is this relation that is experience

whatever one's view of knowledge - the fact is it only exists given such a relationship

the alternative is to put that there is knowledge in a world without consciousness

any theory of how the world is - is a theory of reflective consciousness

it is the conscious imperative - to ground experience

what we are talking about here is not the possibility of logical form -

rather the possibility of explanation

and further - really the need for explanation

and the fact that consciousness will naturally seek explanation

as natural as water finding its own level


6.34. All such propositions including the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of
continuity in nature and of least effort in nature, etc. etc. - all these are a priori insights
about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast.


the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast -

Wittgenstein I think uses the notion of form to pretty much cover every base in the
diamond - the ground itself - the stadium and what is beyond

it is an all purpose concept - as it was for Plato -

and with such a use it appears to be comprehensive - the question though is does it
have any real meaning when used at every turn?

anyway -

the principle of sufficient reason, laws of continuity in nature and of least effort etc. -

are basically reflections on experience -

attempts to ground it - give it explanation

they are in terms of giving sense to experience - useful tools -

they are no more than proposals of view

ways of seeing the world - that enable us to operate effectively in it


6.341. Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the descriptions
of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then
say whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I
wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square
mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way shall I
have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional,
since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the
description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more
accurately with a course triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely)
and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world.
Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all
propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way
from a set of propositions - the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to erect,
whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks, and with these
alone.'

(Just as with the number-system we must be able to write down any number we wish,
so with the system of mechanics we must be able to write down any proposition of
physics that we wish.)


(a) the form is optional -


that is the description that we use is not determined by the phenomenon described

in fact the phenomenon is determined by the description - by the form

pre-description - pre-form the phenomenon is technically unknown

of course we always come to the world with formality

there are no blanks - no dead spots requiring formalization

this though is unreflective experience

in the act of reflection - if it is performed correctly - everything is held - must be held
open

what reflective description is used is metaphysically optional - yes

it is necessity though that determines the option

the necessity to act - to be able to act

this by the way is not to say that we know the end point of action with any certainty

it is just to say we operate as if we do - until we have reason to change our view

the possibility of description - of descriptive systems is really a question of creativity
and inventiveness

but this is so just because the final point is that there is no one comprehensive
description that fulfills all tasks at all times in all places

the idea of such - has some heuristic value

there is a sense of security in universality

in fact security is the point - the reason for the pursuit of universality

it is in another sense - a deep all pervading desire


(b) the test of the form is it's universality within a greater form


any conception of consciousness - for this is just what a form is -

functions within the context of forms already in play

either that or it transforms what is in play - this is the origin of revolution

decisions about the place of forms in a formal setting will always be guided by the
question of how to act

there are nevertheless internal formal issues - issues of logic if you will

the relations of forms

their interconnectedness - and their hierarchical structure - are all matters relevant to
outcome

they are ultimately functional issues

a theoretical system is only functional if it is integrated

the ideal is deductive

the picture is of a Russian doll


(c) number and mechanics


a number system is just a script for essential operations

mechanics is just one theory of physics


6.342. And now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net may
also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles and
hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with
the net of a given form tells us nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such
pictures). But what does characterize the picture is that it can be described completely
by a particular net with a particular size of mesh.

Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics
tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise
way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something
about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of
mechanics than with another.


(a)


the possibility of describing a picture (created by a form) tells us nothing about the
picture -

the picture is a proposal for how to regard the object - (it is a picture of the object - we
would normally say)

the picture is an epistemological proposal

before the picture there is no knowledge of the object

so the nature of the picture is not the issue

however the nature of the picture can be an issue

we can want to describe the picture - this is a meta question

any such description is just the placing of the picture in a theoretical context

a larger mesh to continue Wittgenstein's metaphor

you have to decide here what you are doing

picturing the world (or some aspect of it)

or picturing the picture

the two can be done - but they should not be confused

Wittgenstein wants to say I think - we begin with a picture -

and yes we always begin with a phenomena

what I say is that the picturing just is the formalization of the phenomena

it is in short when the unknown is made known

it is the picture that makes known

the form that makes known

what this is leading to is that the idea of 'picture' here is irrelevant to the analysis

what you have is phenomena (unknown)

and the formalization of the phenomena - the making known

thus - the form is the picture

so I would re-write to: 'what does characterize the phenomena is that it can be
described completely by a particular net with a particular size of net'

look to cut to the chase here - what this means is that we decide that a particular form
just does characterize / describe completely

it may or may not as a matter of fact - but the making of the formalization of the
phenomena can be made with the idea of completion -

it's a question of the use of universality

not all human practices require it -

and in fact it is only ever an endeavour

its value is perhaps heuristic -

but in epistemological terms it is a fake -

we can never know if a form completely describes

for we have no way of determining what any complete description would amount to

the idea is really an old testament hangover

and a hard line view of the belief that we are made in the image of God

you could even say it is another view of the origin of idolatry

or just simply foolishness


(b)


the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanic tells us
nothing about the world -


the world is not something we are outside of

we do not ever give an account of the world

we can make piecemeal offerings

we are in the world

that is consciousness is in the non-conscious

this is our reflective reality

Newtonian mechanics enables us to operate within this reflective reality

it is thus a theory of this reflective reality

if by the world we mean the conscious and non-conscious dimensions of reality

the reflective and the non-reflective - and the relation of the two

what this relation creates -

if this is the world

the Newtonian mechanics gives us a stratagem for operating within this reality

it tells us about our world

that we can operate in a certain way

this at least is the proposal


(c)


'but what does tell us something about it is the precise way it is possible to describe it
by these means'


yes precision -

a very relative notion

with only the less precise to guide us

we assume it is precise

that is until a so called more precise model is proposed

what we know - is that we do describe

that description is a mode of reflective consciousness

'precision' is an argument for preference

like an estate agent's argument for the vista of a property

it's a proposed selling point

(it depends on how you see it)


6.343. Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true
propositions that we need for the description of the world.


mechanics is a theory of consciousness - a theory of operation - operation in the non-
conscious dimension of reality - that is a theory of the operation and function of the
outside world - true propositions are descriptions of or statements of performed or
performable operations -

what is done and what can be done is the subject of any theory

the proof of the pudding is in the eating as my mother would say


6.3431. The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however
indirectly, about the objects of the world.


the laws of physics speak about the relationship of the conscious dimension of reality
to the non-conscious dimension of reality

objects are constructs of this relationship


6.3432. We ought not to forget that any description of the world by means of
mechanics will be of the completely general kind. For example, it will never mention
particular point-masses; it will only talk about any point masses whatsoever.


a point mass is an operational domain

an operational domain is ultimately a theory operation

to put it generally - under these circumstances with these resources these actions can
be performed

physics is not about substance

it is about operation


6.35. Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, nevertheless geometry
can obviously say nothing at all about the actual form and position. The network,
however, is purely geometrical; all its properties can be give a priori.

Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc. are about the net and not about what
the net describes.


geometry represents

what is 'actual form and position' is I presume based on an observation

an observation only has epistemic content in a representational / propositional form

beyond this or beneath this - is the unknown

our knowledge - what we say is - is a complex of forms - that has no necessary
stability (stability is pragmatic - a decision to stop)

there is no fixed - eternal form - all forms refer to or are an expression of - or
outcomes of

to understand forms look to the wind


6.36. If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are
laws of nature.

But of course this cannot be said; it makes itself manifest.


in consciousness' relation to the non-conscious regularities are manifest

the world is this relation

that is the world of the human animal is this relation

we can well understand the world could be otherwise to other forms of nature

and it is clear that in a final sense - we cannot say

we have no way of comprehending the world outside of a perspective on it

and we only have the human perspective in fact

in logic we can imagine other possibilities

but these imaginations are never positive

any such 'imagining' is - what is not known


6.361. One might say using Hertz's terminology, the only connections that are subject
to law are thinkable.


connections - associations - in general begin as anomalous events

and the question then is how to place them within given theoretical frameworks

that is to place them in a law like context

this may or may not happen

science can tolerate anomalous phenomena - with an eye to incorporating within
current theory - or seeing it as a reason to question a reigning hegemony

whatever the case

such connections are thinkable

in general we assume all phenomena - all connections - are subject to law

this though is more a methodological - procedural assumption - than a fact about the
nature of things

certainly we proceed as if

however if we had no reason to doubt - at any level of the theoretical endeavour -

there would be no growth of knowledge

doubt is the force behind knowledge


6.3611. We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time' - there is no such
thing - but only with another process (such as the working of a chronometer).

Hence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on some other process.

Something exactly analogous applies to space: e.g. when people say that neither of
two events (which exclude one another) can occur because their is nothing to cause
the one to occur rather than the other, it is really a matter of being unable to describe
one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry to be found. And if such
an asymmetry is to be found, we can regard it as the cause of the occurrence of the
one and the non-occurrence of the other.


(a)


the passage of time is a process

a process is identified as temporal by being related to the passage of time

measurement of time is a decision to regard a particular process as the standard
(i.e. the revolutions of the earth against the sun)

against this other temporal processes are measured

the point is we cannot conceive of any process without the presumption of the passage
of time

there is no process outside of time

any process represents time

time is the essence of process

process the expression of time


(b)


the nature of process is temporal

a lapse of time is the 'space between' two points in an ongoing process


(c)


in relation to space -

events are distinguished by asymmetry -

really we have no concept of symmetry unless we have the notion of separate events

and the same obviously follows regarding asymmetry

symmetry is a relation of shapes - plural

asymmetry is a relation of shapes

the notion of an event - presumes position in space

we can only have the concept of an event if we have the idea of space

an event is distinguishable from another event in terms of its position in space

an event is a unique position relative to another event

if nothing else distinguishes two events - position in space does

symmetrical objects are the case in point


6.36111. Kant's problem about the right hand and the left hand, which cannot be made
to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed, it exists in one-dimensional space

- - - - o------x - - x------o - - - -
a b

in which the two congruent figures, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they
are moved out of this space. The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely
congruent. It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be made to coincide.

A right hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned around in four
dimensional space.


(a)


the fact that a right hand and a left hand cannot fill the same space - is something of a
false problem -

if the right hand and the left hand were of identical shape - they still could not occupy
the same space

if nothing else what distinguishes entities is their position in space

and this is no more than a version of the identify of indiscernibles argument

or perhaps more to the point the non-identity of discernibles


(b)


time is the operation of sequence

space is the operation of position


6.362. What can be described can happen too: and what the law of causality is meant
to exclude cannot even be described.


description is about what is

hypothesis is about what can be

what is possible may or may not occur

the law of causality is not necessary

un-caused events are conceivable

reality itself can be viewed as un-caused

re: Spinoza's argument for God that substance is sui causa

what can be described is not determined by the law of causality

the law of causality is a description

it is a description that has proven to be operationally fruitful

this does not amount to necessity

as a matter of fact - nothing does

and I mean nothing

reality is open an question

description of reality is never complete

we work with what is useful

a great many things are useful


6.363. The procedure for induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that
can be reconciled with our experiences.


induction is an expectation

it is the expectation that what is experienced will continue to occur

as an inference from a particular instance to a general conclusion

there is no such thing -

that is there is no such inference

the argument that there is - is simply a vain attempt to formalize expectation

it is a worthy effort but a waste of time

as to simplicity -

well I guess it will be argued that any generalization by its form will be simpler than
any number of unconnected and unrelated particular observations -

though you might argue too that there is a simplicity in the particular that can never be
found in a generalization

is not the generalization regardless of its function an added layer - a superimposing on
particular instances?

and if so the argument for simplicity of generalization might seem to come at the cost
of the simplicity of particularity

my point is that simplicity is an issue independent of induction

and simplicity is not a straightforward matter - it is theory dependent like any other
functioning concept

we can discuss induction without simplicity

simplicity is not the key concept in induction


6.3631. The procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological
one.

It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in
fact be realized.


again this is not an issue of simplicity

who is to say that the sun will rise tomorrow is the simplest eventuality?

simplicity - if you want to make this concept central - is a notion defined within one's
metaphysical framework -

it is not something you can just point to

the inductive expectation though is not without argument -

human expectations - simply because they are natural in a natural world - will have
some basis in utility -

granted we can never be certain about anything -

it may well be argued that nevertheless our expectations exist for good practical
reasons

and that therefore there is some sense in which they do connect with the way the
world is

simply because they are features of the world - of the natural world


6.36311. It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow; and this means that we do
not know that it will rise.


yes - it is an hypothesis -

but what is it to know anything?

knowledge is consciousness' embrace of reality

the non-conscious reality - and the reality of consciousness

essentially knowledge is awareness

as regards its basis - there is none

as to the status of expectation -

clearly it has a function and an important function in conscious life

consciousness reaches beyond itself - beyond awareness -

and deals in possibility

possibility is a function of consciousness

it gives awareness - parameters

it gives awareness place

and by 'place' here we mean logical place

possibility is the logical space of consciousness

consciousness asserts that awareness can be expected

expectation is thus a function of consciousness' sense of place

it is to do with how consciousness operates

how it functions

and all this is really an empirical issue

it is about how conscious human entities operate

the theory of inference - as a feature of the theory of logic -

is a reflection of consciousness on its operations

it is an aspect of consciousness' search for knowledge of itself -

that is consciousness' reflection on the nature of its operations


6.37. There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened.
the only necessity that exists is logical necessity.


we do not know why things happen

logical necessity is neither logical nor necessary

(in magic it's the false bottom trick)


6.371. The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.


what is to count as 'the whole modern conception'?

depends where you are - and who you are

there are more things in heaven and earth than in your conception Mr.Wittgenstein

even so

empirical science works -

if an illusion - it is nevertheless a fruitful illusion

and as to illusion -

reality is the chosen one


6.372. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something
inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.

And in fact both are right and wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so
far as they have a clear terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if
everything were explained.


something of a sociological theory and evaluation here -

we need evidence for this view that 'people today.....'

the need for metaphysical security cannot be argued away

such matters though have nothing to do with the epistemological status of science

it is clear that whatever one's view here

we need to keep an open mind - even in relation to our most noble endeavours

wisdom is seeing what you do not know

and you do not have to look far to see


6.373. The world is independent of my will.


my will is in the world

that is my will as an expression of consciousness is inside the world

therefore it is a feature of the world

my will is not independent of the world

it is an expression of the world

'the world' here I assume is all that is

consciousness is I argue a dimension of the world

it is the internal dimensions

consciousness is internality

to suggest that the world is only that which is not conscious

is a ridiculous view

which might have something to do with the 'modern conception of the world' as put
forward by philosophical retards

I have in mind here any view of the world that does not recognize it's internal
dimension

that is any view that attempts to make the inside an outside and to thus put that the
world is one dimensional

such a position I think is argued for by Wittgenstein

and it was certainly advanced by the Positivists that took heart from the argument of
the 'Tractatus'


6.374. Even if all we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour
granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the
world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not
something that we could will.


wishing is just a form of imagination

what we will and what we imagine are two different things

the two should not be confused

the will and the world -

a logical connection?

what is meant here?

my will is an expression of a conscious operation in the world

the outcome of any such operation - that is its result

may or may not be what was desired

this is quite different from saying there is no connection between the two

clearly there is a connection in consciousness

the outcome is affirmed relative to the intent

or it is not -

p v ~p


6.375. Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only
impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.


logical impossibility is what cannot be done

logical possibility is what can be done

therefore logical necessity is what is done

or to put it in another way -

logical impossibility is what cannot be

logical necessity - what must be

what must be is what is


6.3751. For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in
the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the
logical structure of colour.

Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows - a
particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two
places at the same time; that is to say particles that are in different places at the same
time cannot be identical.

(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a
tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two
different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)


the phenomenon of two colours in the same place in the visual field at the same time -
does not occur -

for a colour to be it must occupy a place

this is to say the colour has a spacial dimension

an entity to exist must be in space

space is an attribute of the existing entity

it is an existential attribute

there is no question of one entity occupying the same place as another

for if it did the second entity would have the same spacial attribute as the first

there would be no distinction (between the 'two')

in such a case nothing would exist

for things to exist they must exist in a world where they are distinguished

we distinguish things in terms of their place

but this is really nothing more than to say they are distinguished

for there is no place but that occupied by an existing thing

therefore the totality of existing things (distinguishable entities) is space

in a 'world' where nothing existed there would be no space

like Aristotle and nature - I abhor a void


6.4. All propositions are of equal value.


a propositions value is its utility

we can give a useful proposition the value '1'

a useless proposition the value '0'

value is given to propositions

it could be said the proposition itself has no value

the point is a proposition only comes into being as a proposal for action

so yes - perhaps there is an intrinsic value to any proposition

what that value is depends on the circumstance the proposition is placed in

in one set of circumstances a proposition may have no value

in another context the same proposition may be of use

a proposition's value is its utility relative to a proposed outcome


6.41. The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as
it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did
exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself
be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.


consciousness is the source of the sense of the world

consciousness is the inside of the world

the source of the sense of the world is inside the world

on the surface of the world everything is as it is

there is no value on the surface - value is an internal property

to understand value you need to appreciate it is a function of consciousness

every act of consciousness is a reaching beyond what is to what might be

the possibilities in any situation are determined by consciousness in the situation it
finds itself

valuation is assessment of possibilities

any act to a chosen end is 'good' if it leads to that end

the anticipation that it will is expressed in the proposition that the act is good

all acts of consciousness in so far as they anticipate a future state of affairs are acts of
value

value is not fact - value is the anticipation of fact

it is the anticipation that action will bring about a chosen state of affairs


6.42. So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.


this is a bottom of the barrel argument

higher than what?

an ethical proposition asserting that a certain act is good -

is really shorthand for saying that someone desires a certain outcome - and
presumably will act in such a way as to bring it about

we are not dealing with something higher or for that matter lower

ethical propositions state that a conscious agent desires an outcome - and through
whatever action anticipates its occurrence

it is what Kierkegaard termed a leap of faith -

in that one can never know what the outcome will be

one can only act to bring it about

such an act is really always in the darkness


6.421. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one in the same.)


a desired outcome is an anticipated state of affairs -

how hard is this to understand?

also Dr. Wittgenstein is it your idea to tell people who have nothing and are being
oppressed that ethics cannot be put into words?

to tell them that is to shut up?

really?

for a start there is no transcendental

there is only this world - and the problem of surviving in it

ethical propositions are a strategy for survival

the human being just does think in terms of desirable and undesirable outcomes

it is of the nature of the beast

we do anticipate and act to bring about desired states of affairs

it is what we do

it is an empirical fact of the animal

aesthetics is the projection of desired states upon the non-conscious

it is the assertion of desire as an objective fact of the world

I desire what is beautiful - what is beautiful is what I desire

ethics and aesthetics are quite different


6.422. When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt....', is laid down, one's first
thought is, 'And what if I do not do it?' It is clear, however that ethics has nothing to
do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about
the consequences of an action must be unimportant - At least those consequences
should not be events. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical
punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(And it is also clear that reward must be something pleasant and the punishment
something unpleasant)


there are no ethical laws

it suits those bent on controlling other people's actions to maintain that there are
ethical laws

what you are dealing with there is control - power over others

fear of punishment - and the bribery of reward are methods of control

you cannot speak of actions and not include discussion of consequences

there is a sense in which the meaning of an act is just its consequence

and that consequence may well be an event

to negate consequences is to negate the act

an act is regarded as good if it achieves the desired end

perhaps that amounts to success - and that such success is reward

punishment and reward though are an unnecessary overlay

the act works or it doesn't the fact that an anticipated state of affairs is not the result of
an act is not a punishment -

it is simply a fact that what was desired was not achieved with the action performed

if the desired end remains the same then obviously another course of action is required
to bring about the result

the idea that ethical reward or punishment is in the act is quite confused -

it takes no account of the fact that an act only has meaning in a particular context

one act in one context may well be successful

the same act in another may well result in failure

on Wittgenstein's view we are to understand an act outside of any context

therefore the one act must contain both reward and punishment

if this is so these concepts are rendered meaningless for they cannot be distinguished
by the act itself

pleasant and unpleasant - a very refined can I say English upper class twit view of
morality

morality for genteel society

not of any use at all in a world gone wrong

unless you wish to say that discrimination deprivation and violence are 'unpleasant'


6.423. It is impossible to speak of the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical
attributes.

And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.


'the will' is a description of the action of consciousness

the will exists to effect conscious intent

'ethical attributes' are descriptions of the results of conscious action

we cannot speak in absolute terms here

(there are no absolute terms)

results are arguments regarding satisfaction

to view an act as successful is to say what?

a good result - yes

an unsuccessful action - that which did not achieve the desired result -

a bad result?

again it depends on the circumstances - the context

and this goes to the importance of the act -

how significant the desired end is regarded

and this is about the relative importance of actions and ends

there is no standard we can appeal to here

we make it up as we go

and in the main we have only a superficial understanding of why we value some
actions higher or lower than others

this is about ends - and their organization in a life

invariably there is some kind of hierarchy

and various meta theories to account for such

i.e. an obvious one is the argument that we act in our perceived best interest in order
to maintain our existence

as to psychology -

there really is no such thing

as practiced today it is a poor man's philosophy -

it's the idea that you can understand human behaviour without addressing
metaphysical issues

that in some way these matters have been settled - and then you get on with the job

the reason there is little success in any psychology is just that the central issues that
need to be addressed - the issues of philosophy - of metaphysics - are not tackled

as a result all you get is window dressing

and the inevitable sense of failure

(this of course has generated a thriving industry of frauds)


6.43. If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts - not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so
to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of a happy man is a different one from that of a unhappy man.


to say the exercise of will - does not alter the world is either an argument for non-
action - or in the moral realm an argument for amorality

the world is eternally different - regardless of our actions

though our action - like any other motion effects change

there is no unchanging reality

reality is in motion

the world of the happy man compared to that of the unhappy man is like the difference
between red and green

both colours have a natural place in the natural world

the world of the happy man and the world of the unhappy man are identical in that
happiness and unhappiness are without explanation beyond their presentations


6.431. So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.


consciousness is the light

death is the return to darkness


6.4311. Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.

If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.


(a)


life is a form of existence

death is the limit of the form

the reason for forms and their existence or non-existence is beyond knowledge

logic is the primitive assertion of forms and their limits (p v ~p)

existence is the constant 'v'


(b)


eternity is existence from the point of view of time

timelessness is existence without consciousness

timelessness is the unknown

timelessness is an imagination

time is a form of existence given the existence of consciousness

time is a form of consciousness

there is no measurement outside of consciousness

duration is a measurement

without consciousness there is no light

we can assume that without the form of consciousness existence is darkness

it cannot be seen


6.4312. Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul,
that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption
completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or
is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not eternal life itself as much of a
riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies
outside space and time.

(It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)


the argument of immortality is a species of the argument for eternal forms

it has more to do with vanity than logic or rationality

our knowledge of forms - our direct experience - is that forms alter and indeed cease
to be

if by the human soul Wittgenstein means consciousness -

what we know is that individual consciousness is a natural phenomenon that comes
into being - exists and then ceases to be

there is no reason to believe that consciousness survives death

we have no evidence for believing that life goes on forever - or for that matter that any
form of extistence survives forever

the notion of eternal life is at the best a misuse of logic

the argument is of the form 'p and ~p'

the opposite of life is not-life

the opposite of life is not immortality

that is the negation of life is not eternal life - it is the absence of life

eternal life if it was to exist would exist as a form of life - not its negation

to argue for immortality you must deny the reality of death

the argument would then be of the form 'p and p'

this is simply to assert life

to assert life is no argument for immortality

the riddle of life?

whatever this means the solution can only be in life

for by definition - outside of life there is no riddle

and furthermore the outside of space and time -

is the outside of the relation of consciousness to non-consciousness

space and time are forms of the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness

outside of this relation there is no knowledge of anything

therefore we cannot speak of the outside of space and time


6.432. How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.


the world is revelation

if it is not revealed it does not exist

height is a concept of measurement

to say x is higher than y

is to measure two entities relative to each other in terms of vertical extension

the measurement of a natural phenomenon can only be in relation to another natural
phenomenon

if by the world we mean the physical world

it is clear it cannot be measured in relation to another entity

as there are no other entities

all measurement here is an internal relation

if you were to postulate another world -

and persist with 'higher than'

for such to go ahead the 'other world' would have to be physical

in that case it would not be another world

if the other world was thought to be of another nature

again we would not be talking about another world

rather a split world

something like what Descartes had in mind

even so - the 'higher than' relation could not apply

the real point is that this is sloppy thinking on Wittgenstein's part

really quite disgraceful

and I wonder just how intellectually honest it can be


6.4321. The facts all contribute to the setting of the problem, not its solution.


there is no problem in external reality - if we can imagine it for a moment as separate
from consciousness

any problem is only the problem of consciousness' relation to the outside world

why is this a problem - or the source of the problematic?

just because consciousness' sense of consciousness (the inside) is at variance with its
sense of the reality that is outside of itself

consciousness knows itself as indeterminate

it knows the world outside of itself as determinate

the relation between these two dimensions is the problematic

and it is only a problematic - because of the existence of consciousness

or more correctly because of the existence of the relation - conscious / non-conscious

and in my opinion the problematic is what is essential to human life

that is it cannot be solved


6.44. It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.


yes

however the mysticism here is only a result of assuming there is a causal explanation
for the existence of the world

when it is clear that logically speaking such a view makes no sense

so what do you do?

you can take the intellectually honest route and say we have no knowledge here

and that really is the end of it

this though is a skeptical analysis

the worry for someone like Wittgenstein is that if he goes skeptical here what is to
stop this conclusion rushing all the way from the origin of the world to his kitchen
table?

mysticism is just skepticism with lip gloss


6.45. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole.

Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.


(a)


a limited whole -

is like viewing an object -

a limitless whole?

that which has no limit

- the world -

but the world is what?

obviously not like an object

(if the object is limited and the world is not)

viewing the world as a limited whole -

as an object -

does this make sense?

to conceive of limitlessness -

can only be a negative conception

that which is not limited

or

to simply deny the object-ive (limited) world -

to conceive of that which has no limits -

must be a denial of what is experienced -

can only be that which is not experienced -

that which is not known


(b)


feeling the world as a limited whole -

the world as limited whole - does not make sense to me

what is on the other side of the limit?

more world?

the world - the idea of it only makes initial sense if seen as limitless

and what is it to feel the world

it is to imagine - isn't it?

one's feelings are limited

it is to imagine you can feel without limitation

or

given that one's feelings are specific or particular

it is to imagine you can feel in a non-specific or a non-particular manner

that is you can have a feeling that has as its object the universal

(which is just the non-particular)?

perhaps it is just to say you can feel for the unknown?


6.5. When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into
words.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.


to put that philosophical issues are riddles is to view philosophy as a light weight
activity -

how one should live and how one is to understand the world is the problem of being
human - and there is no solution - the problem just manifests - the manifestation is life

words are a means of addressing the problem of the human condition

words are not the only means -

creative art in all its non-verbal forms is an essential response to the problem of being
human

a philosophical question is a verbal formulation of the problem

the answer may not be adequate and in fact may not be there at all

nevertheless the question is real and valid

that a question can be framed is no guarantee that an answer will be found


6.51. Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise
doubts where no questions can be asked.

For doubt can only exist where a question exists, and an answer only where something
can be said.


this is the argument you are having when you have no argument - no argument at all

there is no doubt where no question can be asked -

sounds right

however what Wittgenstein doesn't do is say under what conditions no question can be
asked

would that be because there are no such conditions - unless of course you are dead

skepticism is a serious response to a proposition

it is the questioning of its bases and its scope

any proposition can be doubted

the essence of a proposition is that it is doubtable

why though would you doubt?

that depends on the use the proposition is being put to -

that is the circumstances under which it has been proposed

there is always a question of fit

how appropriate is this proposition in this circumstance?

so skepticism is just thinking out the relation of a proposition to its proposed context

this is no more than rationality and intelligence at work

as to the philosophical claim that there is no basis to knowledge

what you might call skepticism proper

such a view threatens everything Wittgenstein has proposed

what he has said above leaves the issue untouched

he hasn't - that is - laid a glove on philosophical skepticism


6.52. We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are no questions left,
and this itself is the answer.


this is a rather pathetic view of life

there are always questions - to wish to close down thought is no answer to the
problems facing human beings

and to suggest that all scientific issues can be settled reveals a facile and entirely
erroneous view of science

at this point one gets the impression that Wittgenstein is advocating denial as a
philosophy of life

shame he never ran into Freud

would have made no difference to philosophy

might have cured Ludwig of himself if not the world


6.521. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the
sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that
sense?)


wisdom is to see that the problem of life is not solved - nor does it vanish

doubt is the source of this wisdom


6.522. There are indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves
manifest. They are what is mystical.


language is a representation of what is

language is like a reflection in the lake

it is not that reflected

the world without the reflection of language is manifest

it is nature - it is the external world

language as a phenomenon of the external world

is the mark of a conscious animal

what cannot be put into words is the unknown

the unknown does not manifest itself

it is the logical space of consciousness

the unknown is not revealed

it is omnipresent


6.53.The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science - i.e. something that
has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to
certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other
person - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this
method would be the only strictly correct one.


Wittgenstein here mistakes method for conclusion

the argument of one view of the nature of philosophy and science is not a description
of philosophical method -

if by method you mean how philosophers proceed

and how do philosopher proceed?

well you have to see what they do - and how they go about it -

perhaps we cannot draw a final conclusion here - that fits all philosophers and all
forms of philosophical inquiry -

we can however say the method of philosophy is critical -

and I would suggest that from this follows that any critical activity is an example of
philosophical method

this view of course means that science in so far as it is performed critically - and of
course it is - if it's any good) - is an expression of philosophical method

the conversation between the green grocer and the housewife if it is of a critical nature
likewise is philosophical method at work

non-critical 'argument' on the other hand is propaganda

it is the product of a dogmatic mind set -

and what do we say of Wittgenstein here?

he uses the critical method but never acknowledges it

again it seems he is in denial - denial regarding his own activity

perhaps this is the fear of skepticism

the idea that if a critical method is revealed and placed on the table -

it will be clear that what is being proposed can be regarded as provisional -

in that it is critisizable and hence revisable -

one also suspects that he is really just pushing a line here

that he knows his conclusion is not his method -

but is nevertheless prepared to engage in philosophical propaganda

the message is not the method


6.54. My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -
as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after
he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.


this is a 'pro hominem' argument -

if you understand me you understand the world -

you see things right -

it is the only position available for a dogmatist -

it is a pre-rational view

it is the argument from ignorance

and for the authority of ignorance

a sad way to end up


01/08/07
Tractatus 7


7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.


silence is the ground of all speech

silence is the sound of the unknown


21/11/07
mind and matter


mind in matter

at least in some forms of matter

the relation between the two?

awareness is mind

I don't think it make any sense to speak of mind as in any sense un-aware - like i.e. the
Freudians suggest

mind is awareness

OK

internal /external dimensions of the human being

will a physical effect on the body have a result in consciousness?

a mental event have a physical description?

my thinking is that certain events have both a physical and mental description

any physical event that is made conscious - has a mental description

and mental events - that is conscious events -

a physical description?

yes

always

so my focus is events - kinds of events

we can speculate that there are events in space / time that no consciousness is aware of

but any event that is apprehended by consciousness has a mental description

so any conscious event has a physical description

any internal event an external correlate

yes

so the event in itself?

outside of consciousness - an unknown

in terms of consciousness - it has - as a matter of fact - a double aspect - an internal
(conscious) description - an external - physical description

there is on this account no question of the relation of mind and matter - mind and
body

rather singular events that have dual descriptions

inside and out?

the entity with these dimensions - has two descriptions - in terms of its attributes

a singularity - the entity - independent of its dimensions -

there just is no account

no description

the unity that the attributes express - is what?

a logical unity

that which enables the possibility of the attributes

(and hence - descriptions)

logical in the sense that it must be presumed - for what is - to be

we are dealing ultimately with metaphysical facts

that in themselves have no explanation


24/11/07
consciousness describes


consciousness describes

describes what is presented to it

and what is presented to it?

it describes itself - and the world -

the world outside itself

consciousness describes

'what is presented to consciousness - to 'itself''

is a description

'the world outside itself'

is a description

the terms of consciousness' descriptions are in the first place - substantial

consciousness describes itself as 'consciousness', 'mind' etc.

consciousness describes what it is not - 'the world' - 'matter', 'physical' etc.

these are descriptions

the essence of consciousness is description

a description must distinguish itself - from other descriptions

and of the object of description?

is it then independent of description?

and is this a reasonable question?

or is it rather that what is there - is so because it is described?

the description gives substance - is the substance

the act of describing

as the existential act?

conscious describes

what is described ultimately is the act(s) of consciousness

consciousness describes itself as in the world -

the world is a description necessary for consciousness

without the world-description consciousness could not distinguish itself

therefore

no primary description would be possible

for all description depends on distinction

and a primary - fundamental distinction is between the description and its object

consciousness projects an object in description

either itself or what it is not

and here we leave substance - for p or -p is essentially a distinction of logic

I describe

therefore

'I am' is a description


p.s.


what I am getting here is that description (however you 'describe' it) is the action of
consciousness

subjectivity and objectivity - idealism and materialism etc. - on this view are
categories of description

the essence of description itself - outside itself as it were - is unknown

cannot be described

there is no place outside of description - in a metaphysical sense

the argument is that the categories of internality and externality are in the first place
descriptions of the unknown

the unknown is fundamental -

its primary description is consciousness in the world

this is to focus on consciousness as act

and the act - every act - I would say - as ultimately a description

consciousness describes itself - describes description

this is were the illogical comes into play in human experience

it is its origin

the act of describing - underpinning the descriptive / conscious act is absurd

but only in terms of logic

in terms of need - need to defend against the unknown - the horror of it

a necessity


28/11/07
the argument


the argument is that reality is dimensional

that where mind exists it is two dimensional

and where it doesn't exist it is one dimensional

the existence of mind adds a dimension to reality

mind relative to the physical world - the material world - is internal

where there is mind it is the internal dimension of the entity

i.e. in a human being the body is the external dimension

the mind internal

consciousness is internality - internality is consciousness

if we examine the body at any level i.e. biological, molecular - we are only examining
the surface

the mind on the other hand is pure internality

when we speak of human being as an entity - i.e. 'a human being' - or some such non-
dimensional expression - we are referring to a unity -

that which is the unity of dimensions - is unknown

hence - non-dimensional - essentially non-descriptive terms are used such as 'person'

such an entity can only be understood and hence described - dimensionally

i.e. with human beings we speak of their physical (external) health and their mental
(internal) health -

an event that affects the unity will register on the outside and in the inside

that is an event can have a physical and mental impact

and therefore descriptions

the class of events that this is true of is known events

what of unknown events - i.e. events on the surface (body) that do not register in
consciousness?

these events are purely physical - external until they are made - known to
consciousness

until that is we become aware of them - and I'm thinking here of say the awareness
that comes with a doctor's explanation of the test results - so it's not immediate
conscious awareness

all conscious events - internal events - will have some physical (external) co-relate

hence it is possible in principle to identify the fact of thought in body (surface)
activity


28/11/07
sensation


sensation as the event that has both a physical and mental dimension / description

are all sensations brain processes?

if we take the view that all sensations have an internal and external expression or
manifestation

then the question becomes what counts as a surface description of a sensation?

if you hold that the brain is the central registry of all physical (surface affects) then as
a mater of definition or logic any affect conscious or not will be describable as a brain
event or process

as I understand it in Descartes' time the human heart had something like this central
role in scientific explanation

so yes a sensation will manifest itself physically - just how that physical manifestation
is described will depend on the state of science - i.e. in seventeenth century science
you get a different account to that of the twentieth century scientific view

the real question in twentieth century philosophy of mind is - is sensation just a brain
process?

my argument is that consciousness is the internal dimension of the human being (and
other conscious entities)

the point being that consciousness is not on the surface of things - it is not a public
observable phenomenon

and that a brain process is a surface event of conscious entities

can we associate a brain process - a surface event with a non-surface - internal event?

are we justified in thinking that a brain process is an expression of a conscious event -
a physical surface manifestation?

a pin prick to the hand - the sensation of pain

a picture of brain activity at the time - let us say a region lights up - that doesn't when
there is no sensation of pain

can we say that the brain activity picture is the sensation?

we can say that the brain activity picture is an expression of the event of the sensation

assuming we are dealing here with a strictly veridical circumstance

and it is not likely to be the only physical expression - in fact most likely the least
noticeable

the brain process in this case is really an indicator of sensation - it points to the fact

and to the awareness - what do we make of this?

is the awareness (in this case of pain) the sensation proper?

at one time I would have said yes

however I am inclined now to give awareness - a similar analysis as that just given of
brain process -

yes awareness is awareness with everything that it involves - but here too it is an
indicator of the event - of the event of the sensation

an internal indicator

it is the way the event manifests internally

just as a physical / surface expression (i.e. brain process) is a way the event manifests
externally

as to the event - the event of the sensation -

outside of its internal and external manifestations / description - it is without
characterization

in itself it is without character

its character is its affect


29/11/07
a two dimensional reality


my argument is this:

consciousness - my consciousness - is awareness - and this awareness is awareness of
itself - of awareness - in the context of non-aware reality

and the important term here is 'in'

and the argument from this -

therefore consciousness is the inside of the world -

it is that dimension of the world

the internality of the world

(I do not think the whole world has an inside

- only 'aspects' - regions of it

I favour a Leibnitzian - monad like theory here)

so the argument is essentially a logical one

that which has an inside by its nature has an outside

(though the reverse does not hold - not all 'outsides' have an inside)

so we begin I suggest with this reality -

consciousness in the world

the world as two dimensional

further I do not think this can be explained

it is simply - what is

(the question is correct description)

the reality we begin with

the existential reality

I would suggest this view is better based - this theory of mind / body - than i.e. the
mind-body identity theory of Place and Smart

which rests on a denial of the internal - as a real dimension of reality

and the assumption that all that there is - is surface - and surface explanations are all
that are required or indeed possible

quite a bizarre idea

the language of the inner life is the language of art and under this umbrella I would
include all religious description of the inner life

we may wish to hold that the surface world -

the world of the surface - of matter is determined

it is clear though that the world of consciousness is not

it is essentially - not

hence creativity - art

and what these activities - these descriptions - these languages - address and express is
the indeterminacy of consciousness

so

we have internal logic and 'knowledge' - and external logic and 'knowledge'

reality for human beings is divided

as to the unity - all we have here is the truth - stark and simple - of skepticism

we do not know

there is no unified theory

the idea of - a third position suggests itself here - i.e. the idea of sub specie aeternitatis
- the unified point of view - the point of view of everything -

but in reality there is no such point of view

granted there should be

the fact of a two dimensional reality indicates a unity

a unity we imagine should be seen

but it is not - not revealed

- we can characterize it as the unity that underlies

- or the totality

- etc. etc.

the truth is - it is the unknown

and a corollary of this is that human beings are essentially unknowns


30/11/07
this is where we begin


this is where we begin:

with consciousness in the world

this I argue is realism plain and simple

the human being as a two dimensional entity

the dimensions are internality and externality

the inside and the outside: mind and matter

mind and matter on this view are not substances -

rather dimensions

dimensions of a singularity

how to characterize the unity?

we can only see inside and out -

we can thus only characterize internally and externally

as for the view from above - the third view - the view sub specie aeternitatis - there is
no such perspective

the unity as such is unknown

or the unity above and beyond its dimensions is unknown

OK

still it might be put that we only know this - if we know it - through consciousness

the idea being that internality and externality (mind and matter) are only - and finally
categories of consciousness

if so - the argument goes - all that is presented is an Idealistic picture

that all there is - is consciousness and its characterizations

so what of such an argument - is Idealism unavoidable?

my view is that consciousness recognizes itself as inside -

as inside the non-conscious dimension of the world

so crucial to the recognition of consciousness is a recognition of reality - outside of
consciousness

and the argument is that consciousness would not recognize itself - otherwise

could not distinguish itself - which in fact it clearly does

it distinguishes and defines itself dimensionally

in the absence of this dimensional distinction conscious could not recognize itself

which is to say consciousness would be unaware

that consciousness would not be - consciousness

what can the Idealist say to this -

that this recognition is illusory?

always the question is open - but is this particular question a sensible one?

can consciousness recognize itself as anything other than in the world?

I think not

but of the world?

is not the world only known via consciousness?

yes - quite true

and is what we know of the world only known in terms of consciousness' categories

indeed

nevertheless - the object of consciousness is that which is outside of consciousness

and what can we say of the outside without consciousness?

we cannot say anything

or to be more precise we can only say we do not know - we cannot know

there is no knowledge in the absence of consciousness

a world without consciousness is just that - an unknown and unknowable reality

all knowledge is a function of consciousness

knowledge is the natural expression of consciousness being in the world

consciousness itself - is thus a feature of the world - an attribute of it

which is to say consciousness depends on the world

the world does not depend on consciousness


p.s.


a note on Idealism and Materialism


Idealism amounts to the view that the world is one dimensional - that it has no outside

that the inside is all there is

the question to be asked is - the inside of what?

for on such a view there is no outside dimension

it is clear that you cannot maintain the argument of an inside dimension - of
consciousness - unless you can assert confidently that there corresponds an outside
dimension

with regard to Materialism -

a one dimensional world that is external - and has no internality - is not knowable -
therefore it cannot be asserted in the first place - it is non-sensical

the overall point is - that which is dimensional - has an ontological structure

and the ontological structure of a thing is its logic

it is what makes it what it is

to suggest that you can reduce a two dimensional entity to a one dimensional entity
is to argue illogically

it is to assume you can make something into what it is not


p.p.s.
a note on dimensions


a dimensional analysis of reality or of the mind-body relation is not a substance
analysis

dimensional analysis - is in the philosophical setting - a geometric analysis - let us
term this kind of analysis - meta geometrics

in real or practical terms - it is a structural analysis (a meta structural analysis)

in a 'theoretical' or mathematical sense - it is a formal analysis -

the point is that what exists (substance theories) are irrelevant - and non-productive -
in terms of ontological understanding - substance theories have held up any progress
on the question of the nature of things

first off we need to know what kind of thing we are dealing with - (and substance does
not deal with kind or type - substance theories are weak here because they undercut or
can undercut any formal / structural / meta geometric analysis) - and the way to
approach the problem of the nature of things is to first determine the type of the thing

what kind of thing do we have here?

what is its form - its structure?

a dimensional analysis is the beginning of an answer to these questions

if we ascertain the meta dimensions of a thing - we can begin to understand its nature
and dynamic

the issue is not as Spinoza thought - attributes of substance - it is dimensions of an
unknown unity

where we begin is with consciousness in the world

consciousness as the internal dimensions in a non-conscious external dimension

beyond these dimensions of internality and externality is the unknown


05/12/08
Hegel: consciousness


Note: the numbers in these posts refer to the numbered sections of Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller. Oxford. 1977.

In what follows I will present Hegel's argument and follow it with my own
commentary.


A. CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. SENSE CERTAINTY: OR THE 'THIS' AND 'MEANING' (MEINEN).


90.


ARGUMENT:


the immediate object is immediate knowledge

a knowledge of the immediate is knowledge of what is

our approach to the object must be immediate or receptive

we must alter nothing in the object as it presents

in apprehending we must refrain from comprehending


COMMENTARY:


the immediate object is only immediate knowledge on reflection

just quickly what this tells us is that there is no immediate knowledge

is there nevertheless an immediate object?

yes - but it can only be described - on reflection

outside of reflection - or prior to it - it is unknown

Hegel wants to say knowledge is the immediate object of knowledge

on the face of it this is to say knowledge is its own object

but again this can only be on reflection

and reflection is not immediate

the immediate is non-reflective

and for that reason unknown

I would be happy with the idea that knowledge is the reflective object of knowing

we do reflect on what we know

but outside of this is what is not known

the unknown is thus the object of knowledge

the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown

it is immediate - because it is unknown

to suggest that knowledge is its immediate object

is to confuse subject and object

and further it is to fail to provide a reason for knowledge

Hegel says a knowledge of the immediate is a knowledge of what is

if so

what is - is unknown - that which is not known

you could go from here to suggesting that the point of knowledge is just to give
characterization of the unknown

that knowledge is the mind's response to what is not known

it is to suggest that what is - is greater than what is known

on Hegel's view the two are equivalent

I argue that knowledge is human consciousness' strategy for dealing with what is not
known

it is the organism's fundamental response to its context - its environment - the world

it is in my view a form of action

Hegel says our approach to the object must be immediate - we must alter nothing in
the object as it presents

I just say to this any response to the object (however you wish to define this) will
always be reflective - non-immediate

how can you ever establish what the 'object' is prior to this approach?

can you know if you do not alter it?

could not the act of reflection itself transform the object?

the point is we don't know

what we have is what is reflected

and our purposes determine how we describe this

the presentation is completely and utterly contingent

its definition - the presentation is a matter of reflection

outside of this - outside of reflection - the presentation is pure

it is - that is - unknown

to know just simply is to alter the object of knowledge

the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown

there is no immediate knowledge - all knowledge is reflective

what we can say from this is that reality is immediate -

but in it's immediacy - not known

I would argue too that knowledge and the unknown are categories of existence

that existence is not exhausted by either category

though you can say - what exists is what is known and what is unknown

it can be described by this conjunction

and yes - it is a matter of logic

x and -x

the point being existence is logical possibility

this is the best we can say


91.


ARGUMENT:


there appears to be no bounds to sense knowledge

sense-certainty appears to be the truest kind of knowledge for it corresponds
completely with its object

this certainty the poorest of truth - in the end it amounts only to an existential
statement

consciousness' certainty here is just the 'I'

and the I in this sense certainty a pure 'This' as is the object

I this particular I is certain of this particular thing

neither I or the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation

the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking

nor does the thing signify something that has a host of qualities

the thing is merely because it is

it is - this is the essential point of sense knowledge

pure being or simple immediacy constitutes its truth

certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection

consciousness is a pure 'This'

the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single term


COMMENTARY:


what is given (in 'sense certainty') is prior to reflection - prior to analysis of even the
most primitive or basic kind - and is hence without description

reflection enables characterization

it is on reflection that the description of 'sense certainty' is given

you could here say, 'well what other description is possible' - this is I think what is
behind Hegel's argument

the idea being - there really is no question here at all - it is just a matter of realization -
of seeing what is before your eyes so to speak

what I say here is that 'seeing what is before your eyes' is just what reflection gives

the immediacy of the experience is the unknown

knowledge is not given

and not even given in the act of consciousness per se

it is an act of consciousness -

that is an act upon the unknown

and further we need to understand the 'immediacy' is a category of description

it is an account of - what is given

Hegel says of consciousness - consciousness is 'I' - nothing more

and the fact is - his 'nothing more' - just is no more than nothing -

and this is the problem

the consciousness is 'I' argument is a theory of consciousness - it is a description

now there is the fact of consciousness -

but it is strictly speaking an open fact -

which is to say we do not 'know' what consciousness is prior to reflection on it - on it
and its relations

my 'it' here or Hegel's 'I' are dummy terms whose function is to signify or point to an
as yet unknown - undescribed entity

even 'entity' here is just a functional term

what all this amounts to is that there is no certainty - far from it - everything in an
epistemological sense is in suspension

if by a pure 'This' Hegel is referring to consciousness as a pure unknown - OK

it also has the sense of just a logical sign

a sign that is that signifies but is without content

from a logical - and epistemological point of view - this is a good start

consciousness you might joke is left intact


92.


ARGUMENT:


pure being constitutes the essence of sense certainty

actual sense certainty is not merely this pure immediacy but an instance of it

in sense certainty pure being splits up into the two 'Thises' - the 'I' and the object

when we reflect we see that neither are only immediately present in sense certainty -
but each is mediated - I have this certainty through the thing - and the thing is in sense
certainty through the 'I'


COMMENTARY:


pure being - OK - so what would count as impure?

this is not a frivolous question -

I would suggest that anything that exists is pure being

Hegel thinks by the adjective 'pure' - he can slip in 'certainty'

(what is not certain is not pure being?)

at the very least certainty is a conception - an epistemological conception - that is a
construction of consciousness

designed to deal with the issue of the nature of knowledge

a tree in a field is neither certain or uncertain

it does not posses epistemological attributes

pure being is what in a logical sense? - that to be described

this is the best I can make of it

bearing in mind that the idea of any entity as an object of consciousness without any
description - is just a logical fantasy

the question of appropriate description is though quite real

Hegel wants also to say the sense certainty is an instance of pure being

well this I can agree with

but not for the same reasons Hegel would advance

rather because any phenomena is an instance of what Hegel calls pure being

i.e. anything that exists - exists

he goes on to argue that in sense certainty pure being splits into two -

the 'I' and the object -

consciousness and its object

or as I would put it - the world - reality - 'pure being' - given the existence of
consciousness - is best understood as two dimensional

consciousness brings internality to the world

that outside of consciousness - the 'outside world' - is externality

understood this way - the relation between the conscious and the non-conscious
is dimensional

both are dimensions of the one reality

I put that we only understand reality as such in terms of these two dimensions

but enough about me

back to Hegel -

he is trying to explain or account for certainty -

and he says that the I has its certainty through the object

and further that the object is - in sense certainty because of the I

firstly - the I having certainty through the object -

awareness is a state - a relational state

it is a relation between the I and the object

'the' relation in fact -

it is no more than a simple fact - what Hegel calls pure being

are we to say this is certainty?

if so it is an empty fact

for all the questions that come with awareness - are contained in the relation of the I
and the object

and strictly speaking the relation itself can be in question - as it is in the case of
illusion - delusion or even dream states

certainty if the concept makes any sense is a reflective / epistemological notion

it is not what is experienced

what is experienced is prior to reflection - unknown

as to the second part here - the object is in sense certainty because of the I -

yes - but this is just to say the object becomes an object of awareness

an object of consciousness

this really is a contingency - a happening

there is no certainty in the relation

the relation of I and object is a relation of possibility

and I would say the experience of the relation is not certainty

the experience demands definition and explanation

and is thus the experience of uncertainty


93.


ARGUMENT:


in sense certainty the object is immediate being or essence

the I - a knowing - knows the object only because the object is - while the knowing
may or may not be

the object is true - or essence - it is - regardless of whether it is known or not

whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there


COMMENTARY:


yes the knowing may or may not be there - in particularity -

but are we to say that consciousness is not an essential dimension of reality?

really who is to know the answer here?

as Hegel would be well aware - Spinoza for one argued that consciousness is an
essential attribute of reality -

we can also put the question - is the material world essential?

this too is not a matter beyond question re: George Berkeley

and in a pure Idealist reality there is no object - only subject -

just another point -

Hegel at this stage of his argument anyway

seems not to have factored in the self-consciousness

my point is - that there is an internality that consciousness is aware of - quite
independently of the external world

now granted this internality is not describable in external terminology - nevertheless it
is real and can be given characterization - in art and poetry i.e. -

anyway his main point has to do with essence -

what is essential?

can we say existence is essential and that any thing that does exist participates in and
is an expression of that essence?

OK - if so essence is no great shakes - you can't avoid it - there is nothing else

and on such an argument every form of existence - is essential

my point is that the essentialist argument tells us nothing

it's of no use -

granted particular consciousnesses may or may not exist

and all particular forms of non-conscious reality - may or may not exist

as to the ground of all this - existence in itself - or essence - or pure being

the fact is it is the unknown - it is 'the' unknown


94.


ARGUMENT:


the question - is the object presented in sense certainty the kind of essence sense
certainty proclaims

we are only to consider it in the way it presents


COMMENTARY:


the idea of pure presentation - basic - unanalysable facts - essence - is understandable

the thing is we can only know what we know

the object as presented is known as presented

how this object is described - evaluated - analyzed etc. - is a reflective issue

but what of the presentation in itself?

'presentation' is may be the closest we get to a 'value free' account

the object is present to consciousness

we have here a statement of relation

and the relata - consciousness and the object are left undefined - un-described

they are as it were logical terms - just denoting that x is related to y

the relation of presentation - for it to make sense -

must have some content -

that which is presented (the object) is 'presentable' to that which can receive a
presentation (consciousness)

the point is any statement here - on the relation or on the relata - will raise more
questions than it answers

and the final truth of all of this is that there is no end to this questioning

except by fiat - convention or practice

but in a logical sense the object of knowledge (the unknown) is never exhausted by
consciousness (knowing)

the overall point is that the way it presents - what it is that presents - and what it is
presented to

the presentation in short -

is the open question


95.


ARGUMENT:


if we ask 'what is This?' - in the twofold shape of its being as 'Now' and 'Here' - the
answer is 'This' itself is

to the question - 'what is now?' - if we answer e.g. 'Now is night' - write this down and
the read it when now is noon - we will say it has become stale


COMMENTARY:


to the question 'what is this?' - yes we can say - 'This' itself is -

the point is there is no real elucidation here

to answer with 'here' and 'now' - is just to expand the meaning of 'this' - to introduce
into it categories of space and time -

the real point is that the essence is unknowable

one way of putting it is to say it cannot be located in space / time

the categories of space and time - are of no use to a discussion of essence

best to drop essence and keep your bearings


96.


ARGUMENT:


a paper with 'now is night' is written on it is preserved as something that is

the now preserves itself as something that is not night or day

it is a negative in general

the now is something that night and day is not

it is not in the least affected by what it is not

it is through negation neither this nor that - the universal

and it is the universal that is the true content of sense certainty


COMMENTARY:


Hegel says the now preserves itself as something that is not day or night

that is - it is not a contingent reality or concept

that it is a negative in general

he says a simple thing of this kind - is neither this nor that - that is it has no contingent
content

it is his argument that such a thing that is neither this nor that - that is non-contingent -
is the universal

and he says that it is the universal that is the true content of sense-certainty

what this amounts to in my view is that sense-certainty has no content

the real problem with Hegel's argument is that he thinks negation signifies

modern physics made a complete ass of itself by going down the same path with the
theory of negative matter

in my view when a proposition is negated it is marked as non-operational - that is it is
marked as not useful -

the point is in general that to negate a proposition does not signify or point to an
alternative reality - a negative reality

a consequence of Hegel's confused logic is that he cannot establish the universal - as
anything other than what the 'world is not'

and the fact of it is there is no content to such a reality


97.


ARGUMENT:


we utter the universal in any sensuous content - i.e. the universal 'this'

we do not envisage the universal or being in general - but we utter the universal

we do not say in sense certainty what we mean to say - but language is more truthful

it is not possible to say or express in words - as a sensuous being - that we mean


COMMENTARY:


when I say 'this is red' - what 'this' is - is not defined

the statement - from a purely semantic point of view leaves 'this' as an unknown

we have no grounds to give it the status of a universal

but the point is that the statement's meaning is not just a semantic issue

in the face of such a statement - if you see what the speaker is pointing to you will
understand the truth (or falsity) of the statement

outside of any context - just the bald statement as it were - the statement is virtually -
or practically - meaningless

while we may understand the words and their relationship in the statement - short of
being there or receiving some further explanation we cannot give or withhold assent

what the statement refers to 'in itself' - is unknown

the problem of meaning is the problem of definition

language is a means of giving definition

and whether or not a statement actually means what you say depends on where you
draw the line on definition

it could be argued that to explain any single event - you need to explain the totality

be that as it may in a logical sense in practice no-one does this in making statements
about the world

we know that definition has its limits

these limits are set really by the circumstances in which we operate


98.


ARGUMENT:


the same is true with the other form of the 'This' - with 'Here'

'here is the tree' - if I turn around this truth has vanished and converted into its
opposite - no tree is here but a house instead

'here' itself does not vanish

therefore the 'this' shows itself as a mediated simplicity or a universality


COMMENTARY:


'here' is an indeterminate reference to space

when we are asked to find a position on a map - we might say 'here' if simultaneously
we place our finger on the map in the act of showing - however given the whole point
of maps it is more likely that we will give co-ordinates - that is 'here' will be given a
geometric characterization - and this will be regarded as a representation of the actual
'here'

'here' - without definition is a term that has an unknown reference - but it is a term
that we use as an unknown reference to space - so it has character

in language we have template terms - the function of which is to direct our attention to
a category of our understanding of the world

Hegel's mistake here is the idea that all terms refer to an existing state of affairs or
being

language is not just a simple matter of word and object

terms such as 'here' and 'now' are initial characterizations of the unknown - primitive
or naive characterizations

the point about meaning is that it is unknown

we structure and give form and content to this unknown

language is the principle means of this

and 'the making of meaning' is itself without foundation

it is just what self-conscious entities do

it is fair to say the making of meaning is without meaning

there is no natural or logical end to such

what we call meaning (as a finished product so to speak) is just the decision to stop at
some point in the process

the point is always perceived utility

and that point is of course always open to question


99.


ARGUMENT:


pure being is the essence of sense certainty

sense certainty has demonstrated that the truth of its object is the universal

pure being is not immediacy - it is that which mediation and negation are essential to

it is not what we mean by being - but is rather being defined as an abstraction - or as
the pure universal

our meaning is not the universal - but is what is left over from this empty or
indifferent here and now


COMMENTARY:


pure being is that which is unknown - and is thus the source of any knowledge

knowledge is our fundamental response to the unknown

the object of knowledge is the unknown - what else could it be?

Hegel's idea of pure being as an abstraction - amounts to saying that he has adopted a
definition of 'pure being' or essence

what I say is that any such approach to what is fundamental (whatever that is - or
however it is described) - is a failure

abstractions of any kind are (like anything else for that matter) aspects of being

and aspects of being cannot be the essence of being - this is what is essentially wrong
with Hegel's argument

my point in general is that the pursuit of essence is (and partly for the reason just
given) pointless -

logically speaking all that can underlie all that is known - is the unknown

I don't call this essence - and unlike Hegel I am not going to say some particular
knowledge is essence


100.


ARGUMENT:


the relation in which knowing and the object was first presented is now reversed

the object which was regarded as essential is now unessential

for the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was

certainty is now to be found in the opposite element - knowing

its truth is in the object as my object - and its being - mine

it is because I know it

sense certainty is in the 'I'


COMMENTARY:


the object is outside of my consciousness

and the object is inside my consciousness

the object exists as a duality -

it exists as a dimensional duality - inside and out

outside of this dimensional analysis what can we say of the object - of the object in
itself?

from such a point of view we can only say we do not know

the essence of the object if you like - as that which is beyond dimensions in some
sense - is not knowable

the thing in itself is not known

we assume a correspondence between the internal presentation and the external reality

(the object regarded as just an external thing has no qualities - it can only be known in
formal - mathematical or logical terms

nevertheless it is the logical instance on which we hang our conscious
characterizations)

so - at the heart of conscious apprehension is the unity of dimensions - we are talking
about one thing - that has two dimensions - the unity that is appearance

and its appearance is its existence - its being

what I know is what appears - there is no certainty at all in this

appearance is neither certain nor uncertain -

it simply is

certainty is a construction of thought - that serves certain purposes - primarily
organizational -

we look for a certain premise in order to base our conclusions

it is just a way of organizing thought for action

in this sense certainty is a proposed standard of construction

it has no logical basis - but nevertheless we often choose to assume it for practical
matters

the only sense of certainty is pragmatic

we have more luck in life I would suggest by operating with uncertainty

if you close off avenues of thought and action (via the stratagem of certainty) you are
more likely to get stuck


101.


ARGUMENT:


what does experience tell us about its reality in the 'I'?

the force of its truth lies in the immediacy of the experience

the I holds the single now and here fast

I, this 'I' sees the tree and asserts that 'Here' is a tree - but another 'I' sees the house
and maintains that 'Here' is not a tree but a house instead

both truths have the same authentication - immediacy of seeing - the certainty that
both have about their knowing

but the one truth vanishes in the other


COMMENTARY:


what is clear here is that immediacy is no ground for knowledge

and further that 'knowledge' is not grounded in sense certainty (for this on Hegel's
argument is an illusion) - but rather - uncertainty

firstly

what immediacy points to is the unknown - it is an epistemological portal

what is immediate vanishes - but immediacy itself is never gone

thus the contents of the immediate can never be held - and as result can never be
known

this should make it clear that if immediate knowledge is our goal - the goal can never
be reached

if on the other hand we give up on the idea of knowledge as being immediate -

we have a show at giving the concept of knowledge some significance

at the very least we know knowledge cannot be immediate - if it is anything it is not
immediate

secondly

the 'I' is in fact never known - it is the ground of un-knowing

what I am at any point of space and time is not what or who I am

I am always more than the moment of my being - the moment of I -

so the moment is never I

the moment of I always points to the unknown

the unknown is the I


102.


ARGUMENT:


what does not disappear is the universal 'I' - whose seeing is neither the tree nor the
house

the 'I' is a universal like 'here' 'now' and 'this'

when science is faced i.e. with the task of finding the particular that the universal
refers to - it is impossible to say


COMMENTARY:


consciousness exists as the internal dimension of a two dimensional manifestation

consciousness does not appear -

but appearance is only possible given the existence of consciousness

the external dimension - is the appearance to consciousness

it is what is outside consciousness

and is therefore what appears to consciousness - again because of the fact of
consciousness

the particular consciousness - the I - exists in particular forms of existence

the persistence of consciousness through time is simply a function of the organism
(that has an internal dimension)

it is in such a case an internal function

no different in essence to the external functions of the entity - in that it is simply
function

persistence in space and time is just what existence (of anything) is

the 'I" does not exist as a mediated reality - a universal - as Hegel would put it -

such is just a theoretical construction designed to explain phenomena

once you understand that what we are dealing with in existing phenomena - and
existing conscious and self-conscious phenomena is function - the need to create
theoretical entities such as 'universals' is shown to be unnecessary and irrelevant
- and of no real value because such constructions actually lead us away from the facts
of existing things and states - they are in a sense alienating - strange aversions to
reality

the sense of 'I' that I have as that which is more than any particular experience of the I
(what Hegel calls the universal) - is the functioning of consciousness

in plain terms it is just the way the thing (consciousness) works - and yes as with
every other function of the entity - as conscious entities we can ask - how are we to
explain this function?

how are we - that is to explain consciousness?

well firstly what we are talking about here - and as far as I can see Hegel hasn't
recognized this - is self-consciousness

the function of consciousness that enables consciousness to hold itself as an object -

and this is essentially what the self amounts to - the reflective capacity of
consciousness

in truth we have no explanation of this - only the fact - the bald fact if you like - of it

it is to put it crudely the way the thing works

it is how internality functions

any metaphysical theory that addresses the nature of this - attempts some explanation
is of interest

it is of interest because it is the kind of question that we ask

and Hegel's theory is no exception here

the fact of it is though - we have no way of seeing outside of the world to have what
you might call an objective view of what goes on - in consciousness and in relation to
its object

Spinoza in response to this problem proposed the sub specie aeternitatis concept

a pretty idea - yes - but there is no such point of view -

there is no sense in speaking of a point of view - that would have to be outside of
existence - in order to see it 'objectively'

my argument would be that there are certain existing forms that are two dimensional

they have an inside and an outside - the inside is - internality is - consciousness -

the external world is the world outside of this internality - it is the physical / material
world

the relation between the two is not a relation of substances - rather dimensions -

the relation of inside to outside - a dimensional relation

and you can ask does it make any sense to ask the question 'how does the inside of
something 'interact' with its outside?'

the answer is no

the entity as a unity simply functions


103.


ARGUMENT:


sense certainty knows its essence is neither in the object or in the 'I'

and that its immediacy is neither the immediacy of one or the other

for in both what I mean is something unessential

the object and the 'I' are the universal in which 'Now' and 'Here' and 'I' - do not have
continuing being - or are not

we have to posit the whole of sense certainty as its essence and not one of its moments

it is thus sense certainty as a whole that stands firm within itself as immediacy - and
by so doing excludes from itself all opposition hitherto obtained


COMMENTARY:


firstly -

the simple fact of it is that Hegel has given the unknown a name - the universal

and yes it is true that the unknown has a reality deeper or more comprehensive than
the known

Hegel though really argues it is a known - not directly known - but analytically /
theoretically known

as a matter of fact he is wrong here about the unknown - it is directly apprehended - in
every human act

Hegel's universal is an attempt to give what is unknown the status of essential
knowledge

when all it is - is essentially what is not known

his theory of the universal is really just a result - or a reaction to the shock - the horror
- the anguish of finding there is nothing that we can say about reality other than what
we are presented with

the need - the desire to find an underpinning - a foundation to existence - is
consciousness reflecting on consciousness and finding - nothing else - beside its
awareness of its self and its object

Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to avoid the harsh reality of consciousness in the
world

it is perfectly understandable to wish to do this

the problem is that philosophically - you never do -

i.e. - the proposal of universals - just like the issue of immediacy it is designed to
solve - will be victim to the same problem

the problem of its (the universal's) foundation and basis -

the great advantage of skepticism here is its simplicity and its avoidance of deception

this comes at a cost - at least initially - there appears to be no comfort gained

secondly

to Hegel's - 'what I mean is something unessential' -

here lies the true 'essence' of things - of existence - that it is just what it is and without
underpining - without explanation -

this is why we can breathe

thirdly

the unknown presents in consciousness and in consciousness' relation to its object

what we experience in thought and action will lead us to question the nature of
consciousness and the nature of its object

we are presented always with the unknown

our responses to it are our means theoretical and practical - of negotiating this space

yes we reify our conceptions (universals gods atoms - whatever) - but all they are in
the end is stratagems for negotiating our way in what we do not know

fourthly

Hegel's argument that the whole of sense certainty stands firm within itself - and not
any of its moments - can only sensibly mean that the ground on which all our
activities take place is the unknown


104.


ARGUMENT:


sense-certainty as a whole stands firm in itself as immediacy

its truth preserves itself as a relation that remains self-identical and makes no
distinction between the essential and the non-essential

I take no notice of the fact that another 'I' sees the Here as not a tree - or that I myself
at another time take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day

on the contrary I am a pure act of intuiting

I do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another - but stick firmly to one
immediate relation - the Now is day


COMMENTARY:


consciousness moves in relation to its object

it is no surprise therefore that the object has no permanence in consciousness

and as we cannot 'see' outside of consciousness

we cannot establish the non-conscious nature of the object of consciousness

we understand there is an external dimension - and therefore its 'inhabitants' are not
internal - they are of a different dimension

consciousness is though the means of knowing

so our understanding of the external is consciousness dependent

out of this - if we are to speculate on the nature of the object in itself - we can only -
and as a matter of logic - recognize it as that which is unknown

if an entity has an internality it is conscious - if it has an internality - it necessarily has
an external dimension

the internal exists in the external

the external and the internal are therefore two dimensions of the one thing

in a logical sense we can understand the internal as basically a reflection of the
external

we can say what we apprehend in consciousness is the truth of that which is outside of
consciousness

but if so - it is a truth we can never be certain of

it is an uncertain truth


105.


ARGUMENT:


since this certainty no longer comes to us when we direct its attention to a Now that is
night or an 'I' to whom it is night -

we will approach it - and let ourselves point to it

for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this 'I'

were we to examine this truth afterwards - it would lose its significance entirely

we must make ourselves into the singular 'I' - which is the one who knows with
certainty


COMMENTARY:


this singular 'I' - which 'knows with certainty' is an illusion -

this particularity is immediate - but there is no certainty in this immediacy

the epistemological status of this immediacy is at the very least an open question -
hardly a matter of certainty

what I will put is that the immediate is unknown

the argument is simple really -

any 'knowledge' is reflective - and therefore by definition non-immediate

that which is immediate is therefore (by definition) - unknown

and what this amounts to is that experience - or what Hegel calls sense-certainty -
is unknown

this does not in any way take away from its reality - experience is indeed real - but it is
as immediate experience unknown

and it is for this reason that we reflect on it

'certainty' in epistemological terms is certainly (excuse the pun) not immediate -

it is a conclusion of an epistemological argument regarding status

in so far as I operate in immediacy I operate in the unknown

philosophers might have trouble getting this - lovers never have

it is also clear from what Hegel has said above that I choose my 'I'

i.e. I can place myself in an immediacy and operate from there -

this is to operate in the pure unknown

on the other hand I may take a reflective stance - a non-immediate position and thus
operate in a theoretical or explanatory mode

what is clear is that the 'I' that makes these choices is an 'I' that is neither of these
choices

that is no choice -

this 'I' - the underlying 'I' is simply the ground of choice in a logical sense

and so I would say it is best to regard the self as a 'logical place'

its reality is logical - which is to say - functional

pure function


106.


ARGUMENT:


the Now pointed has ceased to be in the pointing

the Now that is - is another

and so Now is just this - no more than just when it is

the Now that is pointed to has been - it has not the truth of being

'has been' is not an essence that is - it is not

it is with being we are concerned


COMMENTARY


we can mark a moment with a name - i.e. - 'this is red'

but the marker - as a mark persists - beyond the moment

if its reference is just to the moment - in the next moment it will not be true

for the statement to have meaning beyond its utterance - and this you might argue is
indeed the whole point of the mark - of the marking - it must be understood in a non-
momentary sense -

my 'moment' here is Hegel's 'immediate'

language thus we can say does not refer to the moment - to the immediate

the act of language as in utterance is immediate

the point of language as a marker is just that it is not immediate

so all this raises the question of reference -

if 'this is red' - does not refer to the content of a conscious apprehension of a moment -

what does it refer to?

what does the mark refer to?

and we can ask - what does any language refer to if the moment (that is gone) is not its
reference - and here I mean by reference - meaning?

my view is that there is no reference - that language in fact does not refer - in the
sense of correspond to

- or if indeed it does refer - strictly speaking the reference is unknown -

the point of language is just that it is a means of characterizing the unknown - and
enabling language users to operate in the unknown

this is what the making of marks is about in a logical sense

language in this sense is a sophisticated tool

my argument is that language is the reference - language is the making of a reference -

the mark made is the reference

there is no reference - no known reference - outside of language

that is we have reference - because of language

outside of consciousness is the unknown - language of any form is the means of
characterizing the unknown

characterization - that is the positing of reference - is necessary in order for us to
operate in and negotiate the emptiness

also it needs to be pointed out that the unknown - as unknown is without temporality -
or spatiality for that matter

temporal references that is to a present a past and a future - are characterizations of the
unknown

necessary characterizations if we are to organize our experience - our world

they are as with all characterization given by consciousness to the unknown

consciousness that is provides platforms for action

some platforms are indispensable - and others simply useful

the known world is a construct of consciousness

the unknown is the object of consciousness

finally -

'now' - is 'no-time'

it is no-time because it can never be marked

temporal sequencing is a reflective act designed to create relations between events

it is the relation of sequence

does this sequencing - making of relations - refer to anything?

that is does 'time' exist in some sense outside of the act of sequencing?

no

the act of sequencing is all time is

it is an act of order - of ordering -

the point of which is to give the unknown sequence


107.


ARGUMENT:


in this pointing-out we see a movement that takes the following course:

(1) I point out the 'Now' asserted as a truth - however it is something that has been - I
set it aside

(2) I now assert the second truth that it has been

(3) but what has been is not - I set aside the second truth - thereby negate the negation
of the 'Now' - and thus back to the first assertion - 'Now is'

the 'Now' and the pointing out the 'Now' - are neither immediate and simple - but a
movement that contains movements

the now is thus a plurality of nows

the now is a universal


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's universal is the solution to his problem of 'now'

the problem basically is that the immediate - cannot be maintained in reflection

any reflective reference to the now - can only be a reference to what is not now

the 'integrity of now' is lost in any description of it

Hegel does not want to say - therefore the now cannot be described - cannot be stated

for in his view this would ultimately lead to putting it in doubt -

Hegel wishes to avoid this skepticism

his answer is to say in fact the now is every now - that it is the universal

the cost of this move is that the immediate is lost

you could say time is lost

and in its place is a conception - an idea

the argument is OK

the problem though - is just that it doesn't solve the problem - it masks it

we can ask this question -

what is the status of the universal - in terms of time - in terms of the question of
immediacy?

if any assertion of now - is an assertion of the universal -

when I assert the universal - which universal is being asserted?

when I point to the universal what have I pointed to?

is it not the case that the universal I point out 'has been'?

OK - if not -

where is the universal in time?

if not in time - where's time?

and what relevance does the universal have to it?

the issue only gets to this if it is assumed that the term 'now' actually refers -

Hegel's analysis actually shows that it doesn't

but he doesn't want to accept this conclusion

his idea is that now is not a particular moment - but rather every moment

to go down this path renders real experience illusory and language meaningless


108.


ARGUMENT:


the Here pointed out is a this Here which in fact is not this Here etc.

what is pointed out is a negative

this which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they should be - in being so
taken they supersede themselves

what abides is a simple complex of many Heres

the Here that is meant is not a point but a movement through many Heres into the
universal Here


COMMENTARY:


the immediate cannot be described - what do we say of it - not that it does not exist -
rather that it is not known

such a view maintains the immediacy of the immediate - and the reality of its
unknowing

Hegel has missed this point - or simply refuses to acknowledge it -

my bet is that he just didn't see it

the idea of the unknown as the basis of knowledge - just too radical and simple a
notion for Hegel

be that as it may

the whole point of the immediate is its stillness - and yes we do recognize it as a point

any movement is conceptual - some way of understanding - of knowing the unknown

as I have suggested before - Hegel's ideas here are OK - in the sense that any serious
attempt to give form and content - to characterize the unknown is in itself valid -

but as such any such theory is secondary - that is it cannot be regarded as fundamental

and then of course there is the issue of the utility of the conception - just where and
how it functions

I guess you would have to say that Hegel has form here - the marks are on the board

Marxism at the very least is his legacy - in an inverted way

be careful what you wish for you might get it - upside down inside out

OK

nevertheless what we have from Hegel is philosophical fantasy

(and in principle as I have just said I am not against this)

but what he is doing at heart is completely and utterly denying the unknown - the
reality of the unknown

where this gets strange is that in his case it results in the identification of external
reality with actions of consciousness - with conception and a conceptual artifice of his
making

this is the problem - if you deny the reality of the unknown - you will invariably lose
perspective

you will end up thinking what you think must be how the world is

OK - from the point of view of action in the world - that is how you operate in the
moment

but fatal as a reflective view of the nature of things


109.


ARGUMENT:


the dialectic of sense-certainty - is the history of its movement - of its experience - and
sense-certainty nothing but this history

this is why natural consciousness is always learning what is true - but equally it is
always forgetting and starting the movement all over again

it is therefore astonishing that the reality or being of external things taken as This or
sense objects has absolute truth for consciousness

to say this is to say what one does not want to say

the truth for consciousness of a This of sense is supposed to be universal experience -
but the very opposite is universal experience

every consciousness supersedes such a truth e.g. Here is a tree proclaims the opposite
- Here is not a tree

what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense certainty is only that we
have seen the This as a universal

those who assert the truth of sensuous things should go back to the drawing board

you will come not just to doubt the being of sensuous things - but despair of it

we bring about the nothingness of such things in our dealings with them - and we see
them reduce themselves to nothingness

i.e. an animal will not regard such things as having intrinsic being - but assured of
their nothingness will eat them

all Nature like all animals celebrates the open Mysteries - which teach the truth about
sensuous things


COMMENTARY:


what happens to us - what we call experience is just the immediate awareness of the
unknown and the reflective response to that

how we conceive what we are presented with - is how we know it

much of this conceptual response is given in the frameworks consciousness brings to
bear independently of the experience - i.e. the frameworks of space and time - cause
and effect the idea of substance

and biological historical psychological and social contexts bear on any immediacy

our conceptual action in relation to immediacy - is our experience

how we describe this experience will have to do with the meta frameworks and the
contingent contexts we operate in - and every such event will even with these
surroundings have the potential of novelty - new knowledge - new discoveries

and in reality any description of this 'experience' will be no more than a valiant
attempt to come to grips with everything

as such of course it will fail -

and the reason for this is that consciousness though it can reflect upon itself - its
'contents' - can never grasp itself - can never contain itself -

any reflection is just a light into the darkness -

and really what this shows - illuminates is not what is in the light but rather the extent
of the darkness

we have experience and yes it is a multi-faceted affair - but it can never be determined

experience - my experience - even that experience had - is never closed

experience is by its nature an open proposition

immediacy disappears on reflection - or should I say the force of it

as soon as you reflect on what has happened you understand it in a broader context -

you know that to understand it cannot be left as an isolated event

you soon realize - without thinking that there is no such thing

all that really happens is that from your position in space time and given the nature of
your consciousness and body - you take one of the infinite paths possible to
consideration of the nature of reality as a whole

in practice we rarely engage - at least purposely in the grand metaphysical
consideration - but that is just because our circumstances generally confine us closer
to the dirt - however the path is there and it is just a matter of how far you go and why

I think it is true that in immediacy we do witness essence - or should I say essence
impresses itself upon us

and this is not a bad thing - for perhaps without this constant reminder of the unknown
and its power - we could easily get lost in and retreat into our conceptions

the point of consciousness is to give character to the unknown

it is fair to say consciousness is just a function of certain organisms - and of no
significance to the unknown it is the reflection of

as I have argued before - there is no certainty in sense - there is only the event of it -

what we make of it is a question - the proposal to regard experience as certain - is a
proposal that only is possible given the intrinsic uncertainty of the phenomena

sensuous things - the objects of sense experience - are utilized - this is what
consciousness enables - the utility of the objects of sense -

how men use objects - what they use them for - what they do to them - what the
results are - etc. etc. - is the history of human action

as to the end of any of this - the purpose - the goal - there are as many answers as there
are actions

in my view - events - any a kind of event - the falling of rain - the making of a box -
the act of love - the act of war etc. etc. are just happenings - acts - events

and they have no significance in themselves -

significance - meaning - is a gift - a gift of consciousness

and as to consciousness - its only meaning is in the giving -

outside of this it has no significance -

thus a consciousness that does not function - does not exist

the open mystery is a good - very good description of reality as unknown -

and yes - in a poetic sense - all nature celebrates - points to the open mystery


110.


ARGUMENT:


this that is meant cannot be reached by language i.e. that which is inherently universal

they would have to admit finally they are speaking about something which is not

the unutterable is the untrue - the irrational - what is meant but not expressed

if we say of something that it is 'an actual thing' 'an external object' - its description is
the most abstract of generalities - and expresses its sameness with everything rather
than its distinctiveness

'this thing' is anything you like - if we describe it more precisely as 'this bit of paper' -
then each and every bit of paper is 'this bit of paper' - and I have only uttered the
universal

if you want to help out language you can point as in 'here' - even so a universal -
and therefore what I know is not an immediacy but a universal -


COMMENTARY:


yes - in my terms language does not refer -

language is a construction designed to mitigate against the fact of the unknown

language thus is platform for action

the unknown is never extinguished in language - it is covered

and the covering enables action -

the forms and categories imposed on the unknown - are the logic of action

in this sense what we are talking about is a metaphysical pretense - we operate as if
we know

and we must - if we are to operate at all -

there is no metaphysical dishonesty here - it a matter of simply dealing with the fact of
the unknown - and operating in relation to it -

in reality - we do what we must -

the ever presence of the reality of the unknown though - ensures that unless we are
deluded - we do not operate with certainty - we operate in uncertainty

this is to say that even in the face of our constructions on the unknown - we are never
imprisoned in by our conceptions or by our actions

the unknown is the source of freedom - whether you like that or not -

immediate experience is essentially unknown

we only know it in terms of conscious reflection

a reflection is by its nature - a move from the immediacy of the experience

any reflection will place the immediate experience in a conceptual context -

you could thus say the that the price of knowledge is the loss of the immediacy of the
unknown

conception is a move from immediacy

it is as though nothing can be done with the immediate (of course - it is unknown) -
and therefore the only way to deal with it is to redefine it in a non-immediate context
- that is in an epistemological context

that is we make it - known - and in so doing for the purposes of action it is no longer
unknown

however the truth of its real character - as unknown - is not thereby lost -

we are left always - regardless of what we construct and what we do - with an
irreducible sense of wonder

we are left always wondering and in that sense always directly in touch with and
engaged with the unknown


II. PERCEPTION: OR THE THING AND DECEPTION


111.


ARGUMENT:


immediate certainty does not take over the truth for the truth is the universal

perception takes what is present to it as a universal

the immediate self-differentiating moments within perception are universal

I is a universal and the object is a universal

there are two movements: the movement of pointing out is the act of perceiving - the
other is the same movement as a simple event - the object perceived

in essence the object is the same as the movement

the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments

and the object is the approached togetherness of the moments

the universal or principle is the essence of perception -

and in contrast to this - both the moments are distinguished - that which perceives and
that which is perceived - are the unessential

but because both are the universal - both are essential

since they are related to each other as opposites - only one can be essential

one of them - the object defined as the simple entity is the essence regardless of
whether it is perceived or not

the act of perceiving as the movement - is the unessential movement

the unstable factor that can be as well as not be


COMMENTARY:


the problem with this argument about essence is that we don't know what essence is
supposed to be -

for Hegel it is as if the term speaks for itself

he speaks of perception and the object as being moments of the same movement

one would think therefore the movement is what is essential

if i.e. essence is just that which underlies phenomena - that which is the basis of - the
foundation of appearance - appearance of anything - then in so far as this essence does
not appear - it is unknown

now we can conceptualize here - Spinoza went for substance - as that which is the
logical basis of all that exists - Plato forms etc.

what is clear is that these are conceptions - conceptions designed to give some
character to the unknown - to as it were give it a voice

that is such conceptualizations are theories of the unknown

Hegel's essence is such a theory of the unknown - but not a very articulate one - what
does it tells us?

I don't really see how it adds to the discussion of perception and object

the question of perception is how to explain the object as independent of the
perceiver?

clearly the appearance of the object depends on perception - i.e. from one point view
its appearance is such and such - from another angle the appearance is changed -
relative to the first moment

what is it we are perceiving?

in what sense can we say there is a unity that is the object?

what is it that makes the object what it is?

we only have perception and conception - and both these ways of knowing - depend
on the object

so there is no 'objective' view

what we get back to is appearance

the object at place 1 time 1 through the eyes of A is y -

the object at place 1 time 2 through the eyes of A is yi etc.

if we are to speak of the object itself outside of perception - we can only say it is that
which can appear -

and really this is not much help - for it is only a statement about objects per se - not
about any object in particular

it is a conceptual argument

we cannot get to the immediate object

the immediate object remains unknown

so what do we perceive?

we perceive the unknown - (x at time 1 place 1 by A) and attempt to describe it -

any such attempt will be inconclusive - no matter how valiant

we will always be left with an incomplete picture

in Hegel's terms an unessential account

for this reason we can dispense with essence - and operate with confidence (so to
speak) with the unessential

the unessential is our best or worst response to the unknown

the point I want to make clear is that the unknown by definition is that which is
outside of consciousness -

and that whatever is outside of consciousness is unknown

it is a simple - but devastating point -

the object of knowledge is the unknown

the object of consciousness is to make the unknown - negotiable

that which is outside of consciousness is the unknown


NB.


the object is a function of consciousness

the act of perception is the establishing of a relationship between consciousness and
the object of consciousness

between consciousness and the world -

we can say the object is the point of perception

it is the focus

our relationship with the object - as phenomena - is given in the act of perception

what is perceived is given in this act

description of this - of the object - is an epistemological act

any description will place the object - the focus of perception in space and time - will
afford it substantial characteristics and sense qualities

do we say the attributes and qualities of the object are immediately perceived - that is
are given?

yes - we say this - but this is to give the object a description

and any description is non-immediate - which is to say it is reflective

it may be an 'immediate reflection' - but it is still a reflection

that is a move from the immediate event of perception

these reflective categories are given in consciousness by consciousness and for
consciousness

this is to say they are given to the object

for all intents and purposes 'object' is just that which is unknown and undefined

it is the 'point of perception'

this 'point' exists only because of perception - the fact of it - the nature of it

consciousness is internality

its object - is externality

its object is external to it - as a matter of logic

but its object - however that comes in perception - whatever form it takes - is - in the
first instance - unknown

description gives the appearance of transforming the unknown - to the known

we operate and negotiate our way in the world on the basis of description

the fact of the matter is that description is never determinate

it is just a false platform for action

the thing is though - without such a platform there could be no action


112.


ARGUMENT:


since the principle of the object is in its simplicity a mediated universal - the object
must express this nature in its own self

this it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties

the wealth of sense knowledge belongs to perception - not to immediate certainty - for
which it was only the source of instances -

for only perception contains negation - that is difference or manifoldness within its
own essence


COMMENTARY:


in truth can we speak of the object itself - outside of its perception?

outside of perception what you have is that which does not appear - that which is not
known

that which does not appear - that which is not known is the point of perception

that is the point outside of perception - that perception is directed to

it is this point that is the object independently of its characteristics

the characteristics of the object come into being through the relationship of perception

that is as a result of the act of perception on its point of focus

the fact of this event is the revelation of perception

as a result of this event we refer to the object as object -

that is a point of focus that has primary and secondary properties

the object is not manufactured by consciousness

it exists independently of consciousness (as an unknown) but the event of perception
reveals a definite relationship between consciousness and its point of focus which is
the object characterized - the object as a known

I say consciousness characterizes its point of focus - this is just what it does

we never perceive the object as just a point of focus - always as a revelation to
consciousness

nevertheless we can say that in the moment of perception - we only know what is
before us in terms of how it is described - though we describe as a matter of reflex -
logically speaking the description is still a reflective act - after immediacy

so perhaps you could say we perceive the object initially as unknown and known

and if this is so it suggests we perceive the object as it is and as its is perceived -

as it appears and as it does not appear -

if this is so - you have always a logically complete picture of the object

also I wish to say perception is specific

description may not be - but perception is

perception is focus

so - the object is that which is focused on -

perception defines the object - as focus

the characteristics of this focus as revealed in perception are the common reality of the
perception and the object - the common reality - the object perceived -

that is the event - the singular event - of the object perceived


NB.


what perception reveals is the known and the unknown dimensions of the object of
perception

that is as well as what is given in the act of perception - we are as conscious entities
aware of what is not given - what is not known

the known always comes to us in the greater context of the unknown - what is not
revealed -

the awareness of what is not known is the intrigue of the object -

it as an awareness that has two aspects -

firstly what is not revealed

and secondly - the origin - the basis - the foundation of what is revealed

what the reality of the unknown introduces into the world is possibility


113.


ARGUMENT:


the This therefore is established as not This or as something superseded - and hence
not as Nothing - but as a determinate nothing - the Nothing of content viz. of the This

thus the sense element is present - not as what is immediate certainty - rather as a
universal - as that which will be defined as property

the immediacy is a universal immediacy

being is a universal by virtue of it having mediation or the negative in it

when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated determinate property

many such properties are established simultaneously - one being the negative of
another

these determinacies are related only to themselves - they are indifferent to one another
- each is on its own and free from the others

the simple self-identical universality is itself distinct from these determinate properties
it has

it is pure relating of self to self

the abstract universal medium which we call 'thinghood' or 'pure essence' is a simple
togetherness of a plurality - but the many are in their determinateness simple
universals themselves

this salt is a simple here and at the same time a manifold - it is white and it is tart -
cubical and of specific gravity

all these properties are in the simple Here in which they therefore interpenetrate - none
has a different Here from the others - but each is everywhere in the same Here as the
others

and without being separated by different Heres they do not affect each other in this
interpenetration

the whiteness does not affect the cubical shape etc.

since each is a simple relating of self to self - it leaves the others alone -

and is connected by the indifferent Also - this Also is thus the pure universal itself -
the medium - the 'thinghood' - which holds them together in this way


COMMENTARY:


the relation of consciousness to its point of focus (the object) - results in the revelation
that is the 'object in consciousness' and 'consciousness in the object' -

the relation is appearance

consciousness and the object are outside of this relationship - this happening this
event of relation - unknowns

it is the relation that reveals consciousness and the object - as phenomena

the primary act of consciousness is description

the sensual properties of a thing are its natural affects on the body

in describing these natural affects we begin with the differing ways they affect the
body - we describe them in terms of sense experience

these are 'affective descriptions'

the thing itself is nothing more than its affects on the body

affects possible because of the way the body is -

that an object might affect different bodies in different ways - or the same body in
different ways at different times - just points to the fact that its descriptive
possibilities are not limited

the thing itself - if you want to go there - is just 'that which affects'

what distinguishes one thing from another is really just a question of description - how
it is described

the fact there can be no final - essential description is just testament to the fact that
consciousness and its objects are never fixed in time and place

any here and now is just an occasion for description

all that we have of the here and now is the history of its marks - that is the history of
descriptions

a thing's properties are its descriptions

outside of its descriptions the thing is an unknown

the thing itself remains the focus - the point of all descriptions -

Hegel's 'indifferent Also' is a conjunction

we can create complex descriptions of the object of focus by conjoining descriptions

the object itself is not in any way altered by this action

its revelation though is expanded

the point of any description is just that it is a platform from which we can act in
relation to the object of consciousness

it is a platform that suggests the possibility of action - of utility

what this in fact amounts to is in the end a matter of practice - what happens

in order to act - we must always defy essence

which is to say we must always pretend knowledge


114.


ARGUMENT:


if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another - if they
were simply and solely related - they would not be determinate

for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one
another - and relate themselves to others as their opposites

yet thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their
medium - which is just as essential to them as negation

the differentiation of the properties in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation
but is exclusive - each property negating the others - falls outside the simple medium

therefore it is not merely an also - an indifferent unity - but a one as well - a unity
which excludes another

the one is the moment of negation - it is a relation of self to self - and it excludes
another - and it is that by which thinghood is determined as a thing

negation is inherent in a property as a determinateness - which is immediately one
with the immediacy of being - which is universality

as one however this determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite - and
exists in and for itself


COMMENTARY:


how is that the one contains or is a plurality?

if so - what sense of referring to it as 'one'?

and yet - is not a plurality - many of the one?

if so what sense of referring to the 'plurality'?

we can of course take Hegel's road here - and say there is a contradiction at the heart
of being

this is an option - and it makes sense on the face of it

the other option I see is that we say the fact of the contradiction shows us that we
cannot go there

and where is there?

if we assert being is one - or if we assert being is many - or indeed that being is one
and many - we are making the claim that we can know the nature of being - the nature
of existence

that we can give it a formal characterization - and that we can assert this claim as a
true claim

in my view the fact that we can put forward contradictory metaphysical arguments that
ultimately end in contradiction - shows us that we cannot know the essence of things -
the nature of reality

a way of putting it is to say reality - itself - resists such a claim - and furthermore
denies it - throws it back at us as nonsense -

the trick I think is to see that concepts such as the one - or the many e.g. - are
strategies for dealing with the unknown

and by dealing with the unknown I mean in practice - we need certain ideas and
categories for organization and operation

understanding a contingency in terms of the idea of unity can in certain circumstances
be useful and productive

perhaps given different circumstances - different players different goals - the idea of
plurality may prove to be more useful - more productive

there is no guide to what tools to use - what tools to make - or what results can be
expected -

ultimately the solution to any problem of action is a shot in the dark

how we conceive the problem - how we conceive the solution - when and how we
decide to stop or to go on - is finally a matter without knowledge

Hegel's analysis goes awry in my view just because of his use of logic

the concepts of negation and contradiction are properly used in the assessment of
propositions - that is descriptions of reality

my point being - reality does not negate - the world does not contradict itself -

negation is an operation on a proposition - it is an operation of denial - 'it is not the
case that......'

the negation of a proposition is the assertion that the proposition does not apply to the
circumstances under consideration -

it is the assertion that given the way the world is the proposition has no function

a contradiction likewise is a propositional operation or outcome that shows the
proposition that contains a contradiction has no function

negation is an operation on propositions - it is not an assertion that reality contains
negativity - or in the case of contradiction that the world asserts and denies itself -

all our propositions are attempts to provide some basis for action - logic is a means of
determining the functionality of such propositions

reality as such - is not affected one way or another by our propositions

our propositions nevertheless can have function


115.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing as the truth of perception is:

(a) a indifferent passive universality - the also of many properties

(b) negation or the ONE which exclude opposite properties

(c) the many properties themselves - the relation of the first two moments or negation
as it relates to the indifferent element and expands into a host of differences - the
point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into
plurality

in so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are universal

they are related to themselves and do not affect one another

but in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are exclusive of other properties

they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from their
Also

the sensuous universality - or the immediate unity of being and the negative is a
property only when the One and pure universality are developed from it - and
differentiated from each other - and when the sensuous universality unites them

it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at last
completes the thing

so in summary:

the thing is a passive universality of many properties - it is also the one which
excludes opposite properties and the point of singular universality that expresses
plurality

we can distinguish pure universality and the one - sensuous universality (sensuality)
unites them

the relation of universality to the essential moments (universalities) completes the
thing


COMMENTARY:


yes - 'the thing' presents as a singularity that expresses many properties -

the 'properties' are descriptions given of the thing

'the thing' is a description that functions as the reference for the descriptions (of the
properties)

that is it becomes the reference - the term itself I am saying is the reference for the
descriptions given to it -

the terms 'the thing' or 'the entity' - 'the object' etc. are base descriptions of the
unknown that is the subject of focus

they are good descriptions in that they are clearly content free

they are simple recognitions that the unknown is in play -

they announce the unknown and are true to it

description here is the defining of a domain - or should I say the assertion that a
domain is established - for the purpose of description

secondary descriptions - what Hegel would call properties - give the base description
character - give the domain content

at this point for all practical purposes the thing is known -

what acts are performed in relation to it are dependent on the secondary descriptions
put forward

that is its capacity is directly related to its description -

there is no necessity in relation to description

entities are transformed by being variously described

the thing in itself - what Hegel would refer to as a universal - is the unknown - in
focus - an unknown

when Hegel says the thing is a negation of the one that excludes opposite properties -
he is suggesting that the thing is fixed -

which in my terms would be to say there is one set of descriptions that apply to the
entity - and that is that -

rather I would suggest that the point about the thing as unknown is just that it is not
bound by any description

true we will define a thing which means we will go with or run with a set of
descriptions - this is just a decision to utilize

what descriptions are used will depend on what purposes are in play - and how the
thing is to be utilized -

again there is no necessity in this

under different circumstance - inevitably different descriptions will be operative -

we can say it is the same thing because - whatever description - at heart the thing - the
object etc. - is unknown

description does not alter this fact - and this fact - the fact of the unknown - allows for
various descriptions - and is indeed the source of the possibility of description

the thing is never fixed - it is though a focus of possible description

one's circumstances - and I mean this in the broadest possible terms - will suggest
appropriate description of that which is the subject of conscious focus


116.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness is determined as percipient in so far as the Thing is its object

it has only to take it - to confine itself to a pure apprehension of it - and what is thus
yielded is the True

if consciousness did anything in taking what is given - it would by such adding or
subtracting alter the truth

since the object is the True and universal - the self-identical - while consciousness is
alterable and unessential - it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object
incorrectly and deceives itself

the percipient is aware of the possibility of deception - for in the universality which is
the principle - otherness itself is immediately present for him - though present as what
is null and superseded

his criterion for truth is self-identity - and his behaviour consists in apprehending the
object as self-identical

since diversity is explicitly there - it is a conception of the diverse moments of his
apprehension to one another

if a dissimilarity is felt in the course of this comparison - then this is not an untruth -
but an untruth in perceiving it


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is never determined - the essence of consciousness is indeterminacy

the object apprehended in the apprehension is made indeterminate

truth is a reflective argument of consciousness - in regard to its descriptions of that
apprehended

the 'object' apprehended is in itself neither true nor false

truth is a decision regarding propositions - their utility or not -

propositions are descriptions of what is presented to consciousness

to say a thing is self-identical - is simply to say it is a thing

identity per se is an illusion in this world - it is a mistaken concept -

every 'thing' that exists - exists as non-identical to any other thing

the object outside of consciousness is unknown - the object in consciousness is known
- as knowledge it exists as an indeterminate - this is the essence of its utility - its
indeterminateness -

the point is that our knowledge of the object is always an open question - that is it is
never finally resolved-

in practice we always run with some conception of the object of consciousness - but
no conception is fixed - the conception of the object - which is the object - holds only
in terms of its utility - conceptions change radically or ever so slightly depending on
how the knowledge functions

and the question of function is never determined - it simply just how we act - and
there are no absolutes in human action

there can be no incorrect apprehension - consciousness simply internalizes the outside
world -

what it does with this internalization - how the internalization is utilized - depends
entirely on the circumstance of the percipient - and here we include the state of the
body - the state of the immediate external -

all we can offer here is the possibility of different perspectives - different perspectives
determined by differing circumstances

what Hegel calls the awareness of the possibility of deception - is really only the
awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness

there is no deception as there is no determinateness -

there is only indeterminacy and thus the possibility of differing perspectives

you never deceive yourself -

therefore the question of the truth of the apprehension is a meaningless question


NB.


consciousness and self-consciousness

just a note here -

we do not have from Hegel as yet any real definition of consciousness -

and there has been to date no account of the nature of self-consciousness

I want to preempt here and put that all consciousness - is self-consciousness

that any distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be
maintained

my point is that all consciousness is aware of itself -

that is consciousness is aware of consciousness -

that it makes no sense to speak of consciousness as just aware of that which is outside
itself

for the awareness of the outside is just internalization

the object becomes consciousness

as such it is still the object of consciousness

but at the same time it is consciousness

it is subject and object

all consciousness is self-consciousness

consciousness by its nature is aware of itself

'itself' here is awareness

'awareness' thus by its nature is self-referring

this characteristic - self-reference - is what makes it awareness

it is what distinguishes consciousness from the non-consciousness

the non-conscious is not self-referring

it is simply what is - it is one dimensional

in relation to consciousness - it becomes the object of consciousness

further -

what are we to make of self-reference?

how can a subject refer to a subject?

we know this happens but how does it happen?

what is the logic of it?

the point is reference is based on the distinction of referee and referent

clearly if consciousness refers to itself - what you have is the identity of referee and
referent

on the face of it - this is not possible - if what we understand as reference is to occur

so sticking with this idea of reference - what is possible here?

that consciousness reflects itself

and that the reflection becomes the referent -

still the question - how does this happen?

perhaps we have no way of saying how this happens

but is it fair to say it must if self-reference is to occur?


p.s.


consciousness is internality

if it reflects - it reflects out

its reflection that is - is its relation with the world outside itself

its reflection is this relation - inter-internal /external

the 'self' that consciousness knows is this relation


117.


ARGUMENT:


the object which I apprehend presents itself purely as One - but I also perceive it as a
property that is universal - which thereby transcends the singularity of the object

the being of the objective essence of the one was therefore not its true being

but since the object is what is true - the untruth falls in me - my apprehension was not
correct

on account of the universality of the property - I must take the objective essence to be
on the whole a community

I now see the property to be determinate and opposed to another and excluding it

therefore the objective essence is not a community with others - on account of the
determinateness of the property I must break up the community - and posit the
objective essence as one that excludes

in the broken up One I find many properties that are mutually indifferent

therefore I do not apprehend the object correctly when I apprehend it as an exclusive

it is now a universal common medium in which many properties are present as
sensuous universalities

what I perceive as the simple and the true is not a universal medium - but the single
property by itself - which is neither a property or a determinate being - for now it is
neither in a One nor connected with others

only when it belongs to a One is it a property - and only in relation to others is it
determinate

as this relating of itself to itself - it remains merely sensuous being in general - since it
no longer possesses the character of negativity

and the consciousness that takes its object - as my object - has ceased to perceive and
has withdrawn into itself

sensuous being and my meaning pass over into perception -

I am thrown back to the beginning and drawn into the cycle which supersedes itself
each moment and as a whole


COMMENTARY:


the object I perceive is a possibility of description

it is in this state an unknown that is open to consciousness - open to interpretation

any conception of it - as e.g. - 'one' - is revisable - but nevertheless any such
description is true - as true as any other -

the truth of descriptions is determined by their use

the concepts that Hegel refers to here - the one - property - universal - common
medium etc. - are all in themselves valid -

that is the unknown can be defined and described in such terms -

for them to make sense we need to know their point or their use

what is clear from Hegel's analysis is the interconnectedness of such concepts and the
importance of argument -

argument is what relates one conception to another

on the conceptual level - the focus of consciousness - the unknown - becomes an
argument

here really is the beginning of objective status -

what was unknown is now argued - and as an 'argued' is at least a public entity - and
open to the possibility of description


118.


ARGUMENT:


thus it becomes quite definite for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially
constituted - that it is not a simple pure apprehension - but in its apprehension is at the
same time reflected out of the True and into itself

this return of consciousness into itself which is directly mingled with the pure
apprehension of the object -

this return into itself alters the truth

consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes responsibility for it -
by doing so it will obtain the pure object in its purity

we have in perception the same as happened in sense certainty - the aspect of
consciousness being driven back into itself - but not as this happened in sense
certainty - not as if the truth of perception fell in consciousness

on the contrary consciousness recognizes that it is the untruth occurring in perception
that falls within it

but by this recognition it is able to supersede this untruth

it distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth - and since it undertakes
to make this correction itself - the truth qua truth of perception falls within
consciousness

consciousness no longer merely perceives - but is conscious of its reflection into itself
- and separates this from simple apprehension


COMMENTARY:


consciousness' perceiving is a simple apprehension -

the object of this apprehension is given form and content in the act of conscious
attention

the object of consciousness - is embraced by consciousness

prior to conscious apprehension - the object is unknown

the essence of the object of apprehension - the fact that it is unknown will be at the
heart of any conscious apprehension and characterization

and in so far as this is the case - the truth is never altered - it is rather given new
clothes

the object as unknown is the pure object -

this reality is the pre-conscious reality -

consciousness imposes its categories on its object of focus - and these categories
function as the phenomenal dimensions of the object -

reflection on any of the attributes of the object apprehended - is to raise questions -

it is here that the uncertainty of the apprehension emerges

this uncertainty is a reflective uncertainty

yes the object in consciousness - as now an object of consciousness - is subject to the
nature of consciousness - and that is the essential uncertainty of consciousness

in reflection the object is uncertain

so it is in reflection that the true nature of the object of consciousness is revealed -

it is revealed as uncertain - and thus in any final sense - unknown

so we can say consciousness does not just perceive - but it reflects on its perception

however it is not the object that reflects to consciousness

the object is made by consciousness and reflected on by consciousness

before its making the object is unknown - after its making the object is unknown -
however in the making - the uncertain making - the object is given the possibility of
utility and function


119.


ARGUMENT:


I become aware of the thing as a One - and have to hold fast to it in this its true
character

if in the course of perceiving it something turns up which contradicts it - this is to be
recognized as a reflection of mine

there also occur in the perception various properties which seem to be properties of
the thing - but the thing is a one - and we are conscious that its diversity - by which it
would cease to be a one falls in us

so in point of fact the thing is one only to our eyes - tart to our tongue - cubical to our
touch

we get the entire diversity of these aspects - not from the thing - but from ourselves

and they fall asunder for us because the eye is distinct from the tongue etc.

we are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist
each on its own

through the fact then that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as
our reflection - we preserve the self-identity and truth of the thing - its being One


COMMENTARY:


the thing as one is no more than the focus of consciousness - consciousness defines
and determines its object

conscious definition is never fixed - so there is always the possibility of revision -
such revision though is always a result of a reflection on the initial perception

the fact that the object defined as one has properties does not take away from its unity

the properties are signs of the unity - they point to the unity -

the properties of a thing are our descriptions of it - they are our attempt to determine
the thing - to give it some utility - some possibility of function

no description is final - all descriptions are revisable - the thing in itself is unknown

it is true to say that the entire diversity of these aspects come from ourselves - and not
from the thing

and further that the very focus of consciousness - which is the thing - which makes an
unknown a thing of focus - which makes it 'one' - likewise comes from ourselves

the focus of consciousness however it is defined is never the truth of the thing - except
in the sense that we decide that it is - and we do this for our purposes

'the thing' outside of consciousness is the unknown - consciousness describes -

the unknown though is not made by consciousness - it is the object of consciousness


120.


ARGUMENT:


the diverse aspects for which consciousness accepts responsibility are specifically
determined - white is white only in opposition to black etc.

and the Thing is one precisely by being opposed to others

it is not by being a One that a thing excludes others from itself - for to be a One is the
universal relating of self to self - it is through its determinateness that it excludes
others

things are therefore in and for themselves determinate - they have properties by which
they distinguish themselves

the Thing has a number of properties

in the first place the thing is what is true - it possesses intrinsic being - and what is in
it is the thing's essence

secondly - the determinate properties do not exist on account of other things - and for
other things - but in the Thing itself - they are determinate properties in it because they
are a plurality of reciprocally self-differentiating elements

they exist in and for themselves

the Thing is the Also - or the universal medium in which many properties subsist apart
from one another


COMMENTARY:


my argument is that pre-consciousness - what exists is unknown - and that therefore
the object of knowledge - is the unknown

consciousness reveals the world - as the revelation of consciousness

so yes the sky is blue the grass is green and the farmer and his tractor are coming up
the road

what we perceive is the revelation of consciousness

now the question - can we say that the world of veridical perception is a true account
of the nature of the world?

can we start at least with this assertion?

my answer is that we don't know -

what we do know is that such a world is revealed in consciousness - it is what we
know - because of consciousness -

outside of consciousness - or let us say in terms of some other form of consciousness -
some other revelation - the world may look entirely different to how we see it

or indeed it could be that how we see it just is the way it is -

the point is we can't know the answer here -

so we are wise to regard the deliverances of consciousness for just what they are -
deliverances of consciousness

why a thing is white and has certain shape or taste - why that focus of consciousness
yields those descriptions is not a question we can finally answer - we only have these
deliverances - and the explanation that they are not properties of the thing - but rather
descriptions of it given in consciousness

now we may wish to explain this and account for it - and to this end sciences have
been developed

clearly our perception of the world is determined by our physicality - that is the forms
of that perception are determined by the body

consciousness as the internal dimension of a two-dimensional being operates through
the agency of the body

this though is not to argue consciousness is of the external dimension - that it is
physical -

awareness is not an external property - it is therefore not a physical manifestation

even so we can understand something of the way consciousness receives the external
world through an understanding of its immediate external - the body

the limit though that science has to recognize here is that it is only ever a reflective
argument - that is an argument after awareness -

understanding the surface world (the body and beyond) is not to explain the internal
dimension

the internal dimension is the seeing - it is the seeing that is never seen

we do of course reflect on the nature of consciousness - but again this is awareness
holding itself as object -

the subject truly cannot be the object - so any internal focus of consciousness will only
reveal consciousness

the point being that consciousness though it reveals - is never revealed


121.


ARGUMENT:


now in perceiving in this way consciousness is also reflected into itself

in perceiving the opposite moment to the Also turns up

this moment is the unity of thing with itself

this unity consciousness takes upon itself

for the thing itself is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties

positing a thing's properties as a oneness is the work of consciousness - and therefore
consciousness has to prevent them from collapsing into oneness in the Thing

it introduces the 'in so far' - preserving the properties as mutually external - and the
thing as the Also

the oneness here which was called a property is represented as 'free matter'

the Thing is raised to the level of a genuine Also - since it becomes a collection of
matters - and instead of being One becomes the enclosing surface


COMMENTARY:


firstly -

consciousness reflecting into itself - just is the issue of consciousness -

the fact of it is really not at issue - the question is - what does this mean - what sort of
'thing' reflects into itself -

the reflectivity of consciousness does distinguish it from the non-conscious -

but can we explain it?

can we explain its logic?

in the case of a physical reflection - i.e. - a mirror reflection - the reflection is external
to the thing reflected

what does it mean to reflect into the thing

what is reflected in?

is it consciousness -

or is it an awareness of consciousness?

and how does consciousness 'hold itself'?

and if it does not hold itself in reflection -

can it be said to reflect into itself?

I am hoping Hegel will throw some light on all of this -

just to say consciousness reflects into itself is really where the issue of consciousness
begins -

secondly -

it's clear isn't it that all conscious perception is the perception of a diversity in one -
and indeed a diversity of 'ones'?

this is just what happens in conscious apprehension

and what this diversity in unity leaves us with is uncertainty

and that I would say just is the revelation of consciousness - uncertainty

Hegel's 'free matter' here is simply a tag for the unknown -

and yes the thing is of the surface of the world - it is of the external dimension

consciousness is the inside of the world -

it is internality -

and indeed the external world encloses the internal


122.


ARGUMENT:


we see consciousness alternately makes itself - as well as the thing - into both a pure
many-less One - and into an Also that resolves itself into independent matters

consciousness finds - that not only its truth perceiving contains the distinct moments
of apprehension - and withdrawal into itself - but rather that the truth itself - the Thing
- reveals itself in this twofold way

our experience then is this that the Thing exhibits itself 'for the consciousness
apprehending it' in a specific manner - but is at the same time reflected out of the way
in which it presents itself to consciousness and back into itself

in other words - it contains in itself an opposite truth to that which it has for the
apprehending consciousness


COMMENTARY:


the relation between consciousness and its object - or consciousness and the Thing is
that of revelation

consciousness reveals - the object of consciousness is revealed

the revelation then is a revelation in consciousness

that which is revealed has the characteristics that are revealed

strictly speaking we cannot say whether these characteristics come from
consciousness to the object - or from the object to consciousness

there just is no way to decide this issue

all you can logically say is that what is revealed is revealed

so what we are talking about here is not consciousness 'and' the object or visa versa

what the revelation reveals is a relation

it is the relation that is revealed -

and it is because it is the relation that is revealed we can say - that what is revealed in
consciousness is just what consciousness reveals

that is that there is a complete correspondence

this is the first moment of consciousness - and it is what appears to be sure

the second moment of consciousness is reflection -

it is here that it becomes known that this initial correspondence - is without any
foundation - and even more devastatingly that we cannot characterize consciousness
or its object in any sustainable way -

that is to say consciousness and its object are 'doubtfuls' (to use a kind of Hegelian
term)

my point is you have the initial revelation - but a revelation is all that it is -

on reflection it is seen to be without a basis -

this does not take away from its reality -

what it does is show us that its reality is purely phenomenal

that there is nothing we can point to with any certainty - behind this appearance - this
revelation -

in fact all that is revealed there is uncertainty

we are left simply with what occurs -

we may wonder at this - and yes we do - and in response to this wonder we attempt to
give the phenomenal some underpinning -

this epistemological endeavour though is not really to do with the phenomena at all -

granted this is the almost universal assumption - that we are in theorizing foundations
- giving phenomena an epistemological basis and content -

in fact as I have pointed out - this can't be done

and if so the epistemological enterprise needs to be re-evaluated

what I suggest is that the whole business of epistemological is to do with utility -

that is how to operate with - to utilize - to work with the given phenomena

in practical terms i.e. it is often seen to be necessary to give our perceptions a basis
that is not perceived - in order to make the perception operable

so epistemology and indeed metaphysics are sciences of operation - sciences of action

the whole point of speculation is to find the best way forward -

I don't think that speculation ever actually delivers here - but it does give that
appearance

the final point is that we ultimately do not know - how to proceed - and this is of
crucial importance -

but nevertheless we must - and so we do - and speculation gives us options

options that is for dealing with the unknown


123.


ARGUMENT:


the object is now for consciousness the whole movement previously shared between
object and consciousness

the Thing is a One reflected into itself - it is for itself but also for another - a being
that is doubly differentiated but also a One - but the Oneness contradicts this diversity

hence consciousness would have to assume responsibility for placing the diversity into
the one - and for keeping it away from the Thing

it would have to say that in so far as it is for itself - the thing is not for an other

but the Oneness also belongs to the Thing itself as consciousness has found by
experience - the thing is essentially reflected into itself

the Also - or the indifferent difference falls as much within the Thing as it does the
Oneness - but since the two are different they do not fall within the same Thing - but
different things

the contradiction that is present in the objective essence as a whole is distributed
between two objects

in and for itself the Thing is self-identical - but this unity of the Thing is disturbed by
other Things

the unity is preserved - and at the same time the otherness is preserved outside of the
Thing and outside of consciousness


COMMENTARY:


consciousness recognizes what it is not -

it is not that which is outside of itself - it is not that is - its object

this is a base fact essential to the logic of consciousness

it is this fact which is the source of consciousness' identity -

its identity is essentially - what it is not -

consciousness can reflect on consciousness - and this is self-consciousness

the reflection of consciousness on itself reveals that it is - what it is not

and for all intents and purposes this is as good as it gets

that consciousness knows itself as what it is not

as to positive definition of consciousness by consciousness -

this does not occur -

the drama of this fact has led though to positive definitions -

and these are really definitions in panic

we hear it said that consciousness is spirit - is soul is mind etc.

but really consciousness is what its object is not -

there is a beauty in this definition - it is non-substantial - it is purely logical -

my specific point here is that the object is never compromised by consciousness

the object outside of consciousness is unknown

consciousness gives it knowledge - that is description -

the object is not a movement - it is a point of focus -

the thing is an unknown - it is given description in the action of consciousness

the giving of description - does not in any way alter the object - rather description
gives the object possibilities of use and function

different descriptions will give the object different possibilities - different utilities

the thing itself does not reflect - this if nothing else defines the thing - as what it is -
and what it is not

it is not consciousness

the relation of consciousness to its object - which is the phenomenal world - is a
relation of clarity and uncertainty -

this just is the relationship - it can be no otherwise -

we perceive the world clearly - the world is clear -

nevertheless on reflection - in reflection - it is uncertain

my view is that uncertainty is the gift of consciousness

that in a world without consciousness - no categories of thought would apply

we would simply have what is unknown


124.


ARGUMENT:


the contradiction present in the objective essence - is that the thing is self-identical
and its otherness is preserved - this contradiction is distributed among different things

different things exist on their own account - and the conflict is that each is different
from the other

each is determined as being a different thing - and its essential difference is its own
self

its self is a simple determinateness

it is an actual difference manifoldly constituted

but this manifold - in that it distinguishes a thing from others is unessential

thus the thing does have the twofold 'in so far as' within its unity - but the aspects are
unequal in value

this opposition does not develop into an actual opposition in the thing itself - but is an
opposition of the thing to that outside itself


COMMENTARY:


Hegel is here saying what distinguishes things is not essential to the individual things
- rather that it is unessential

and he says what determines the identity of anything - is essential

any account of the nature of a thing - of the logic of a thing will if it is successful
distinguish that thing from all other things

so I am saying that there is an argument that the essence of a thing is what it is not -
that is what is excluded from its definition

on such a view a thing is that which is not-known -

and it is to say we define entities negatively

that definition is a negative description

it is to put - is it not that 'x' is -x?

where 'x' here is a focus of consciousness - an entity to be described

and '-x' - the account of what x excludes?

my general point is that to define an entity with any precision will always entail a
characterization of what it is not -

for it is only in terms of what it is not - that we are able to differentiate it from
everything else

a corollary of this is that we cannot define everything - or the totality - or 'the' one' -
just because there is nothing to distinguish it from

the way consciousness determines its focus is by determining what it is not

the focal point is therefore never grasped positively - only negatively

what is clear here I think is that the essence of consciousness is negation

consciousness brings negation into play in the world

and it is through negation that it determines and distinguishes

negation is the essential operating category of consciousness

can we say that negation is consciousness?

that into a 'world of assertion' consciousness brings negation?

and the game is on


125.


ARGUMENT:


the determinateness that defines a thing and distinguishes it from all others - puts it in
opposition to other things - also preserves its independence

its relationship with others establishes rather its continuity with others - and for it to
be connected with others is to cease to exist on its own account

it is the absolute character of the Thing and its opposition that it relates itself to others
- and is essentially only this relating

the relation is the negation of its self-subsistence - and it is really the essential
property of the thing that is its undoing


COMMENTARY:


they key concept here is uncertainty

the thing or entity in consciousness exists - even in phenomenal perception - as an
uncertain

its identity is unknown

how we describe it - what characteristics we operate with in relation to it - is
dependent on what we want to do with it - what function it is to have

and of course a thing can have many functions and many descriptions - all of which
are useful and true

i.e. - from the point of view of atomic science we do not regard the thing as 'a table' -
rather as an atomic structure or state

the reality outside of any description - is unknown

the object of consciousness - the focus of consciousness does not have any absolute
description or function

knowledge is an attempt to deal with the world outside of consciousness

consciousness presents an alternative to the unknown

how that alternative - in whatever form it takes - functions - is not a matter that is
decided in any independent sense -

we simply make our decisions and run with them - and in the course of this running
make assessments (finally based on nothing) as to whether these decisions have or
have not borne fruit - whatever we decide that is to be - or is to mean


126.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing is posited as being for itself - or as the absolute negation of all otherness -
this is self-related negation

but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself - and so the thing has its
essential being in another Thing


COMMENTARY:


the thing as being for itself - what can we make of this?

'being for itself' must be being outside of consciousness -

of course we have no knowledge of this -

such being - for consciousness - is no more than a logical possibility

it is to say yes the world could be without consciousness -

and that such a world would exist not for consciousness - rather for itself

for 'being in consciousness' it is fair to say is being for consciousness

that is from consciousness' point of view

bearing in mind there is no other 'point of view'

in the sense that consciousness is the focus - brings a focus to being - that which is the
object of the focus - from the point of view of that focus - exists for that focus

OK - this though is what you have to call a consciousness-centric view

and yes - this is not a criticism per se - for indeed the practical reality of consciousness
in the world is that consciousness is metaphysically central

however we can think beyond such - or outside of such a conception

we can imagine a world without consciousness

and if we do this we are imagining a world without self

and in such a world the categories of being for itself and being for another - do not
apply

all you have is being -

now you can call this pure being if you like - or give it some other poetic
characterization

the fact is that we are only speaking - and quite precisely - of what we cannot know

this is the result when consciousness imagines its non-existence you come squarely to
the unknown


127.


ARGUMENT:


the object is defined as having within it an essential property which constitutes its
simple being for itself -

but along with this it contains a diversity which though necessary is not essential
determinateness

this distinction is nominal

the unessential which is none the less supposed to be necessary - cancels itself out

it is what has been called the negation of itself


COMMENTARY:


look the fact of it is that this 'essential property' that is 'simple being for itself' is
unknown

we can decorate the fact with such phrases - but in the end that is what it comes to -
decoration

we may wish to think of things as having simple base properties or essences and also
on top of this a collection of non-essential properties - and this way of thinking may
well be very natural - ingrained - and as it were necessary if we are to do anything
with an object or objects of our focus

but really all this amounts to is that consciousness characterizes the unknown - gives it
some structure and utility

my own view is that strictly speaking we can't say for sure what the origin of this
characterization is - on the face of it there are two options - consciousness or the non-
conscious -

origin is not really the issue - and it can't be decided

we have what we have and we work with it

my immediate response to this issue would be to say consciousness imposes its
characterization on the unknown - and I think there is value in looking at it this way -
it does set up the issue quite sharply -

however my considered view is as I just mentioned that strictly speaking once this
perspective is understood - it too must be held in doubt


129.


ARGUMENT:


thus the object in pure determinateness (essential being) is overcome just as surely as
it was in its sensuous being -

from sensuous being it turned into a universal - but this universal originated in the
sensuous and is conditioned by it - and thus not a truly self-identical universality at all
- but one affiliated with opposition

for this reason the universality splits into two extremes of singular individuality and
universality - into the One of the properties and the Also of 'free matters'

these pure determinatenesses seem to express essential nature itself - but they are only
a 'being-for-self' that is burdened with 'being-for-another'

as both are essentially in a single unity - what we have now is an unconditioned
absolute universality - and consciousness for the first time enters into Understanding


COMMENTARY:


what we have from Hegel is a series of descriptions of the object - and he believes that
the incompatibility of these descriptions - the fact that they 'contradict' each other - is
really because the object itself is contradictory -

first as I pointed put earlier contradiction is a relation between propositions - that is
descriptions of the world - it is not a fact of the object of these descriptions -

it is just that the object is described variously

now there are a number of ways of accounting for this

my view is that the object itself is unknown - and that consciousness gives it
characterization in the form of description

now consciousness itself is essentially uncertain - hence possibility - possibility of
description - and the fact of various descriptions

you might say that the object of consciousness is still (perhaps eternally so) - but
consciousness is not - it is not stillness -

granted it reaches for definition - definitiveness - absoluteness - stillness

this you might say is the desire of consciousness

but it is a desire that is never satisfied just because consciousness itself is without
definition - indefinite - unessential and contingent

perhaps it is desire that is definitive - not that desired

we might say the object - the objective world - a world of things - suggests a stillness -
and consciousness follows that suggestion - but in terms of that suggestion the result
is always futile

I've got a little away from myself here -

my point is that really Hegel is not in his metaphysics of the object addressing the
object at all - rather what he is doing is characterizing the movement of consciousness

Hegel confuses the object of consciousness with consciousness

also he assumes that consciousness knows what is the case

the truth is rather that consciousness never knows what is the case - hence
metaphysics


130.


ARGUMENT:


the singular being of sense vanishes in the dialectical movement of immediate
certainty and becomes universality

my meaning vanishes and perception and perception takes the object as it is in itself or
as a universal

singular being emerges in the object as true singleness - as the in-itself of the One - or
as a reflectedness-into-self

this is still a conditioned being-for-self - along which appears another being-for-self -
the universality that is opposed to and conditioned by singular being

these two contradictory extremes are in a single unity

being-for-self is burdened with opposition i.e. is at the same time not a being-for-self

the sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments by distinguishing between the
aspects - by sticking to the 'Also' and 'in so far as' - and finally distinguishing the
unessential from an essence

these expedients instead of warding off deception in the process of apprehension
- prove to be empty

the truth of this logic of perceptual process - proves to be in one and the same respect
the opposite of itself - and to have an essence of universality devoid of distinctions
and determinations


COMMENTARY:


sense experience as the immediate connection of consciousness to the world outside
itself - is strictly speaking without content

consciousness reflects on this immediacy and gives it form and content

the singular being of sense does not vanishes - it was only ever there as the contact of
consciousness with the unknown

my meaning is never definitive - perception regards the object as a sophisticated
unknown - that can be characterized and thus can be grasped for use

the 'single unity' does not burden us with contradictory extremes - the object is simply
essentially and unessentially - unknown

how consciousness regards the 'single unity' - depends on whether or not there is a
clear conception of use

it is not a matter of 'also' and 'in so far as' - consciousness deals with possibilities of
definition - possibilities of use - and the object does not have these possibilities -
outside of consciousness - the object as a question of use becomes a range of
possibilities

conception which is really only the operation of consciousness on perception - is
never without distinctions and determinations

that is so long as human beings have to act


131.


ARGUMENT:


empty abstractions of 'singleness' 'universality' 'essence' 'non-essential' - whose
interplay is conceptual understanding - are often called 'sound common sense'

philosophy recognizes them in their perceptual determinateness - whereas common
sense takes them for the truth - as substantial material content - in fact they hold sway
over it

the essentialities in fact run to and fro through all material and content

they are what the sensuous is as essence for consciousness - and it is through them
that the process of perception and its truth runs its course

this course of perceptual alteration constitutes everyday life and activity of
consciousness

in each single moment it is conscious only of this one determinateness - and then in
turn the opposite one

it does suspect their unessentiality - and resorts to the sophistry of asserting to be true
what is declared untrue

the nature of these untrue essences tries to bring together and thereby supersede the
thoughts of these non-entities

the understanding makes itself responsible for one thought in order to keep the other
one isolated - but the nature of the abstractions brings them together

it is sound common sense that is prey to these abstractions

it calls their deceptiveneess a semblance of the unreliability of Things

when the understanding separates what is essential from what is unessential - it does
not secure their truth but convicts itself of untruth


COMMENTARY:


these abstractions are based on nothing - that is there is no knowledge behind them -

they exist - Hegel's abstractions and anyone else's - as explanations of the relation of
consciousness to its object -

they are that is tools for organization - for procedure and ultimately for action

consciousness which has no basis in itself manufactures categories to function as basis
- as foundation -

the object as unknown is not diminished by these efforts - it remains unknown and for
this reason the categories hoisted onto it never sit with any authority -

they are infected by the nature of the thing - that is consciousness is aware even as it
uses such concepts - that they have no foundation - that they are just responses to the
unknown - and thus finally without basis

it is not that consciousness is involved in a conflict of truth over its abstractions - one
minute true - the next false -

the truth is just that consciousness knows it does not know - there is no conflict here

and truth is what functions - is what enables - clearly there will not be no end to such
an endeavour - and whatever is useful to this enterprise will find its place

its dangerous to speculate about the nature of common sense - but in my view what
common sense points to is conceptual openness

absolutes tend to be the refuge of insecurity - the trick is to understand that insecurity
is the grain of being - that it is the essential intrigue of conscious being


III. FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING: APPEARANCE AND THE
SUPERSENSIBLE WORLD


132.


ARGUMENT:


seeing and hearing have been lost to consciousness - and as perception consciousness
has arrived at thoughts - which it brings together in the unconditioned universal

if this was an inert simple substance - it would be one extreme of being-for-self - for
it would be confronted with non-essence - but if so it would be unessential - and
consciousness would not have escaped the deceptions of the perceptual process

however this universal has returned into itself out of conditioned being-for-self

this unconditional universal which is the true object of consciousness - is still just an
object for it

consciousness has not yet grasped the notion of the unconditioned as Notion

it is essential to distinguish the two -

for consciousness the object has returned into itself from its relation to another and
has become Notion in principle - but consciousness is not yet for itself the Notion -
and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected object

for us this object has developed through the movement of consciousness and
consciousness is involved in that development - and the reflection is the same both
sides - there is only one reflection

but since this is movement consciousness has for its content objective essence and not
consciousness as such

consciousness shrinks away from what has emerged and takes its essence in the
objective sense


COMMENTARY:


clearly Hegel wants to argue that self-consciousness or consciousness of
consciousness - consciousness holding itself as object - is an outcome a development
of consciousness' movement

in general on this issue I wish to say consciousness is self-consciousness

that it makes no sense at all to speak of awareness that is not in some sense aware of
itself

all awareness is self-aware

and I argue this is just what distinguishes consciousness from its primary object - the
non-conscious

the conscious dimension of an entity is the internality of that entity - the non-
conscious - the externality - is in the first place the body and then the external world
the body exists in

also it is clear that this primary distinction of consciousness and non-consciousness -
of internality and externality - mind and body - is only possible because consciousness
is aware of itself

it is this awareness (of self) that is at the basis of notion - of distinction

consciousness just does distinguish itself and it can only do this if it is aware of itself

and here too is the foundation of logic - for it is in consciousness' awareness of itself
that negation is introduced -

because of its awareness and the distinction this implies - consciousness is thus aware
of what it is not

and this 'what it is not' - is the basis on which - the 'other' is recognized and defined

just a note - it is important to see that consciousness does not as many philosophers -
principally Descartes - have thought - see the body primarily as its negation

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - consciousness sees itself as the internal
dimension of an operating unity - the non-conscious dimension of which is the body

so in this sense consciousness sees the body as itself revealed

and itself as the body hidden

the unity which is consciousness and non-consciousness - that is in a non-dimensional
sense - is unknown


133.


ARGUMENT:


with this Understanding consciousness has superseded its own untruth and the untruth
of its object

what has emerged is the Notion of True - but this is not yet a Notion - it lacks the
being-for-self of consciousness

the Understanding without knowing itself - lets go its own way -

this truth follows out of its own essence - consciousness plays no part in its realization
- it simply apprehends it

we must step into its place and be the Notion which develops and fills out

it is through awareness of this fully developed object that consciousness first becomes
a consciousness that comprehends its object


COMMENTARY:


consciousness superseding its own truth and its object's - is to point out that
consciousness posits or holds the object in awareness - and so too consciousness
posits or holds itself in awareness -

and the reason for this is the first realization of consciousness - that its object is
unknown - and the second realization (consciousness) is that it is unknown

whatever thus comes to be the object and the awareness of the object is never held
with certainty - consciousness deals with the world and with itself as uncertain posits

and this fact is the origin of consciousness' creativity - what I guess Hegel would call
its movement

the movement of consciousness is no more than its uncertainty in action

truth in fact is just a marker for consciousness - if a state of consciousness is marked
as true it is viewed as having function - if false - the mark is do not proceed - go
directly to jail

this fully developed object is just the unknown with layers of clothes - and the truth of
this adornment is only to do with whether these accessories enable the object to have
the function consciousness intends


134.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness negated its one-sided notions and abstracted them - it gave them up -
but the result is the unity of 'being-for-self' and 'being-for-another'

the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence

being-for-self and being-for-another are the content as well as the form of the
moments in reciprocal relation

but being-for-self and being-for-another are the content itself since the antithesis in its
truth can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result - that the content taken
in perception is true - belongs in fact only to form - in the unity which is dissolved

the content is likewise universal

no particular content could fail to fall within this unconditioned universality

in general to be for itself and to be in relation to an other constitutes the nature and
essence of the content - whose truth consists in it being unconditionally universal


COMMENTARY:


I would put that Hegel's unconditioned universal which he argues constitutes the
nature and essence of content - is effectively an abstraction that is empty of content -
and is a theoretical devise designed to empty content from perception -

for it is true that in the unconditioned universal there is no negation -

the reason for this - is I suggest - there is nothing to negate

the unconditioned universal is being put up as a category of knowledge that has no
content - it comes at the end of a rather tortuous logical route

what it amounts to is this - that reflective consciousness reveals perceptual /
/ conceptual posits as ultimately without epistemological content - that is as unknowns

what I have put is that the object of consciousness is unknown - reflection on this I say
- simply - finally reflects this reality -

this is the reality of the 'unconditioned universal'

in the meantime - between immediate perception - the perceptual unknown - and the
reflective unknown - is the operating reality of consciousness in the world

it is between the unknowns of perception and reflection that the world we deal with -
with all its features in tact - is to be found

veridical reality and its interpretations - is the world we operate in

the illusion of knowledge is the operating basis of consciousness in the world

consciousness is aware of the uncertainty of its posits - and finally of the relation that
creates them - and yet at the same time recognizes the absolute necessity of these
posits

these posits - which finally comes down to consciousness and its object - are real -
though uncertain - they are the 'foundations' of the world we operate in

they are nothing more or nothing less than operational posits

consciousness can never escape consciousness - to have any sense of itself - it must
hold itself as object -

this holding of the self as object - this subject positing itself as object - reveals a
complete absence of self knowledge

self knowledge I would suggest is an operating illusion of consciousness


135.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness - there emerges in it the
distinction of form and content - and in the shape of content the moments look like
they did in the first presentation - on one side - a universal medium of many subsistent
'matters' - on the other a One reflected into itself - in which their independence is
extinguished

these moments exist only in this universality - they are no longer separated from one
another - they are essentially self-superseding aspects - and what is posited is only
their transition into one another


COMMENTARY:


I have an argument with Hegel regarding his unconditioned universal - either it is
unconditioned or it is not -

if it is unconditioned it is without form and content - it is pre these conditions

and as such it is correctly understood as the unknown -

and in my terms the description 'unconditioned universal' can be dropped altogether

on the other hand if Hegel is offering a theory of the object - his unconditioned
universal as stated above - all very well - this is a reflective argument concerning the
unknown -

as I have said before as a theory of the unknown such a creation is in principle as good
as any other

but let's be absolutely clear here - what we are talking about is a theory of the object of
consciousness -

a theory of - the object is not this theory - the theory is a response to the object - and
here I mean the object is pre any such theory - the object 'in itself' is unknown - and
remains so regardless of one's ingenuity and imagination


136.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse universals

the universal an undivided unity with this plurality

these 'matters' mutually interpenetrate but are independent

their unity directly unfolds its diversity and once again reduces itself to unity

this movement is what is called Force

one of its movements - the dispersal of the independent matters in their immediate
being is the expression of Force

but force taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper - Force that has
been driven back into itself from its expression

Force exists only in thought

what has been posited is the Notion of force - not its reality

in fact Force is the unconditioned universal - which is equally in its own self what it is
for another - or which contains the difference in its own self

in order then that Force may in truth be - it must be set free from thought - it must be
posited as the substance of these differences

Force exists as an exclusive One - for which the unfolding of the different matters is
another subsisting essence - and thus two distinct independent aspects are set up

these differences are superficial vanishing moments

there would be no Force if it did not exist in these opposite ways

these two moments exist independently and supersede themselves

in general it is clear that the movement is nothing else than the movement of
perceiving

thus the movement which was the destruction of contradictory notions - has objective
form and is the movement of Force

the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something not objective but
rather the inner being of things


COMMENTARY:


the inner being of things - if indeed things have an inner being - is consciousness

the nature of consciousness is that it is inner - that it is internality

this is the essence of consciousness and effectively nothing more can be said of it

there are no substantial issues to the question of consciousness -

consciousness is not a substance - it is a dimension - the internal dimension that is
awareness

consciousness recognizes consciousness directly - which is to say internality
recognizes internality

or dimensional entities recognize dimensional entities - perhaps it is a recognition of
type

the point is not all entities have an internal dimension -

I would put it to you that from what we can see most of reality is one-dimensional

consciousness is thus exceptional

and what this amounts to is to say much of reality is one-dimensional - simply
externality

some of reality has an internal dimension

not very neat logically - somewhat skew-whiff - nevertheless - from what we can see
that's how it is -

such an argument would not sit well with Hegel - it is clear he does not want
exceptions in his universe

he has represented the object as an argument from consciousness - and extended this
description - as a matter of logic to everything

so the world of the universal and the universals within the universal - and the
movements of these universals - the movements of difference and unity - is for Hegel
not just a construction an invention an imagination of consciousness - but rather the
objective reality of the world outside of consciousness -

the hard and pure reality is that the world outside of consciousness is unknown

Hegel has indeed resisted this conclusion with every trick of the trade - and yes his
resistance has resulted in a rather magnificent work of art - one is often reminded of a
painter of grand scale and style when reading Hegel -

nevertheless the truth is any work that begins - only begins on a blank canvas

Hegel knows his grand picture is only a picture - and he has it mind for it to be the
reality - that is pictured - and for this picture and its reality to in some sense be one

for that to happen we need something to kick start it off the page - or out of the mind

enter force -

now the universal is force - and force of course will get everything moving

this jump from concept to reality here is reminiscent of the ontological argument of
Anselem


137.


ARGUMENT:


Force is itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as 'matters' - or in
other words - Force has expressed itself - and what was supposed to be something else
soliciting it is really force itself

it exists as the medium of the unfolded matters

but equally essentially it has the form of the supercession of the subsisting matters - or
is essentially a One


COMMENTARY:


it is clear that 'Force' becomes a characterization of the unconditioned universal - of a
One

and what this tells us is that the unconditioned universal - is undefined - it can
function as a ground for definition

in this case the idea that is being run through the universal is force

one gets the impression that any notion could have its place here -

that Hegel's universal does not discriminate regarding its use

this is OK - but what it really points to is that this universal is an unknown that
becomes the ground for description - in this case 'force' - but anything is possible

we can also see from this that language has meaning given particular use - given a
particular slant -

the term 'force' is a term that is designed to function in e.g. a dynamic context - in a
context that is - in which we wish to explain movement -

how far you want to go with this depends on how far you think the concept extends

if you end up thinking of it in a holistic way - the particularity of the concept is by
definition lost - you move into the realm of such indefinite terms as 'one', 'universal'
etc.

and its really at this point that function is lost

and this is why in my view such terms as 'universal' 'one' 'totality' are of no use

they are actually not positive concepts though they are often presented as such - they
are in fact non-functional concepts - that have been mistakenly accorded significance

perhaps this is overstating the case a little

clearly such concepts have function - but only in a formal sense

whereas when it comes to force e.g. we are dealing with a concept that defines action

we can I think also say of these formal concepts that in a metaphysical sense - they
function as signs of the unknown


they function as markers of the foundationless ground of consciousness and the world


138.


ARGUMENT:


what appears as an 'other' and solicits Force - proves itself to be Force - for the 'other'
is as much a universal medium as the One - and each of these forms appears as a
vanishing moment

the notion of Force - in that it has an 'other' has gone from a unity to duality -

instead of the antithesis we have two independent forces

the second force solicits the retraction of Force into itself - through its being solicited
to do so

this distinction between solicited Force and soliciting Force is transformed into the
same reciprocal interchange of determinateness


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's argument is that underlying the relation of the conditioned universals (in the
unconditioned universal) is Force

and here he argues that to understand the action of Force we must posit two forces -
or two moments of Force

and Force proper is essentially the alteration of these two moments - i.e. the second
force solicits the retraction of Force into itself

so we have a dynamic in Force - that is the action of Force

the question is I think - do we need to posit force as the explanation of - as the action
behind the movement of consciousness

is not 'force' here just an attempt at explanation of 'movement' - a definition if you like

a way of characterizing the 'action' of consciousness?

I think the answer is yes -

any explanation of consciousness will simply be consciousness reflecting on its own
action

which in effect is no more than just the very conscious event that is being explained -
for in the end consciousness is reflection

the real question is - how do we explain reflection?

characterizing consciousness as a relation of moments - or as the action of forces
underlying these moments - might prove useful in the sense that it does seem to give
us some kind of handle on consciousness

all very well

however any such characterization is just - in the end a reflection - on what?

on reflection

and this you could say is just what self-consciousness is -

we perhaps might like to think that each reflection on reflection - in some way reveals
more - goes deeper into the nature of consciousness

but in the end I am afraid a reflection is just a reflection

and we can only ever account for reflection via reflection

what does this tells us?

it tells us consciousness is an action (reflection) - and that is as far as we can go with
any analysis

does reflection on reflection - reveal 'self-consciousness'?

I use to think so - these days as I just said I think of consciousness as a kind of action

as an internal action

if self makes any sense - in my view it is just internality

and thus consciousness' awareness of itself as inside

that is it is awareness of dimension

and the inside is just the inside

your inside and my inside - no difference per se


139.


ARGUMENT:


the interplay of the two Forces thus consists in their being determined as mutually
opposed

the soliciting Force e.g. is posited as a universal medium and the one solicited on the
other hand - as Force driven back into itself

the first Force has its determinateness only through the other and solicits only in so far
as the other solicits it to be a soliciting force - and its determinateness passes over to
the other

the solicited Force gives the other its character as a universal medium - it gives the
soliciting Force this character because this determination is essential to it - because
this is its own self


COMMENTARY:


first up we have no explanation of force here -

what we have at best is simply an account of its 'logic' - its soliciting and its being
driven back into itself - there is an attempt to present a description of force as a
dynamic

this is all verbalism

in the first place Hegel just simply introduced force as a category and then did his
thing on it

his argument equally applies to 'x' - or any number of similar terms - i.e. 'essence'

OK - let's say Hegel just does want to introduce force - and say something about it -
because it is an important concept for him -

that is he is setting up his view - and force is in there

nothing wrong with this as such

the point is though we can read these paragraphs on force and really be none the wiser

yes we have various metaphors for its nature and action - but still it has no content

Hegel's description of force is a possible description of reality

that is a particular focus or slant on the workings of consciousness and the world

the term force has for us to begin with wide enough applicability -

from the seventeenth century at least the idea of force as a universal has been part of
the common understanding -

OK - what we need from Hegel is more than just the use of this concept - for it to have
(excuse the pun) 'force' - we need a compelling reason as to why such a notion is to
have a central importance - and a compelling reason is not just common parlance

as it stand all Hegel has done here is give the unknown - a name and some
characterization

there is nothing wrong with this - it is just what we do - but for the characterization to
be of value it needs to be operable - that is it needs to do work - to issue results

as it is with Hegel all we have at this stage is an empty name

this is not to say it might not amount to something - but at the present all we are
getting from Hegel is hot air - without force


140.


ARGUMENT:


the Notion of this movement exhibits a two fold difference - one a difference of
content - one extreme - the force reflected into itself - the other the medium of the -
'matters'

and as a difference of form - since one solicits and the other is solicited - the former
active the other passive

according to the difference of content they are distinguished for us -

but according to the difference of form they are independent - and in their relation
keep themselves separate and opposed to one another

these extremes are vanishing moments - the immediate transition of each into its
opposite

this truth becomes apparent to consciousness in its perception of the movement of
Force

but for us the differences are differences of form and content - vanished in themselves

on the side of form the essence of the active - soliciting was the same as that on the
side of content - Force driven back into itself


COMMENTARY:


consciousness in relation to its object - which we now understand as force -

we can only theoretically separate consciousness and its object

consciousness in itself is without object makes no sense - what is reflected in such
consciousness?

the object without consciousness is simply unknown - nothing can be said of it -

so we come to consciousness in the world - and consciousness in relation to it object

the key notion here is relation

consciousness and the object are the two terms of the relation

the relation is the unity of the object and consciousness

and the unity is what the object (the world outside of consciousness) is to
consciousness

and what the object becomes in its relation with consciousness

we can call the immediate relation experience

this experience is the connection between consciousness and its object

it is the unity

experience (the relation) is the ground on which consciousness operates

its operation is reflection

consciousness' reflection on this relation - on experience - is its 'knowledge'

the point is reflection is a reflection of the relation

not the object per se

not consciousness per se

consciousness and the object really are abstractions out of the relation

the relation is in itself - an unknown - even though it comes into being as
consciousness in the world -

that is the world as we know it - the world we operate in

we abstract from this to consciousness and its object

we abstract that is the internal dimension and the external dimension

but the real game is what is dead centre - the relation

that is the ground of being

now I think we can only approach this ground of being in terms of its dimensions - the
internal and the external

I don't think logically we can speak directly about the relation that is the unity

we can only speak logically in terms of its dimensions - with the understanding that
the real focus is what we don't know - the relation

nevertheless in fact in practice we do regard the object in terms of consciousness - and
we speak of consciousness as an object

what I think this shows is that we use the categories that we make as best we can to
cover the ground as best we can

reflection on this - which is what philosophy is - shows us very quickly that such
interchanging of subjective / internal categories and objective / external categories -
brakes down

and we are in analysis left point blank with what we do not know

this can lead to despair or creativity - the usual response though is to proceed as if
everything is in order - and to try and make something of it that satisfies our needs

most I think would admit that on reflection this approach is an illusion but a necessary
one


141.


ARGUMENT:


the notion of Force becomes an actual through its duplication into two Forces

these two Forces exist as independent essences - but their movement is each towards
the other - such that their being is a being posited by the other - their being has the
significance of a pure vanishing

they do not exist as extremes that are fixed and substantial - transmitting to each other
in the middle term of their contact a merely external property - on the contrary they
are only in this middle term and in this contact

in this there is immediately present both the repression within itself of Force or its
being-for-self - as well as its expression - Force that solicits and Force that is solicited

their essence is solely through the other

thus they have no substances of their own that support and sustain them

the Notion of Force preserves itself as the essence in its very actuality

Force as actual exists in its expression

the truth of it remains only the thought of it -

the movements of its actuality - their substances and movements - collapse into an
undifferentiated unity

thus the realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality - in that realization
it has become something quite different - viz. - this universality - which the
understanding knows at the outset to be its essence and which proves itself to be such
in the reality of Force - in the actual substances


COMMENTARY:


here consciousness and its object are instances of the one universality

the understanding consciousness has of the object - is the reality of the object

consciousness understands itself in terms of force and understands its object as force

this is if you like an account of the middle term - of the relation of consciousness and
its object

the relation is force expressed in consciousness - expressed in its object

'force' is the name of the universal

even so this force argument is post immediacy - post that is raw experience - it is a
reflective and indeed metaphysical account of the relation - of the experience

and yes it is true to say the relation is a relation of unity

the relation is the unity of consciousness and its object

we experience the unity

but the unity as experienced is unknown

consciousness reflects on this - on its unity with object and characterizes it - gives it
'substance' - or at least expression

Hegel's argument that the understanding knows immediately its essence and that this
essence is the actuality of the substances - is not correct

this 'knowledge' is not immediate at all -

it is a reflective argument - an explanation of the unity that presents - immediately -
without knowledge -

it is the ground of knowledge - it is what 'knowledge' rests on

in truth there is no explanation in the sense of a final account - just transitory
hypotheses - that function as explanation

Hegel's notion of force really just gives the unity - the unknown - a name


142.


ARGUMENT:


the first universal is the Understanding's Notion in which force is not yet for itself

the second is now Force's essence as it exhibits itself for and in itself

the first universal would be Force driven back into itself or Force as Substance

the second is the inner being of things qua inner - which is the same as the Notion of
Force qua Notion


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's method is to propose a general term i.e. 'force' - and to then argue that this
name applies to reality

granted we seek and need description of reality - without description we are simply
faced with the unknown - and while this may be a philosophically pure position - in
practice it is of no use -

language focuses and defines -

language is essentially a decision to act -

and for this to be the unknown is effectively disregarded

and to it - or onto it consciousness brings its frameworks

there is no one set of structures that can be applied here

the making of the known is a creative and ultimately baseless exercise

language is the assertion of coverage

so

indeed Hegel's method is essentially what does happen

where it falls down is that Hegel has not understood that the object of consciousness is
the unknown

and that whatever is proposed as its operational alternative - the unknown remains
untouched -

it is not transformed it is simply covered for practical purposes

therefore he is committed to holding that his argument is the truth

in philosophy this charge generally applies across the board

the best any of us can do is present a comprehensive and interesting perspective on
how the world is

what is in fact of most interest in a philosophical theory is ingenuity

what I say of my own view of things is that it's the best I have been able to come up
with so far - that it requires a lot more work - and as to its value in a public sense -
well that is finally a matter of sophistry and chicanery i.e. persuasion

but back to Hegel -

one other thing I would say here is that the idea of taking a term - and then showing or
arguing that it applies in all circumstances - that is the metaphysical argument - is
nothing from nothing

Hegel may well have used any term to have the function that 'force' has in his
argument

in the end he has simply resolved all description into one term

the result paradoxically is that the term has no content

the reason for this is that for a term to have content it must exclude

for this is what definition amounts to

you could ask well what meaning does language as whole have?

it has none

a statement has meaning relative to other statements

there is nothing that language as a whole is relative to

all the relations of language are internal

another thing to consider is the status of universals

here Hegel is speaking of the first and second universals

we must remember his universal argument was his solution to the problem of the
fleeting nature of experience - the problem of here and now

it strikes me that his multiplicity of universals simply is the same problem in different
terms - without his recognition of the problem -

what was the problem for him - now is the solution

it seems metaphysics is often just a matter of packaging

finally I want to say here that Hegel is quite confused about what is in and what is out

the 'inner being' of things is not the 'notion' of things

a notion is an idea had by a conscious human entity

if a thing has inner being it is a conscious thing

consciousness is internality

and the uncomfortable fact for metaphysicians is that not everything has an inner
being

non-conscious entities have only (relative to conscious entities) a surface dimension

that is they are pure externality

one's notions about things is consciousness' reflection

we make notions in order to effect action

our idea of a thing is simply a theoretical construction designed to facilitate action

the thing itself is mercifully free of our vanities


143.


ARGUMENT:


the true essence of things has the character of not being immediately for
consciousness

consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being

consciousness looks through this mediating play of forces into the true background of
things

the middle term which unites the two extremes - the understanding and the inner
world - is appearance

for we call being that is directly and in its own self a surface show

the totality as totality or as the universal - is what constitutes the inner - the play of
forces as a reflection of the inner into itself

in the universal - the totality - things of perception are expressly present for
consciousness as they are in themselves - as moments that turn into their opposite

the universal is the object that in itself possesses being

the being of this object for consciousness is mediated by the movement of appearance
- in which the being of perception has a merely negative significance

consciousness reflects itself out of this movement back into itself as the true

consciousness converts this truth again into an objective inner - and distinguishes this
reflection of Things from its own reflection into itself - just as the movement of
mediation is likewise objective for it

this inner for consciousness is an extreme over and against it - but it is for
consciousness the true - since in the inner as with the in-itself - consciousness
possesses the certainty of itself - or the moment of its being for self

but it's not yet conscious of this ground as the being-for-self is a negative movement

this for consciousness is still the objective vanishing appearance

the inner for Consciousness is certainly Notion - but it does not yet know the nature of
the Notion


COMMENTARY:


the true essence of things for consciousness is uncertainty

the world of appearance as a mediated world is this uncertainty

when consciousness looks through this play of mediating forces what it sees is the
unknown

and the unknown is the explanation for - the reason for - uncertainty

consciousness in relation to that which external to it - this relation is experience - is
appearance

this is the middle term

the understanding just is a function of the inner world - and here I mean not the inner
nature of things - but internality - that is consciousness

consciousness is the inner world

and I too would say that being that is directly and in its own self is a surface show

the surface as in the external world

the totality -

the 'totality' - as I understand it is that which is undefined - so any word denoting it is
dummy word - a marker or a placement that signifies the absence of definition

the universal is on the other hand a definition of type - the universal is that which has
members - it signifies membership - so it is just a general classification

its nature has to do really with how we describe - that is how language is structured to
operate in the world

in a way the universal is best seen as an approximation of particularity - a pointing to
it -

we never of course get to it - for it is the unknown

consciousness operates with universals - the universal is its stock and trade - the
universal is form

universals are essentially without content - they are merely proposals of category or
organization

we use them to gather particulars - to make particulars in effect - but the particulars
are just decided contents for a specific purpose

reality is never at issue - everything is real

the question is definition is description - it is here that uncertainty reveals itself as the
essence of consciousness

so the universal is not the object that possess being

the universal is an operation of consciousness - the universal is an action

appearance is just appearance - there is really nothing else to say of it

and what I mean here is that whenever we reflect on it - we come a cropper

a good deal of Hegel's thinking is about how to make appearance not what it is - to
give it a basis that has no movement - or perhaps he would say - higher movement

appearance is just appearance - and what this amounts to is that appearance - as with
any purity - is unknown

that is essence or essences are unknown

reflection is the dissolution of essence -

reflection makes the essence into object

the object thereafter is unstable

yes consciousness does distinguish its reflection of things from its own reflection into
itself

consciousness distinguishes itself from what it is not

that is consciousness - in reflection - distinguishes internality (itself) from externality
(what it is not)

it couldn't be further from the truth to say that consciousness possesses certainty

the essence of consciousness is uncertainty

the self is a reflective construct of consciousness - we are best to understand in terms
of its function - what such a construct enables

consciousness is the inner - and consciousness reflects - its reflection of itself - the
construct of consciousness for consciousness - is indeed unknown -


144.


ARGUMENT:


the inner truth as the absolute universal - purged of the antithesis between the
universal and the individual is the object of understanding

there now opens up above the sensuous world the world of appearance - a
supersensible world which hence forth is the true world

above the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond - an itself
which is the imperfect appearance of Reason - or the only pure element in which the
truth has essence


COMMENTARY:


for Hegel the inner truth is his conception - the universal - and it is clear that this
absolute universal - is just another reflective step back - or conceptual step back from
reality as given - from the unknown

it seems he wants to say this conceptual argument of the absolute universal is an
accurate description of how the world is - a true account - that the world is not only
understood as this - but is in fact - this

as a pragmatic argument about how to understand the world in order to operate in it -
in principle I have no objection - if it works it works

but clearly for Hegel it is meant to be more than this

the 'sensuous world' is a description of 'immediate experience' - is a description of
...... etc.

my point is that we never get to gold

every description is an attempt to grasp - and an attempt that in fact finally fails

for what it is that we are trying to grasp is the unknown

we are left to fall back on some syntax - on the structure of language

this becomes our foundation - even though we realize its inadequacy - it is all we have

so whatever the reality is that we immediately (whatever this means) come to - its
understanding or its knowledge - will of necessity be a step back

we don't need to posit a supersensible world

we just need to be realistic about the tools we have at our disposal

and we need to accept the uncertainty of our situation

positing alternative realities might be practically useful in specific contexts

however the ground is the ground - dirt is dirt

and all that is done by proposing super realities - is to move the issue of uncertainty
into another context

now you might be able to con someone that in so doing you have solved a problem -
give the impression that there is now an end to it

but in fact all such a move does is restate it

now I am not against doing this - and I think as matter of course this is just what we
do in life -

but let's do it in a clear headed fashion

understanding that what you are doing is re-conceptualizing a state of affairs that is
unknown

we have to deal with the unknown - such is the purpose and function of epistemology


145.


ARGUMENT:


the object now has the extremes of the inner being of Things and the Understanding
and appearance as the middle term

the Understanding sees the inner world through the middle term and it learns about the
close linked unity of these terms


COMMENTARY:


the object has no inner being or understanding

inner being is consciousness

understanding is consciousness operating with and on the object which in itself is
unknown

yes appearance is the middle term - it is the basic relation of consciousness to its
object

the understanding is reflection on this - on this relation

consciousness - the understanding recognizes itself as internality and it recognizes
what it is not - that which is external to it

it operates reflectively with the relation given between itself and the external world

appearance is this relation

'knowledge' is reflection on this relation


NB:


consciousness expresses itself

the non-conscious does not express - there is no self to express

the expression is a function of consciousness' searching for foundation

the foundation does not exist - this fact does not alter the rationale of consciousness

the outside world is the means of consciousness' expression

the immediate outside - the body - is consciousness means of expression

the body enables consciousness to function

the body is consciousness' mechanism

consciousness is the internal dimension of a two dimensional entity

the two dimensional function

the body - the external dimension

the unity that is the action - can only be comprehended in terms of its expression

the unity - in itself - the person - is unknown


146.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world for consciousness is still - a pure beyond - because consciousness does
not yet find itself in it - it is empty - for it is merely the nothingness of appearance -
and the simple or unitary universal

this mode of inner being of things finds acceptance by those who say the inner being
of things is unknowable

we have no knowledge of this inner world as it is here in its immediacy - because in
the void nothing is known - or expressed from the other side

this inner world is the beyond of consciousness

if no further significance is attached to the inner world - there would be nothing to
stop us perceiving something as true that is not true

the void - the holy of holies - we must fill up with reveries appearances produced by
consciousness itself


COMMENTARY:


the inner world for consciousness just is consciousness - consciousness is internality -
and this is all consciousness is -

now what this is - this internality is not known - it is an unknown -

nevertheless it is recognized as a dimension - the internal dimension

consciousness may attempt - in fact does attempt at every move to define itself - to
'find itself' - but the reflective realization of consciousness is that the lack of definition
is the definition of consciousness

the external world is surface - it does not have the depth of consciousness - that is it
does not have the dimension of consciousness

the surface is just that - the surface

appearance is strictly speaking a relation -

it is the relation that is the world experienced - that is the relation of the internal and
the external - it is the unity - given

Hegel has got it all wrong in my opinion

and his fundamental mistake is with the nature of consciousness

consciousness is internality

that which does not have consciousness has no internality

the external world - the outside of consciousness - the material world - is purely one
dimensional

so there is no question of the inner being of external things

they do not have an inner being

unless that is they possess consciousness

and from what we can see such is an exception and not the rule

so the inner world is not beyond consciousness - the inner world just is consciousness

Hegel's imaginary inner world of things has nothing to do with the issue of truth

what appears (the external world) is what is true - and what does not appear
(consciousness) is what is true

and as to the void - there is no void -


147.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world or supersensible beyond has come into being - it comes from the
world of appearance which has mediated it - appearance is its essence and its filling

the supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is in truth

the supersensible is appearance qua appearance

the supersensible is not immediate sense certainty and perception

the world of appearance - is not the world of sense-knowledge and perception - but the
world as posited as superseded - as the inner world

it is often said the supersensible is not appearance - what is here understood as
appearance is not appearance - but the sensuous world as itself - the actual



COMMENTARY:


appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object - consciousness and non-
consciousness -

the middle term is appearance

appearance that is - is the unity of the internal and the external

and this unity becomes - is - the actual ground of consciousness and the external
world

it is where we begin - though in truth it is not the beginning

Hegel's view here is very strange - appearance as the supersensible - as the inner world

it is not the inner world

and it is not supersensible

the inner world is consciousness -

appearance is a relation between consciousness and the non-conscious

there is no supersensibility involved here

sensibility is the relation between

the sensible world is a relation

what is given in this relation is in the first instance unknown

the relation itself though is necessary

reflection - the operation of consciousness is the creation of characterization

it is in reflection that we have 'knowledge of'

or to be precise the positing of knowledge

knowledge as that which gives us something to go on with

in itself it is nothing but a reflex -

a reflex of consciousness -

in principle no different to a reflex of the body

just the essential - natural - primitive action of the unity in action


148.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world has come into being for the understanding only as the universal - still
unfilled in itself

the play of Forces has the negative significance of being in itself nothing - its positive
significance is as a mediating agency - but this is outside of the understanding

the inner world through the mediation fills itself out for the understanding

what is immediate for the understanding is the play of Forces - but what is True for it
is the simple inner world

the movement of Force is therefore the True

what is present in the interplay of Forces - the soliciting and the solicited is the
immediate alternation of the determinateness that constitutes the sole content of what
appears - either a universal medium or a negative unity

it ceases immediately on its appearance in determinate form to be what it was on
appearing -

by appearing in a determinate form it solicits the other side to express itself - the latter
now what the first was supposed to be

but these two relations are again one in the same - and the difference of form is the
same as the difference of content

in this way there vanishes all distinction of mutually contrasted Forces - the
distinction between these Forces - soliciting and solicited - passive and negative -
collapses into one

there are no Forces - nor a determinateness of being - nor a stable medium and unity -
nor diverse antitheses

what there is in this absolute flux is only difference as a universal difference - or the
difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved

this difference as a universal difference - is the simple element in the play of Force
itself and what is true in it - it is the law of Force


COMMENTARY:


the inner world - is consciousness' reflection on its object -

its object is that which is to consciousness immediately unknown

the inner world - is just the characterizations given to the object by consciousness

and these characterizations or descriptions are decisions regarding how to operate with
the object

such operational decisions will always involve provisional definitions and strategies
for action

what is immediate for the understanding is the unknown -

which is to say consciousness' awareness that it cannot fix its object in a determinate
manner

and indeed the realization that it has no theory of what such a fix - such
determinateness amounts to

and further that any theory of determinateness even if provisional - is without
foundation or basis

this is to say the object despite its appearances is unknown

and further that the appearances themselves have no basis in knowledge

what Hegel calls the state of flux is just the fact of the unknown as a relation between
consciousness and the world

the relation is uncertain - appearance is uncertain


149.


ARGUMENT:


the absolute flux of appearance becomes a simple difference through its relation with
the simplicity of the inner world - or the understanding

the inner being is an outcome of the flux or the flux is its essence

but it is a flux that is posited in the inner world as its truth

in other words negation is an essential moment of the universal - and negation is a
universal difference

this difference is expressed in the law - which is the stable image of unstable
appearance

consequently the supersensible world is an inert realm of ideas which though beyond
the perceived world - for this exhibits law only through incessant change - is equally
present in it and is its direct tranquil image


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is the inner world - the inner world is the internal dimension - its
characteristic is awareness

the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious - between the internal and
the external - is the unity of these two dimensions - this unity is appearance

the characteristic of appearance is uncertainty

this uncertainty is reflected in consciousness and in the external world

uncertainty is the essence of awareness

the inner dimension therefore is not an outcome of appearance - of the uncertainty

in a metaphysical sense it exists prior to appearance -

appearance though is what consciousness deals with

the uncertainty of appearance becomes the ground of consciousness - it becomes the
basis of consciousness

the positing of this uncertainty is consciousness' reflection on appearance

assertion and negation are the operational actions of uncertainty

law is the denial of uncertainty

law is not first and foremost a stable image - it is rather the expression of the decision
to act in the face of uncertainty

action is the denial of uncertainty

law is a reflective description of the ground for such action

any such ground is to be true - groundless - however we propose it as if it has
foundation

the assertion of law is purely pragmatic -

it is finally based only on the need to act and to act in a 'rational' fashion - which is to
say an ordered fashion

the tranquil image of law is a ruse


150.


ARGUMENT:


this realm of laws is the truth for the Understanding - and the content of the truth is in
the law

this truth is only an initial truth and does not fill out the world of appearance

the law is present in appearance - but it is not the entire appearance

with every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality

thus appearance retains for itself an aspect that is not the inner world

there are indefinitely many laws

but this plurality contradicts the principle of the Understanding for which the True is
the implicitly universal unity

the many laws must collapse into one law

but when laws coincide they lose their specific character -

i.e. the unification of all laws in universal attraction expresses no other content than
just the mere Notion of Law itself - universal attraction merely asserts that everything
has a constant difference in relation to other things

the expression universal attraction is important in so far as it is directed against the
view that everything is contingent


COMMENTARY:


for the understanding truth is always an open question - we decide out of necessity -
but recognize that such a determination of truth is pragmatic

laws are descriptions of proposed regularities - they are formulations of reflective
analysis

the term 'law' has more to do with epistemological naiveté and vanity than anything
else

we understand a so called law holds if it holds at all only within the set of
circumstances it embraces or describes

any decision to use a law will involve the assumption that its content is true

a proposition is held to be true if we decide to proceed with it - that is - utilize it

a false proposition is a useless proposition

clearly a proposition regarded as true in one set of circumstances could be regarded as
false in another

it is true that our descriptions of the world - our proposals for order and regularity
cannot embrace the whole of appearance

however the 'whole of appearance' is nothing more than the unknown that has not
been characterized by consciousness

a law can be seen as the setting up of a domain of knowledge - in the totality of the
unknown

these domains - have currency so long as they effect action

we need to understand that at any time the great body of knowledge of the world is
essentially a proposal - or really a multitude of proposals for dealing with the
unknown

we can say that what is useful is good -

and this turns the light on utility - what is really useful to human beings?

it is clear that there is no universal answer to this question

my own view is that what is useful is what enables us to proceed

and that finally we all proceed or not in the unknown

Hegel thinks the true is the implicitly universal unity

this is rubbish

the true is what is useful

it is clear that this concept of utility implies multiplicity and flexibility

utility is the pure action of consciousness

'true' is the decision to proceed -

the basis of any such decision is another question -

it may be good or not

the decision is made -

the result will determine the wisdom of the action - or at least will be seen to - or held
to - so determine

yes the idea of a universal law - its value - collapses as soon as you come up with a
law of that kind -

any such law is without content

and it is so because by definition it excludes nothing

therefore there cannot be any particular content to it

nevertheless such 'laws' have value as myths - and out of myths come good stories -
and who's not up for a good story?


151.


ARGUMENT:


in contrast to specific law we have universal attraction - or the pure notion of law

this notion is seen as the essence - but the true inner being - the determinateness of the
specific law belongs to appearance

but the pure notion of law transcends not just specific law - but law itself

the determinateness is a vanishing moment - it is only the law that is true - not the
moment

the Notion of law as universal attraction must to get its true meaning - be grasped in
such a way - as what is absolutely simple and unitary

the differences in the law return to the inner world as a simple unity

this unity is the inner necessity of law


COMMENTARY:


the idea of the notion of law - of universal law is fair enough - it is just that - a notion

to define it so specifically as 'universal attraction' - is to give this notion - this
universal notion a particular characterization - and in so doing take away from the
universality of the notion

a universal notion - the idea of a universal law - may have some heuristic value - it
may - it may have some emotional value - but essentially the idea is the idea of what
we do not know

to say it is 'universal attraction' destroys the notion - and its value

it's really a case of trying to have it both ways - universality - and specific
characterization -

the idea of essence again may be a useful stratagem - but essence in the sense that
Hegel is putting - is - if it is anything - just what we don't know

I wouldn't say the essence is the unknown

but I would say essence is unknown

determinateness is strictly speaking an illusion and Hegel knows this - it's where he
began

what do we say of determinateness?

the best we can say is that it is the decision to act -

to say the notion of law transcends law as such - is just to do the Hegel thing - but
actually it is also to recognize that laws are made - and made for particular purposes -
and so there cannot be any universality - that is in our descriptions of reality

the notion of law is for Hegel - a necessary posit - it is almost for him it has to be -
even though we have no experience of it

he wants it to be the simple that underlies the complex of experience - the unity that
underlies the diversity

from a practical point of view I can see the utility of such

in practice we do use such a notion

however I would say the purest characterization of experience is to say it is unknown

for any other characterization i.e. as 'diversity' or 'unity' - is really an attempt to
establish a basis for use -

and it is here that contingency and necessity resolve into action


NB:


how are we to determine utility?

what is useful?

my view is that the issue is open

that in truth we don't know in any absolute sense what is useful

we face problems and we face the unknown

I think that which is useful is that which enables us to proceed in the face of the
unknown

now it could be said - well everyone proceeds anyway - no-one stops still -

there is always some action

but this is just to say from a logical point of view -

we have options and we will choose

yes

the question is what to choose?

and once the question is asked -

the state of skepticism is put on notice

so - the considered - the determined action - the chosen action - will be the act that
takes us out of a position of uncertainty

why choose one course of action and not another?

again there are no a priori answers here

we decide for our reasons

and we may find these reasons have no basis when reflected upon

but nevertheless they are the reasons for the moment

they are the reasons that enable - enable action -

they are the 'appearance' of reason

and this is what I mean by utility

- not just any action -

but a considered action

now why should this be a definition of utility - and not just a description of a certain
kind of action - i.e. - 'considered action'?

why that is - is 'considered action' - 'useful action'?

indeed - 'utility' is a philosophical classification

- no action is or is not useful in itself

to describe in this way is to place a framework on action

philosophically speaking there are any number of frameworks

action itself is - in itself - unknown

we give it characterization by framing it

there is no way of 'testing' philosophical frameworks - to decide - which is true

one's perspective here is an outcome of one's philosophical exploration

the argument is always - open


152.


ARGUMENT:


the law is present in a twofold manner - once as a law where the differences are
expressed as independent moments - and in a simple withdrawal into itself which can
be called Force in the sense of the Notion of Force - an abstraction which absorbs the
differences of what attracts and is attracted

simple electricity e.g. is Force - but the expression of difference falls within law - this
difference is positive and negative electricity

in the case of the motion of falling - Force is the simple factor of gravity - whose law
is that the magnitudes of the different moments of motion are related to one another as
root to square

electricity itself is not difference per se - not essentially the dual essence of positive
and negative electricity

it has the law of the mode of this being and it has the property of expressing itself this
way

the property is the essential property of this Force - it belongs to it necessarily

necessity is an empty word

Force must - just because it must duplicate this way

of course given positive electricity negative too is given in principle

but that electricity should divide itself in this way is not a necessity

electricity as a simple force is indifferent to its law

it's Notion is indifferent to its being

it merely has this property - which means the property is not necessary

definition does not contain the necessity of its essence - it either exists because we
find it or it exists by means of other Forces

that is its necessity is an external necessity

being through another is to relapse into a plurality of specific laws - which we left
behind in order to consider law as law

it is only with law as law that we are to compare its Notion as Notion - or its necessity

but in all these forms necessity has shown itself to be an empty word


COMMENTARY:


this law of attraction - that which attracts and that which is attracted - is a law that
cannot be put to the test - how could we devise a test to determine if the law does not
apply - in terms of this law - any state of affairs is either that which attracts or that
which is attracted?

it is simply a case of a universal statement - and as such - as it does not exclude
anything - it has no testable content - that is to say in principle it cannot be falsified

according to this law there cannot be anything that does not attract or is attracted

the only thing you can say for it is that it shapes focus - it directs our attention to the
subject of force -

in speaking of electricity as a force Hegel says it is not essentially positive and
negative - and it is not necessary that electricity should divide itself this way - that
electricity is a simple force indifferent to its law of positive and negative attributes

we can say here that any phenomena can be categorized and then described - and that
in essence this is the endeavour of science - levels of description

always we can say that the phenomenon in itself 'is indifferent to' its description

in describing consciousness places phenomena within more and more general
descriptive frameworks

this is the business of dealing with phenomena

outside of this dealing the phenomena is unknown

it is only 'known' in terms of the descriptive attributes given to it

I should point out - we never begin - in this descriptive process with a pristine state -
always we come to description - in the midst of a given description - it is in response
to this given description that we develop our theories - our stratagems for action

however at the same time we see that outside of description primary or secondary -
what is given is unknown

so yes 'definition does not contain the necessity of its essence' -

by the same token there is not I think any non-pragmatic value in retaining the notions
of essence and necessity

on necessity - to get right to it - we cannot know whether the world is necessary or
contingent - the world as it is - if such a concept makes any sense - is simply the world
undefined - which is to say unknown

contingency and necessity are best understood as tools - for dealing with what we face

they are concepts that have a role in certain activities and certain understandings

mathematics has used the notion of necessity as a concept fundamental to its
operations

and empirical science has done the same with contingency


153.


ARGUMENT:


in the law of motion it is necessary that motion be split up into time and space or
again into distance and velocity

thus motion is only the relation of these factors - the universal - is certainly divided in
its own self

but these parts do not express themselves in a One

they are indifferent to one another - space is thought to be able to do without time -
time without space - distance without velocity - just as their magnitudes are
indifferent to one another - since they are not related to one another as positive to
negative - and are thus not related to one another in their essential nature

the necessity of the division is thus certainly here - but not the necessity of the parts
for one another

but its just for this reason that the first necessity is a sham - a false necessity

for motion itself is not thought of as something simple as a pure essence - but as
already divided - time and space are in themselves independent parts or essences -
distance and velocity - modes of being - ways of thinking

if it is thought of as simple essence motion is no doubt gravity - but this does not
contain these differences at all


COMMENTARY:


what you have with Hegel here is the placing of common sense and the science of the
day in a philosophical arrangement

his philosophy is designed to show that the conceptions of space and time distance
and velocity - can be further resolved into the broader categories of his metaphysics

in this way his philosophy is descriptive

he is proposing a description of the world

now I say this world is the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious -
between the internal and the external

the world is this relation

science is a form of description - an account of this relation

what is clear is that there is no one account of the world - of the relation

human belief systems are testament to this fact of consciousness

how are we to judge one system against another?

what is preferable?

there is no standard that is not a player in the game -

descriptive systems are non-commensurable

what Hegel does is create categories which resolve apparent non-commensurable
theories

but this in effect is just to further fill out his own vision - to show that it has 'universal
applicability' - it is really just what any theorist will attempt to do

even so his description as a complete picture is just one of a number of possible
complete pictures

and as there is no true objectivity in any of this - there is no objective standard to
appeal to

you can only work within your descriptive framework - or change it - or take up with
another

this is the artistry of living - of acting - it is what we do

possibility - this possibility of different views of the world - exists because
'knowledge' - in whatever form it is expressed - is finally only a stratagem for dealing
with the unknown

the unknown gives us the reality of possibility - the indeterminateness of description

consciousness is the awareness of indeterminacy -

consciousness creates possible descriptions

these possible descriptions become real through our actions in the face of the
unknown


154.


ARGUMENT:


either the universal - Force - is indifferent to the division that is the law - or the
differences - the parts are indifferent to one another

the Understanding however has the Notion of this implicit difference just because the
law is on the one hand the implicit being - but is at the same time inwardly
differentiated

that this difference is an inner difference follows from the fact that the law is a simple
force - or is the Notion of the difference - and is therefore a difference belonging to
the Notion

but this inner difference still falls to begin with only within the Understanding - and is
not yet posited in the thing itself

it is therefore only its own necessity that is asserted by the Understanding - the
difference here is not a difference of the thing itself

this necessity which is merely verbal is thus a recital of the moments constituting the
cycle of the necessity

the moments are indeed distinguished but their difference is expressly said to be not a
difference of the thing itself - and consequently it is immediately canceled again - this
process is called explanation

a law is enunciated - from this its universal element or ground is distinguished as
Force - but this difference is no difference - the ground is constituted exactly the same
as the law

the single occurrence of lightning is apprehended as a universal - and this law is
enunciated as the law of electricity - the explanation then condenses the law in Force
as the essence of the law

this Force then is so constituted that when it is expressed - opposite electricities
appear - which disappear again into one another - that is Force is constituted exactly
the same as the law - there is no difference between them

Force and law have the same content


COMMENTARY:


a statement or law i.e. 'all a's are b's' - strictly speaking can never be asserted in the
first place - we have no grounds for such a proposal

so we ask what is going on in the proposal of law?

it is simply this - universal statements give the appearance of certainty

they are in effect a simple denial of uncertainty

and I would put that they therefore function as platforms on which and from which we
deal with - the true reality of uncertainty

for purposes of action we need such illusions -

they are false platforms - created for the purpose of looking forward and proceeding

in such proposals as 'all a's are b's' - what we have is an argument of unity -

the differences are there 'a' is 'a' - 'b' is 'b' - the argument is that all a's are b's -
which is to dissolve the differences - the particularities - into what -?

clearly just the notion of singularity

and this is really the logic of the idea of singularity -

the argument that particularity dissolves -

dissolves into what?

well here the answer is Hegelian in a sense -

into the opposite of particularity

now it's not hard to see that this conclusion - has no content -

multiplicity is given - unity is posited as its opposite

but here the argument as much of Hegel's argument does - assumes there is always an
opposite - and that the opposite has reality

it is true we can always construct an opposite simply by applying the negation sign

the fact that we can perform this operation - may well be very useful at times

however it doesn't follow that in performing that operation we are pointing to an
actual state of affairs

Buddhism and other mystical traditions are based on the fallacy of negative content

the notion of singularity I am suggesting is without content -

clearly though - even as such it has function in our thinking

perhaps it gives us the idea of space

and in order to organize our actions such an idea is necessary

it is clear that when Hegel speaks of force and law as having the same content what
we are getting from him is alternative descriptions of the unknown

these descriptions are - in terms of the unknown - equivalent

their difference is a matter of function


155.


ARGUMENT:


in this tautological movement the Understanding sticks to the inert unity of its object -
and the movement falls only within the understanding

its an explanation that explains nothing - only repeats the same thing

in the Thing itself this movement gives rise to nothing new - it comes into
consideration as a movement of the understanding

in it we detect what is missing in the law - the absolute flux - for this movement is
directly opposite of itself - it posits a difference which is not only a difference for us -
but one which the movement cancels as a difference

this is the same flux as presented itself as the play of forces - soliciting and solicited
forces - but these distinctions were no distinctions - and immediately canceled out

what is present here is not merely a bare unity in which no difference would be
posited - but a movement in which the distinction is made - but canceled

this process of explaining the to and fro of change - which before was outside of the
inner world and present only in appearance - has now penetrated the supersensible
world itself

consciousness has passed over from the inner being as object - to the other side - into
the Understanding - and it experiences a change there


COMMENTARY


yes - the canceling out of the movement - if this is what happens it is a canceling out
to what?

if the movement is canceled - what do we say of it?

that it is an illusion -

for either it is a real movement - which presumes movement is possible - actually
occurs - or it is not -

and as to the status of such - if it is an illusion - what is this to mean?

if it is a comprehended movement - it has some reality

if you want to then say - well reality just doesn't support such a movement -

then it's pretty clear your theory of reality is what is out of whack

the focus of consciousness is like a template that is placed on all conscious experience

if you want to say time moves on - then this template moves with it

the focus of consciousness - of a consciousness - is the action of a particularity within
a non-particular context

consciousness moves with the movement and therefore its focus - while a focus - is
never still

the object in this movement is rendered unknown by the movement

reflective consciousness fixes the object as an argument

this is how the object is held in consciousness

reflective consciousness theorizes and describes the object

this action moves it from the phenomenal realm into the theoretical

this theoretical realm is no timeless form -

the act of description and particularly its expression in language - as it were holds the
moment - this is the idea of it anyway

for operational purposes we assume we are then dealing with a fixed form - and one
therefore we have some hope of dealing with and of manipulating

but really all we have done is create a descriptive event - which in its complexity is an
argument

also it is worth noting we only operate on this level - in these terms given the very real
fact of memory

and memory here I will put is clearly a necessary function for and of consciousness

and it is clear consciousness can only function in memory given a certain physical
state of it functional external - the body

so I am saying the fact of focus - focus in time is no metaphysical conundrum - it is
just the fact of it

reflectively we can say this is what happens

and yes we can try and explain it - and for a lot of reasons - this can be an important
thing to do - it can help us function better in the world

but this is all it is - explanation is simply a ground for function


156.


ARGUMENT:


thus this change is not yet a change of the thing itself - but presents as pure change
because the contents of the moments remain the same

this change becomes for the Understanding the law of the inner world

the understanding thus learns it is a law of appearance itself - that differences arise
that are no differences and the self same repels itself

and differences cancel themselves - thus what is not selfsame is self attractive

thus a second law - difference which remains selfsame - this expresses that like
becomes unlike and visa versa

the second law posits the permanence of impermanence

consequently the difference exhibits itself as a difference in the thing in itself or as an
absolute difference

and this difference of the thing is thus the selfsame that has repelled itself from itself
and posits an antithesis that is none


COMMENTARY:


the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious is the reality we face

thus for consciousness the object of consciousness does not appear as the thing itself

the thing itself is for all intents and purposes an abstraction - if anything - an
abstraction from the appearance

so any change in the object is a change only in the appearance - the object as
appearance

the thing in itself - on a phenomenal level is irrelevant

as a reflective argument it has a function in consciousness - but this is a theoretical
function

the thing in itself cannot be known - so the issue of change does not arise

the object as an appearance is what?

well strictly we don't know

however the function of consciousness is to describe

so the object is consciousness' description

we know consciousness does not remain still

so descriptions change

in a logical sense the object of consciousness as an objective reality is the sum of
possible descriptions

and this does not presume some fixed point that all possible descriptions refer to

the point of descriptions is itself up for argument

these epistemological issues are never resolved qua epistemology

'resolution' is only a decision to move or proceed in relation to a conception that
provisionally stabilizes the object of consciousness

here it must be understood that issues of 'change' and 'sameness' are arguments that are
never settled qua argument

rather they are acted upon and the action is as close to resolution as is required

finally any action is - despite its apparent determinateness - an argument that can be
opened up


157.


ARGUMENT:


through this principle the first supersensible world of laws - the immediate copy of the
perceived world is changed into its opposite

the law was like its differences - that which remains selfsame - now it is posited that
each of the two worlds is really opposite itself

the selfsame really repels itself from itself - and what is not the selfsame posits itself
as selfsame

here the like is unlike itself and the unlike like itself

the second supersensible world is in this way the inverted world - the inversion of the
first

for the supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the perceived into the
universal element

it had its necessary counterpart in this perceived world which still retained for itself
the principle of change and alteration

the first realm of laws lacked that principle but obtains it in the inverted world


COMMENTARY


to account for the relation that is consciousness in relation with the non-conscious -

to account that is for the world that appears - a world that presents but is unknown -

it is necessary to abstract from the phenomenal - the world of appearance - to its relata
- consciousness - and its object

this is done quite instinctively - in fact it generally takes argument for us to see that
what we have -

what we are presented with is the unity -

that is to say appearance here is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious

and therefore these categories - conscious and non-conscious - are steps back from the
unity

the fact is though - and this is reality - we have no way of comprehending or dealing
with the unity - unless these steps are taken

so in practice - the analytical position is the working position - what we call the real
position -

and this is the division of the unity - into consciousness and non-consciousness -

this is the working posit - or the position of human beings

what I am arguing here is that we do not begin with consciousness as Descartes
argued

but rather that we begin with the unknown as the given reality that is appearance -

and that this appearance can only be analyzed if we see it in terms of the conscious
and non-conscious

it is in so doing that we apprehend the reality of a dimensional existence -

we see - we recognize consciousness as the internal dimension and - the non-
conscious as that which is external

so the reality of consciousness in the world - I'm suggesting is the actual state of
affairs - but it is also an analytical response to the unknown unity

consciousness recognizes itself - and its object - in response to the unknown

the unknown is where we begin

I hasten to add - the unknown is also where we end - but in the process we make a
world - which is to say we give the unknown a working character - many characters

the greatness of Hegel's work is in the fact that he doesn't flinch on the attempt to give
a comprehensive account of reality - he takes it on

and at the basis of this quite heroic endeavour is the assumption that we can know

I don't think he ever seriously questions this assumption

it strikes me that he attempts to begin in the midst of it all - that he has in mind the
relation of consciousness and the non-conscious as his central focus

for Hegel you might say it is then something of a juggling act - he has the two balls in
his hands

and what he argues for - what his juggling results in is the universal

the way I see it we begin with the unity and separate out to the categories of conscious
and non-conscious

my unity though it is 'appearance' - is in an epistemological sense - the unknown

Hegel's unity - the universal - is he thinks the unity of all opposites - the unity that is
knowledge and substance

my argument here is just that his universal is really no more than the unknown -

I am quite happy to accept that beyond appearance - and I mean this in the broadest
sense - is not what does not appear - but what is unknown

Hegel in my terms wants to make the unknown - substantial - a substance - the
universal substance

even if we were to begin with such a view - as Spinoza does - still the question - can
we even say of this (universal) that it is a substance?

to my mind - the granting of substance - though it may seem rather harmless is
nevertheless - without rational basis

by all means let the imagination run wild

Hegel's theory of inversion here - that what is perceived becomes its opposite in
conception is really his attempt to give some logical justification for his metaphysics
as a solution to his account of immediate perception

he can say here the world of conception is the real world - just inverted

if this is so - it is more than just a way of seeing things - Hegel wants to say it is in
fact a truer reality -

OK - but you can always ask - why?

if one is the inversion of the other - what is the essential difference - surely just a
matter of how it is seen?

and if indeed you can see the world in one of two ways - why go with the second - or
why the first?

also you can ask what grounds do we have for this inversion?

that is why ditch the standard view that consciousness is not an inversion of the non-
conscious world - or visa versa

on what do we base this idea of the reversal of position of the internal and external
dimensions?

in is in - out is out - the relationship is essentially logical -

you could say here - Hegel has solved nothing - that he has tried to create the opposite
to his theory of perception - by just inverting it - and is then presenting this as the
solution

logically neat - but where is the world in all this?

I have deeper concerns with his account here

as I see it the world of change and alteration is a conceptual world

what we perceive immediately is the unknown - the undefined - the undescribed

reflective consciousness gives this world character - and yes you can define it in terms
of selfsameness and its opposite -

and you can theorize further and argue to something like the opposite of this - Hegel's
universal

all this is well and good - but be clear what you are doing at every stage is theorizing
the unknown



158.


ARGUMENT:


according then to the law of this inverted world what is like in the first world is unlike
to itself and what is unlike in the first world is equally unlike to itself - or it becomes
like itself

expressed in determinate moments - this means that what is the law of the first world
is sweet - in this inverted is sour - what in the former is black in the other is white

what is the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet - in its other supersensible
in itself - in the earth - is the south pole

in another sphere revenge on an enemy is according to the immediate law to the
satisfaction of the injured party - this law forces me to confront him as a person who
does not treat me as such - and in fact bids me to destroy him as an individuality - this
law is turned around by the principle of the other world into its opposite - the
reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien personality is
turned into self-destruction

if this inversion finds expression in the punishment of crime and made into a law - it's
only a law of one world - which is confronted by the inverted supersensible world
where what is despised in the former is honoured - and what in the former is honoured
meets with contempt

the punishment which in the first world disgraces and destroys a man is inverted into
the pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honor


COMMENTARY:


it is clear that the world of the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness - that
which appears -

presents our perception and that perceived - as a unity

so that we can quite naturally say - what is - is what is seen

this is the first moment of awareness

consciousness does not appear in this unity

the object 'in itself' does not appear in this unity

what appears is the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness

so appearance is a singular experience

however the singular experience as a singularity is without differentiation

consciousness divides

it separates itself out and its object is that which it is not

the separation is based on awareness - awareness of consciousness - as internal - and
thus its object as external

it is clear that the essential logical category of consciousness is negation

the operation of negation - is the operation that defines and differentiates
consciousness from its object

opposition is one form of characterization of this act of differentiation (the logic of
negation)

and inversion - one kind of opposition

anyway the point is consciousness acts in this way -

and it transfers this action to the unity - to the world of appearance -

consciousness acting on and in this unity differentiates

this fundamental action forms the logical or metaphysical basis for subsequent action

action in the world of appearance - the appearance that is unknown independently of
this action

what thus really appears is the appearance of knowledge


NB.


the action of consciousness that reveals consciousness - that results in self-
consciousness is reflection

in the initial state the appearance is unified -

consciousness reflects and thus reveals itself

and in this action distinguishes itself and posits its object

the point here is that consciousness is - in the initial state unknown

unknown to itself

its action - reflection reveals

there is nothing deeper to this

reflection is just what happens - what occurs

it is the revelation of internality

and consequently of externality

this is the first reflection

reflection on this initial reflection is not revelatory in a phenomenal sense

it is interpretive and thus theoretical


159.


ARGUMENT:


superficially this inverted world is the opposite of the first in the sense that it has the
latter outside of it and repels that world from itself as an inverted actual world - that
the one is appearance and the other the in-itself - that the one is the world for another
whereas the other is the world as it is - what tastes sweet is really or inwardly sour

but such antitheses as inner and outer - of appearance and supersensible - as of two
different kinds of actuality - we no longer find here

the repelled differences are not shared between two substances - this would result in
the Understanding withdrawing from the inner world

the one side or substance would be the world of perception again in which one of the
two laws would be operative - and confronting it would be an inner world - just such a
sense world as the first - but in the imagination - it would be exhibited as a sense
world without its characteristics

but in fact if the one posited world is a perceived world - and its in-itself - as its
inversion is equally thought of as sensuous - the sourness would be the in itself of the
sweet thing - and it would thus be a sour thing


COMMENTARY:


Hegel introduces the idea of inversion

in the context of the consciousness and the non-conscious - it is an interesting idea

there is a neat logic to the idea that consciousness is the inversion of the non-
conscious - that what we 'see' is the inversion of what is -

while logically neat the idea has no content - what is inverted - is just what is (not
inverted) - in a different position - a different way of seeing - the same thing

the metaphor is geometrical

the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness can be seen as an issue of
position - but not in such a simplistic way - that is it is not just a matter of reversal

I have argued that consciousness is internality - the internal dimension of an entity
(that has an internal dimension) - and that this is a fundamentally different
philosophical position to the substance arguments of the Cartesians and the
materialists (brain-identity theorists)

I argue we understand a thing fundamentally in terms of its dimensions - that the
substance approach ought to be abandoned -

that is we can know a thing - whatever it is - dimensionally -

that consciousness recognizes itself as internal - and sees its body as external

and that the notion of the unity - as unity - is unknown

so yes my own argument about mind and body is meta-geometrical -

the issue is dimension not substance

dimensions do not interact - they are the formal characteristics of a thing -

and that which has two dimensions is a different kind of thing to that which does not -
or that which is one-dimensional is effectively non-dimensional

thus metaphysically speaking there are two dimensions - the entities that are so
constructed are those entities that have an inside and an outside

internality - the second dimension

we variously describe this internal dimension as 'mind' 'consciousness' 'spirit' - even
'soul'

the essential nature of such an entity as a unity of dimensions - is unknown

we describe the unity in either internal and external terms

there is no non-dimensional language - no way to approach the unity as unity

what we have here is the unknown manifested two dimensionally

this is where we begin


160.


ARGUMENT:


from the idea of inversion - which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the
supersensible world - we must eliminate the idea of fixing the differences in a
different sustaining element

and this absolute Notion of the difference must be represented and understood purely
as inner difference - a repulsion of the selfsame from itself and likeness of the unlike
as an unlike

we have to think contradiction

for in the difference which is an inner difference the opposite is not merely one of two
- if it were it would simply be without being an opposite - but it is the opposite of an
opposite - or the other is immediately present in it

certainly I put the 'opposite' here - and the other of which it is the opposite there

thus the supersensible world which is the inverted world has at the same time
overarched the other world and has it within it

it is for itself the inverted world - i.e. - the inversion of itself - it is itself and its
opposite in one unity

only thus is it difference as an inner difference - or difference in its own self - or
difference as an infinity


COMMENTARY:


the internality and externality of thing are its dimensions -

which is to say the formal characteristics of its structure

now Hegel describes the relation of the sensible to the supersensible as inversion

do we say the inside of an entity is the inversion of the outside?

this is to give the relation a definite characterization

the idea is neat in a logical sense - i.e. it does preserve the unity of the entity and yet
define the difference in terms of perspective

and it seems to acknowledge the inside-ness of consciousness

and yes we could just say the inside of a thing is the outside - inverted

why I resist this characterization is that it seems to carry with it much metaphysical
baggage - i.e. the sensible world is in a state of flux - the supersensible the home of
the universal -

this preserves the inversion but it is clear that the idea of inversion is not the simple
geometrical one - it is metaphysically loaded

I think this is a mistake

I think we can give a simple and elegant characterization of mind and body that can be
stated in terms that shows we do not need to fill it up with extraneous metaphysical
issues and properties

that is we can say an entity has an inside and an outside - and we understand this just
as stated - the notion of inversion is not necessary to the idea of inside - to the idea of
the relation of inside to outside

what do we say of this relation?

that one is the opposite of the other?

'opposite' is easy - but like 'inversion' it seems to imply more than just an essential
relation

internality and externality are essential qualities of a thing

these qualities are distinct - internality cannot be changed into externality or visa versa

the space of these qualities is distinct - they exist in different spaces

so I would argue it is not just a matter of a different perspective in the same space -
which is the inversion argument

mind and matter are different dimensions regardless of perspective

furthermore perspective is a function of internality - internality is not a function of
perspective

the internality of a thing is awareness

awareness is not the inversion of its absence

the absence of awareness is its non-existence

the non-existence of a thing cannot be inverted

there is nothing to invert


161.


ARGUMENT:


we see that through infinity law completes itself into an immanent necessity - and all
the moments of the world of appearance are taken up into the inner world

that the simple character of law is infinity means - (a) that it is self-identical but is
also in itself different - (b) what is thus dirumpted - which constitutes the parts
thought of as in law - exhibits itself in a stable existence - and if the parts are
considered without the Notion of the inner difference - then space and time - or
distance and velocity - which appear as moments of gravity are just as indifferent and
without a necessary relation to one another as to gravity itself - (c) through the notion
of inner difference - these unlike and indifferent moments or space and time are a
difference which is no difference - or only a difference of what is selfsame and its
essence is unity - as a positive and negative they stimulate each other into activity and
their being is rather to posit themselves as not being and to suspend themselves in the
unity - the two distinguished moments both subsist - they are implicit and opposites in
themselves


COMMENTARY:


the way I see it is like this -

the world we experience - the world of appearance is the first moment of awareness

reflection - which is an act or operation of consciousness divides the unity of
appearance into consciousness and non-consciousness

and so we understand appearance as the relation of consciousness and non-
consciousness -

the world as given - the world of appearance is initially unknown

the division of consciousness and non-consciousness - becomes for us the existential
reality and the analytical reality -

this is the second moment of awareness

and so we can say that the operational reality is a divided reality - in the sense that we
recognize that the unity has for us a conscious and non-conscious aspect

the understanding is that we can deal with the unity in terms of the relation of its
aspects

the world in the first moment prior to the reflection that gives us the awareness of the
conscious and non-conscious aspects is not a blank - but it is unknown

what is given in this first moment is analyzed in the second - so that what appears is
given characterization in consciousness

this is the beginning of the reflective process that gives us operational power

this power is the power of knowledge

this knowledge though is based on the unknown - it is consciousness' reflective
response to the unknown - and therefore it has no foundation other than operation

and the truth is we operate in mystery - in the sense that why the world just is the way
it is for us is never a matter we have - 'knowledge' of - but this understanding actually
makes no difference to how we deal with what we have to deal with

so for operational purposes the world of appearance - becomes that which is external
to consciousness

the inner world the world of thought is the resource we have to determine how to
proceed outside of thought

Hegel has it that all the moments of appearance are taken up into the inner world -

that which is outside of consciousness and is placed in the focus of a consciousness is
the world of appearance for that consciousness -

what this is for that consciousness is in the first place given in the very relation of
consciousness and the non-conscious - but what this means is always a reflective
possibility of the individual consciousness - and what it in fact means is shown in how
the person operates - which is just thought translated into action

it is not possible to ascertain the full meaning of any action - it is here that we are
faced with infinity - what in fact happens is we decide - that is cut-off the process and
determine - and in so doing we posit the finite - we make our actions and the world of
our action finite

infinity is the reality of the absence of knowledge

decision is the world made finite


162.


ARGUMENT:


this simple infinity or the absolute Notion may be called the simple essence of life

this self identical essence is related only to itself

each sundered moment is a pure opposite and therefore each the opposite of itself -
therefore not an opposite at all - but rather a pure self-identical essence

philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from this pure essence does difference or
otherness issue forth?' - for the division into two moments has already taken place -
difference is excluded from the self-identical and set apart from it

what was supposed to be self-identical is already one of these two moments instead of
being the absolute essence

that the self-identical divides into two means that it supersedes itself as an otherness

the unity of which it is usual to say that difference cannot issue from it - is in fact one
of the two moments - it is the abstraction of the simplicity or unitary nature over and
against the difference

but in saying the unity is an abstraction - it is only one of the opposed moments - it is
already implied that it is the dividing of itself - for if the unity is a negative it is
opposed to something - then it is eo ipso posited as that which has an antithesis within
it

the different moments of self-sundering and of becoming self-identical are therefore
only this movement of self-suppression

for since the self-identical moment which becomes its opposite is an abstraction or is
already a self-sundering - its self-sundering is therefore a suppression of what it is and
therefore a suppression of its dividedness

its becoming self-identical is equally a self-sundering - what becomes identical with
itself thereby opposes itself to self-sundering - it puts itself on one side - it becomes
the sundered moment


COMMENTARY:


first up the term 'self-identical' is meaningless - the phrase suggests a relation where
none holds - a relation exists between different things - therefore a thing is not related
to itself - if it is related to anything - it is related to what is not itself

likewise 'self-sundering' makes no sense - if a thing is sundered - it is sundered by
another thing

if 'self-identical' is the definition of essence - we can forget essence

alternatively we can simply recognize that the final nature of things is unknown

in saying that philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from pure essence does
difference issue forth? - Hegel is for a moment recognizing the truth of skepticism

that is he is acknowledging that we do not and cannot know the origin and nature of
reality

but this acknowledgment is short lived - it is in his terms 'sundered' and I think never
to be 'un-sundered'

really where Hegel shines is in his introduction of movement into the metaphysical
realm

and it is a useful concept in relation to the problem of unity and diversity

his idea in short is that the unity diversifies and that the diversification unifies
and that this movement is ongoing - that is it is of the nature of reality - reality is this
movement

his logic of opposites is the conceptual underpinning or description for this reality

and he can say that his logic expresses the movement of reality and that the movement
of reality is described or expressed in his logic

one cannot help but think that whatever else you might say against Hegel's argument -
there is no doubt his identification of reality as a movement is of lasting significance
and value

for Hegel - it is the movement - the fact of change that is unchanging -

and this for him is the essence of life

as to this movement - it is quite simply unknown -

Hegel devotes all his power to describing it - 'explaining' it - but really all his efforts
finally point to the fact that the 'movement' is no more than a name for the unknown

to my mind his dialectical argument amounts to saying that the idea of stable
knowledge is an illusion

and I would go the one step further and say that therefore this account of knowledge
and reality - cannot itself be held outside of it own logic

that is to say that such a metaphysics - like what it describes is only a moment in an
ever changing reality

language fixes it to a page - therefore it has the appearance of being what it is not -
unchanging

in fact like everything else it is ephemeral

from an artistic perspective it is a moment of revelation - even a moment of delight


163.


ARGUMENT:


infinity or this absolute unrest of pure movement - is being - is the soul of all that has
gone before -

it is in the inner world that it has freely and clearly shown itself

appearance or the play of forces displays it - but it is as explanation that it first freely
stands forth

and in being finally an object of consciousness - as that which it is - consciousness is
thus self-consciousness

the Understanding's 'explanation' is primarily the only description of what self-
consciousness is

the reason why 'explaining' affords so much satisfaction is just because in it
consciousness is so to speak communing directly with itself - enjoying only itself -
although it seems to be busy with something else - it is in fact occupied only with
itself


COMMENTARY:


it is very disappointing to finally get to self-consciousness in Hegel's argument - and
to get nothing from him

it appears that he does not see that the question of how the inner world of
consciousness becomes an object of consciousness - is the question that must be
answered in any theory of consciousness

it is not even on his radar - as if there is no question here

and this is the central issue of consciousness - the nature of self-consciousness -

how does the subject hold itself as object - how can the subject be object?

what kind of thing can be subject and object - how can we explain or comprehend
this?

to simply say - consciousness exists as 'object consciousness' - and thus consciousness
is self-consciousness - is at the best breathtakingly naive

in what sense - how - does consciousness exist as an object?

we have no account form Hegel on this issue

his next point is that the understanding's explanation of consciousness is the only
description of what self-consciousness is -

so on this view - the understanding is something other than consciousness

to be cruel here you could say therefore the understanding is by definition - non-
conscious - and this of course is ridiculous

or the alternative is - that the understanding is consciousness - and therefore
consciousness' explanation of itself is the only description of self consciousness

OK - so how does consciousness 'describe itself" - what is being described?

and again - how is that consciousness can regard itself as the object of consciousness?

these are all questions Hegel's seems not to have recognized - or if recognized decided
not to address

and everything depends on the answers here

finally it's clear that he has put all this in the too hard basket - and just taken the
apparently easy way out - an unexplained solipsism -

'it is in fact only occupied with itself'

as I said this is a sad chapter in Hegel's discussion

I was really hoping he would take this issue on - instead he has just sidestepped it

I am going to jump in here and put some conclusions -

consciousness is self-consciousness -

to be aware one must be aware that one is aware

so this is just the nature of consciousness - of awareness

by its nature consciousness is 'self-illuminating' - and this is where we begin

if so consciousness - does not become self-conscious

the categories of subject and object - of knower and known are constructs of
consciousness deigned to give some logical foundation to our dealings with the
unknown that is appearance

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - it is thus aware of its meta place

the world outside of consciousness is the external world

the external world is the object of consciousness

consciousness recognizes itself as knower -

the idea that consciousness is known - that you can know yourself - is to confuse
subject and object

consciousness does not - cannot know itself

'itself' is internal - the known is external -

consciousness is not external to itself

consciousness is aware of itself - aware of itself as unknown

this is the essential nature of consciousness - that it recognizes itself as unknown

in fact it sees itself as unknowable

the category of knowability does not apply to consciousness - only to that which is
outside of consciousness

awareness of self is simply and only the awareness of internality

and this awareness is not an awareness of something - of substance - it is an awareness
of dimension -

which is simply to say it is an awareness of logic - of logical form

that is consciousness' awareness of 'itself'

my view is that the world of appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object

that this relation is the common ground of conscious and non-conscious being - it is
the working reality

and so it is the case that consciousness reflects on what is given in this working reality

and what is it that is given?

I am going to put something quite radical in answer to this -

my view is that the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious is the common
reality that is image -

the relation of mind to its object results in image

the ground that consciousness comes to in the second moment is the world of image

I say this here to get to the fact that image is not a characteristic of the internal - and it
is not a characteristic of the external - not that such a view would generally need to be
argued

image is the relation

image is the reality of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious

therefore as object the image is reflected on by consciousness

it is this reflective action that transfers the image as reflection to consciousness

so it will be asked - if so what is the internality of consciousness?

most would say it is the world of image - at the very least

the internality of consciousness is thought

and thought is without image

imagination is the action of thought in the world of image

it is consciousness' dealing with the world of image

and what can we say of the nature of the this relational world - this unity of the
conscious and non-conscious?

it is not to be confused with the internal or with the external -

so how is it to be characterized?

my answer is both ways -

it's really the Blues Brother's joke - "what kind of music have you got here?" "we got
both kinds - country and western"

the point is - we can only explain the unity in terms of thought or non-thought

in terms of mind or matter

the unity that is the unity of mind and matter is not definable - it is unknown


164.


ARGUMENT:


infinity becomes the object of the Understanding - but the Understanding falls short of
infinity as such - since it apportions to two worlds - that which is a difference in itself
- the self-repulsion of the selfsame and the self-attraction of the unlike

to the Understanding the movement as it is found in experience is a mere happening -
and the selfsame and the unlike are predicates whose essence is an inert substrate

what is for the Understanding an object in a sensuous covering - is for us a pure
Notion

the exposition of its Notion belongs to science - consciousness immediately has this
Notion - and the notion comes onto the scene as a form belonging to consciousness
itself - or as a new shape of consciousness

since this object of infinity is an object for consciousness - the latter is consciousness
of a difference that is no less immediately canceled

consciousness is for its own self - it is a distinguishing of that which contains no
difference - or self-consciousness

I distinguish myself from myself - and in doing so I am directly aware that what is
distinguished from myself is not different from me

I - the selfsame being repel myself from myself - but what is posited as distinct from
me or as unlike me - is immediately in being so distinguished - not a distinction for
me

it is true that consciousness of an 'other' - of an object in general - is itself necessarily
self-consciousness - a reflectedness-into-self - consciousness of itself - in its otherness

the necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth
was a Thing - an 'other' than themselves - expresses just this - that not only is
consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness - but that self-
consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes

but it is only for us that this truth exists - not yet for consciousness

but self-consciousness has become simply for itself - not yet as a unity with
consciousness in general


COMMENTARY:


infinity in the sense of a conception of the endless or the boundless is a pseudo
conception in that a concept is a concept because it is bound or defined - that is if this
infinity makes some kind of existential sense - it cannot be conceived - what you have
here is the mistake that the non-concept refers or signifies - an example of the general
logical error that the negative refers - or is a sign of a kind of reality - when in fact all
the negative is - is a sign of decision - the decision not to proceed -

beyond what is conceived - is relative to the conception - that which is not known -
this is the best that can be made of this 'infinity theory'

the 'mere happening' Hegel refers to is just a description of the fact of consciousness
facing the unknown - this unknown or 'mere happening' is the object of consciousness
- it is just what consciousness must and does make something of

the 'object in a sensuous covering' is the world of appearance - that is the relation of
consciousness and the non-conscious - the ground which consciousness reflectively
interprets - for us it is a pure notion in the sense that it is the unknown - this is its
'purity' - if you want to go down the poetic track

science is indeed a tool for the exposition of the world of appearance as it is given as
an unknown - and yes consciousness immediately has this notion - it is what is given
to consciousness - just in the act of consciousness' relation to the non-conscious - and
yes the notion as any notion does belong to consciousness - the notion is a creation of
consciousness - and notions do give consciousness a characterization - but in so far as
consciousness is a dimension - the internal dimension - what you will have is the play
of shapes within this space

Hegel defines self-consciousness as that which contains no difference - all this
amounts to is the idea that self-consciousness is a unity - which in my terms is to say
it is the internal dimension of a thing -

now I happen to think that all consciousness is self consciousness - and that therefore
any distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness is a false distinction -
but for Hegel consciousness is not self-consciousness - self-consciousness is some
kind of development of consciousness

therefore to say that self-consciousness is that with no difference - is really to say
nothing -

we have no theory of self-consciousness from Hegel

he says I distinguish myself from myself - this makes no sense - there is no proper use
of logic here - that which is - may be distinguished from that which is not - that which
is therefore outside of itself - consciousness may distinguish that which it is not i.e. -
the external world - but 'itself' - is not - external to consciousness

his idea that I repel myself from myself suggests the beginning of some kind of theory
of how consciousness can create 'itself' - strange as this idea might be - but this line of
inquiry ends quickly with the realization that any such distinction is 'not a distinction
for me'

but the real kicker comes next - the argument that the 'other' is itself necessarily self-
consciousness

as they say you can run but you can't hide - and this is the position Hegel is in - he has
no where to go -

his failure to understand that consciousness / self-consciousness is internality - and
that its object is externality - his failure that is to recognize and or establish the
external world - as external - has left him only with consciousness - we cannot even
say - 'the internal' - for Hegel does not understand that the essence of consciousness is
internality - therefore his 'consciousness' - is nothing - literally nothing - the term has
no meaning as a result of his deliberations -

he can't even retreat into solipsism - there is literally nowhere to go - for to this point
he hasn't managed to establish the self - let alone the self as everything

what you have from Hegel is like an archeological expedition that covers all the
ground and uses every tool available - and even makes a number of new tools - but in
the end after all the blood and sweat - all the high hopes and grand endeavours - finds
nothing - and leaves nothing but a hole where once there was a serene landscape


165.


ARGUMENT:


we see that in the inner world of appearance the Understanding comes to know
nothing else but appearance - not in the shape of a play of forces - rather it is the play
of forces in its absolutely universal moments - in fact the Understanding experiences
only itself

raised above perception consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with the
supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance - through which it
gazes into this background lying behind appearance

the two extremes - the one of the pure inner world - the other that of the inner being
gazing into this pure world - have now coincided - and have vanished - so too the
middle term as something other than these two extremes

this curtain of appearance hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away -
and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world - self-consciousness

it is manifest that behind the so called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner
world - there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves - as much in order
to see - as that there may be something that can be seen

it is nevertheless evident that we cannot go behind appearance

for this knowledge of appearance and of its inner being - is a result of a complex
movement whereby the modes of consciousness 'meaning' perceiving and
Understanding vanish

and it will be equally evident that the cognition of what consciousness knows in
knowing itself - requires a still more complex movement


COMMENTARY:


appearance as I have argued is the relation between the inner and outer worlds -
between consciousness and non-consciousness

so appearance as such is neither of the inner or outer worlds - and for this reason I say
it is clearly unknown - if not inner or outer - what is it - the answer quite clearly is that
which is not known

the relation nevertheless exists and the object in the sense of the goal of consciousness
is to make it 'known' - it becomes clear that this goal is not reached - but the
endeavour results in the capacity to deal with what is presented and what is unknown

so yes I would agree the understanding comes to know nothing but appearance - and
that this knowledge qua knowledge is an illusion - a ruse - a con

Hegel has no account of the external world - as external - and so for him - the
'knowledge' that results is a knowledge that has no basis outside of consciousness

he does speak a lot of the inner world - but strictly speaking he has no inner world to
refer to - for an inner reality only has any sense and definition if it is the inner of an
outer - and so for Hegel it is true the Understanding only experiences itself - but here's
the twist - there is no self in Hegel that can do the experiencing -

consciousness is not raised above perception - perception is a function of
consciousness -

and yes consciousness is a closed unity - the inside dimension is defined - and
determined by the unity it is the inside of -

however there is no background to consciousness - there is no background to the
inside - there is relative to the inside - only the outside - and the outside is just the
external dimension of the unity

appearance is a 'mediating term' in the sense that appearance is that which results from
the relation of consciousness and its object -

this relation is given - it is natural - there are no holes in it - it is simply the world we
inhabit - in all its fullness

the inner world is pure - and but the inner world just is the inner being - there is no
differentiation between inner world and inner being -

and from the inside there is no 'gazing in' - there is no inside - in the inside -

the gazing is gazing out - and what is reflected into consciousness is the world
conceived

the relation that is consciousness and the non-conscious does not vanish - but equally
it is not seen - the unity that is the human being in the world can only be approached
in terms of consciousness and what is outside of consciousness - the unity per se is
ever present - but unknown

there is no curtain of appearance - appearance covers nothing - there is nothing to
cover

the relation of the inside and the outside is the creation that is appearance - appearance
is an effect


03/03/08
Hegel: Self-consciousness


B. Self-consciousness

IV. The truth of self-certainty


166.


ARGUMENT:


in the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is other than itself -
but the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it - what the object was
immediately in itself - turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another

the Notion of the object is superseded in the actual object - immediate presentation of
the object is superseded in experience - certainty gives place to truth

but now certainty is identical with its truth - for certainty is to itself its own object -
and consciousness is to itself the truth

if we give the name of 'Notion' to the movement of knowing - and the name 'object' to
knowing as a passive unity - or as the 'I' - then the object corresponds to the Notion

for the in-itself is consciousness - but equally it is that for which another (the in itself)
is - and it is for consciousness the case that the in-itself of the object - and its being for
another - are one

the 'I' is the content of the connection and the connecting itself

opposed to an other the 'I' is its own self - as the other is the 'I' itself


COMMENTARY:


it is rather that the actual object is superseded in the notion of the object - the actual
object in its immediate presentation is unknown - the notion of the object is the
characterization of the object - a characterization that enables utility - action in
relation to

there is no certainty in the initial experience - presentation is not certainty - we reflect
because we don't know - reflection is the natural - animal response to uncertainty -

truth is an argument regarding description

quite clearly in identifying the object with the 'I' - Hegel demonstrates he has no
account of the external world as external - a very confused notion of self-
consciousness (the 'I') - and no account at all of object - his object has simply become
absorbed into the subject - and given the status of 'I' -

this whole approach is utterly unworkable

the notions of 'in-itself' and 'for an other' - here have no actual content - we can't say
they belong to the subject or the object - they are without metaphysical place -

at this point you can ask quite reasonably does Hegel know what he is talking about?

he says the 'I' is the content and the connection between the in-itself and the being for
an other

the fact a thing can be regarded as in relation to or not - is all that is being stated here

such a distinction exists in order for us to have options in relation to how we are to see
an entity and thus how we are to act in relation to it

so these distinctions are purely operational - they are categories that transform the
entity from an unknown into an operation

self-consciousness - which is just the awareness of awareness - and again this is just
awareness - (self-consciousness is really just an explanation of consciousness - or visa
versa) - is not at the centre of some metaphysical space - the end points of which are
'in-itself' and 'for an other' - self-consciousness creates such categories to engage the
external world

consciousness is the internal impacting on the external - (and the opposite of course
occurs) - self-consciousness is awareness of awareness

this is just the sense of internality that a conscious / self-conscious entity has - because
its unity is expressed in two dimensions


167.


ARGUMENT:


we have now to see how the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appearance

if we consider this new shape of knowing - the knowing of itself - in relation to that
which preceded - the knowing of an other - then we see that though this other has
indeed vanished - its moments have been preserved - and here they are present as they
are in themselves

self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and
perception - and is essentially the return from otherness

hence otherness is for it in the form of a being - or as a distinct moment - but there is
also for consciousness the unity of itself - with this difference as a second distinct
moment

with that first moment self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness - and the
whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it - but only as connected with
the second moment - the unity of self-consciousness with itself - and hence the
sensuous world is for it an enduring existence

the unity of self-consciousness with itself is essential to self-consciousness

self consciousness is Desire in general

consciousness as self-consciousness has a double object - one is the immediate object
- that of sense certainty and perception - the second - itself - the true essence - and is
present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object


COMMENTARY:


the idea that consciousness recognizes - or as it were has the concept of the other - and
incorporates this into itself - is an attempt to give self-consciousness an analysis

also - self consciousness as the reflection out and return from the non-conscious - of
the reflection

my view is reflection is the act of consciousness -

self-consciousness is just this act

there is nothing behind this reflective act - no 'self' - no essence - no nothing

self-consciousness is reflectivity

it gets interesting when you try to say what this is - what reflectivity is

the point is I think is - we can only recognize the action - that's all -

and as to explaining it -

it needs to be understood that any account of reflection will be reflective

there is no other action we can perform as conscious beings

reflection is to the internal dimension - what reflex is to the external

and the thing is - you never leave reflection

one reflection can be the subject of another

this is the best you can say

and perhaps there is a law of diminishing returns in any such process

anyway the point is that any explanation of reflection - of self-consciousness - will be
a reflective argument - a reflective action -

so - there is no explanation of that which explains

and what this amounts to is that consciousness / self-consciousness - is not
accountable

we have no knowledge of it - we can only witness its action

and the witnessing itself - is this action


168.


ARGUMENT:


for us the object which for self-consciousness is the negative element has returned
into itself just as on the other side consciousness has -

through this reflection into itself the object has become Life

what self-consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being - is being reflected
into itself - and the object of immediate desire is a living thing

for the in-itself or the universal the result of the relation of the Understanding to the
inwardness of things is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished - or the
unity of what is distinguished

to the extent that consciousness is independent so too is its object - but only implicitly

self-consciousness which is simply for itself - and directly characterizes its object as a
negative element - or is primarily desire - will therefore on the contrary learn through
experience that the object is independent


COMMENTARY:


self-consciousness - recognizes what it is not -

this recognition is a direct logical result of the nature of self-consciousness

self-consciousness recognizes itself as conscious - that which it is not - as not-
conscious

that which is outside of it (the outside of essential internality) is the object - for the
subject

the recognition of internality - is the key - this recognition just is self-consciousness

if 'x' knows what 'x' is - it follows 'x' knows what it is not

if this is not the case - then we do not in fact have an 'x' - that is we have an undefined
entity

internality is defined - and self-aware - therefore it knows that what it is not - is not
aware

for consciousness the object is the result of a logical operation

this knowledge which recognizes the object - the external - the world outside of
consciousness - is no grand metaphysical scheme - it is a simple logical operation

substance is not the issue - it is an issue of form - logical form

substance comes later as a posit of consciousness

consciousness' recognition of the object has nothing at all to do with experience -

experience is predicated on this logic


NB.


desire I think is the ground or the reason for action

we only know of desire in any determinate sense in terms of the object desired

and if we reflect here we are forced to ask why - why this?

so the issue is not settled - on the contrary it brings into sharp focus the fact that we do
not know

that is we do not know what desire is

and this I would suggest is the origin of and the force of desire

desire is not knowing


169.


ARGUMENT:


the determination of life as it has issued from the Notion is sufficient to characterize it
without having to further develop its nature

its sphere is completely determined in the following moments - essence is infinity as
the suppression of all distinctions - the pure moment of axial rotation - its self-repose
being an absolutely restless infinity - independence itself in which the differences of
the movement are resolved - the simple essence of Time has stable shape of Space

the differences are present in this universal medium - for this universal flux has its
negative nature - only in being the suppression of them - but it cannot supersede the
different moments if they do not have an enduring existence

it is the very flux as a self-identical independence which is itself an enduring existence
- in which the different moments are present as distinct members and parts

Being no longer has the significance of an abstract universality - nor has the essence
of the different moments the significance of abstract universality - on the contrary
their being is the simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself

the difference of these members is just the moments of infinity - or the pure
movement itself


COMMENTARY:


I think Hegel missed his calling - he should have been a classical composer - he has
created a masterful and beautiful - quite exquisite music - and its most stunning
feature is that it is soundless

what we face is what we don't know -

the result of such is anxiety - anxiety is just the experience of not-knowing - with the
belief that knowing is possible - anxiety is this conflict -

out of this anxiety - in response to it we create explanations - pictures - myths
the point of which is to dispel the unknown

strictly speaking it is to just cover it -

our posits - our 'descriptions' are the platforms we create in order to act with some
bearing - some coordinates - in a world that is essentially unknown

we conquer the unknown in our imaginations

here I will leave Hegel for the present


05/03/08
consciousness and its display


we begin in awareness with a knowledge of dimension

our awareness is of internality - and of externality

it is an awareness that manifests as logic - that which is - that which is not

this reality of awareness in the world - of internality and externality is the foundation
of logic - it is the ground on which all thinking is based

this is the reality of consciousness

awareness of awareness and awareness of what is outside of awareness

that consciousness is 'aware of itself' - is not a relation internal to consciousness

awareness just is this luminosity - it is of the nature of the thing - or more precisely
the reality of the dimension

internality is awareness

awareness is 'self-awareness'

that is all consciousness is self-consciousness

our language is essentially a tool for dealing with the external reality - and so its
fundamental structure is subject / object

when we come to consciousness - when we come to the internal reality - we find that
the object language does not fit

we need a language - if we are to explain consciousness as we do external objects -
that makes sense of a subject holding itself as object

and so this is the initial problem - the object language cannot be used in this context

really this just points to the fact that the internal dimension will not be elucidated by
external means - in external language

so at this point we are best to drop the idea altogether - object language or subject /
object language will not do the job -

but this is not a drama -

we cannot put prose to the service of consciousness -

but we can and do call on poetry

and poetry is just that 'misuse of object language' that will enable us to have a sense -
an 'account' of the internal

poetry in whatever form - in language - art - music - dance

poetry displays awareness

and at this point we realize there is no explanation

there is just display

and the possibilities of display are endless

poetry is the language of consciousness

finally consciousness is never authentically revealed in an external form

poetry is a corruption of the prosaic - of the subject / object language

a necessary one because we do need to display awareness

and there are indeed many reasons for this - but the essential enduring reason is the
need for delight

however the metaphysical fact is that awareness is essentially - internal -

and so essentially unrevealed

the poetry of the unrevealed is the essence of mysticism

there are those who prefer to direct their gaze inwards rather than outwards

those who prefer an internal focus rather than the external focus

here is the origin of religious experience - the poetry of the internal

what is I think is clear is that neither perspective - the internal or the external is in
itself complete

the essential unity that either perspective presupposes is unknown


06/03/08
Descartes: infinity substance God and the unknown


'We will thus never hamper ourselves with disputes about the infinite, since it is
absurd that we who are finite should undertake to decide anything regarding it, and by
this means, in trying to comprehend it, so to speak regard it as finite. That is why we
do not care to reply to those who demand whether the half of an infinite line is
infinite, and whether an infinite number is even or odd and so on, because it is only
those who imagine their mind to be infinite who appear to find it necessary to
investigate such questions. And for our part, while we regard things in which, in a
certain sense, we observe no limits, we shall not for all that state that they are infinite,
but merely hold them to be indefinite. Thus because we cannot imagine an exception
so great that we cannot at the same time conceive that there may be one yet greater,
we shall say that the magnitude of possible things is indefinite. And because we
cannot divide a body into parts which are so small that each cannot be divided into
others yet smaller, we shall consider that the quantity may be divided into parts whose
number is indefinite. And because we cannot imagine so many stars that it is
impossible for God to create more, we shall suppose the number to be indefinite, and
so in other cases.

And we shall name things "indefinite" rather than "infinite" in order to reserve to God
the name infinite, first of all because in Him alone we observe no limitation whatever,
and because we are quite certain that He can have none, and in the second place in
regard to other things, because we do not in the same way positively understand them
to be in every part unlimited, but merely negatively admit that their limits, if they
exist, cannot be discovered by us.'

- Descartes.

(From Principles XXVI and XXVII of the First Part of the Principles of Philosophy,
trans. Haldane and Ross. Cambridge 1911.)


Commentary:

the idea of the infinite only makes any logical sense as a negative concept - that which
is not finite

Descartes wants to apply these concepts - finite and infinite to substances

a finite substance that which has limits - an infinite that which does not have limits

so to substance -

that which is before its attributes - before its presentation - the 'ground' of existence

or indeed as some have held - existence itself

what is clear is that substance is an abstraction

and an abstraction that is has been seen to perform certain philosophical functions -
i.e. to give a sense of metaphysical coherence in the midst of change - to be a 'logical
ground' to perceived attributes i.e. mind and matter - etc.

what I would argue is that the concept of substance is without substance-

that substance is not the stuff of the universe - but rather that it is an organizational or
operational principle

and one that is a natural result of the relation of the conscious to the non-conscious
world

consciousness operates with such a principle in order to function

so what you have with the idea of substance is an organizational principle designed to
give some coherence to the conscious world

it is the idea of unity - of oneness - and it seems to be essential to our functioning as
human animals

it might be asked - well what is being organized when such a concept or principle is
used?

that is if we are not going to use the term 'substance' for that which is being operated
on - what do we call it?

language is a platform of description

as language users we operate on that platform - and the platform of language is very
rich an complex

so we have many and diverse 'descriptions' of the world and our presence in the world

there is no one account

as to what underlies all accounts - what is essential?

the fact of the reality of the diversity points to one thing - and that is that we don't
know

so the world as given - prior to language if you like - is unknown

and it is to this unknown that we bring consciousness

which is to say consciousness makes the unknown - known

and so for me - Descates' substance is the unknown

once this is understood and grasped - the question - is substance finite or infinite? - is
seen in its correct light -

it is not a sensible question

that is it makes no sense to ask is the unknown finite or infinite?

the unknown is just that - unknown

All of Descartes' discussion here is infected with his notion of substance -

but he nevertheless makes an interesting distinction between the infinite and the
indefinite - and he does this really to reserve the infinite for God

he sill talks in terms of substance - i.e. 'indefinite things' - and this is a shame because
if he saw the matter in the operational sense I have proposed - there would be some
conceptual movement at the station

the dividing of a line i.e. is the repetition of an operation - now the example of the line
just points to the fact that there are indeed repeatable operations - or repeatable acts

and yes they are the kind of act that can go on indefinitely

this does raise the question - well what act is not repeatable indefinitely?

and by 'act' here I mean conscious act -

to cut to the chase - there are certain operations that require repetitive acts

so the question really is - in what operational setting does indefinite repetition make
sense?

thankfully not too many and not for long

we must also realize that a human being is not capable strictly speaking of indefinite
acts of any kind - in the sense of endless

it is better here to speak of repetitive acts and repetition

yes the idea of 'God' as the infinite - as that which is not finite -

is really just a trick - a misuse of logic

every proposition can be negated

we can say that that which is not finite is infinite

it does not follow at all that the term 'infinite' here actually refers to anything

the application of the negation sign to a proposition does not create an alternative
reality

what it does (in my view) is point to the non-utility of the proposition under
consideration - that's if it is correctly used

we can of course have great fun with negation sign - we can make all kinds of realities
if we think it signifies substance

substance as I have pointed out is not the issue - the issue finally is function

and the question for us always with our concepts is - what is the appropriate context
for the use of this concept?

in what context is it designed to function?


07/03/08
Spinoza on mind


Spinoza: Concerning the nature and origin of the mind

(Ethics: second part)


D.III. idea - a conception of the mind

conception an action of the mind

A. II. - man thinks

A. III. - modes of thinking - such as love or desire - or any other name by which the
emotions of the mind may be designated - are not granted unless an idea in the same
individual is granted of the thing loved desired etc.

a mode is determined by an idea -

for a mode to exist - the idea must be in the individual who i.e. loves or desires

the idea is thus the necessary condition of the mode

A.V. we only perceive or feel bodies or modes of thinking

so it seems on this view ideas are not perceived or felt - what is perceived or felt are
(bodies and) modes of thinking

the idea determines the mode - but the idea is not felt or perceived

so if it is not felt or perceived - what is the idea -

it can only be an explanation of that which is felt or perceived - in this case the mode
of thinking

so the idea - for Spinoza is really an argument about the basis of the ground of modes
of thought - or simply thought

this doesn't sound too bad except that we have no idea on this view what an idea is
except that it is necessary to a mode - and this tells us literally nothing

we are no better informed about the nature of thinking through the introduction of
'idea' than we were before it was introduced

it is in this sense an empty concept

a mode (E. I. D.V) is that which is in something through which it can be understood

so a mode of thought is that which is in thought through which it can be understood -
it is thus a defining of thought - a characterization of thought - i.e. as love or as desire
etc.

first up can we define thought? - we speak of ways of thinking yes - but what is this?

isn't it just that we conceptualize behaviour and categorize it in an ideal fashion - i.e.
in terms of 'thought' - rather than in terms of action?

that is it presents action in a logical format - an ideational format

and in this sense it is really just to internalize the external - or present it in an internal
format -

so we conceptualize - and then refer to this conceptualization as 'thought' - that is give
it an object-like rendering

what I am saying here is that we make thought out of our conceptualizations - in a
crude sense we make a name -

and you might say - alright - something is going on in conceptualization that is
different to externally observable behaviour - so why not call it 'thought' or thinking
etc.?

OK - so what is happening here is that in conceptualizing we define conceptualizing -
and out of this comes such notions as thought

but it is clear that the action of so defining occurs because we need to define

what we are presented with in conceptualizing without this definition of
conceptualizing is quite simply unknown

the act of defining gives us a basis on which to operate in a ideal or ideational form

so what we have really with this argument from Spinoza is just the adoption of the
conclusions of such a process

Spinoza begins at the end -

he does not seem to see that outside of the action of thought - there is no thought

thought is its act

and as such in the first instance - that is in its act - it is unknown

the act of thinking about thought - that is reflective thinking - is the act of
characterization

this action of characterization though is just the necessary response to the unknown

necessary in the sense of enabling action

and this is purely a contingent necessity

so all that comes from this has strictly speaking only ephemeral status - it just enables
us to get going - to act

therefore - any characterization of conceptualization - is as valid as any other

logic is just this possibility

in D.III. Spinoza says :

'By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a
thinking thing.

Explanation. I use the word conception rather than perception because the name
perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object. But
the word conception seems to express the action of the mind.'

an idea is a conception - a conception an action of a thinking thing

can we say therefore the mind is the act of conception?

yes I think so - but it leaves unanswered the question - what is conception?

Spinoza will say the action of the mind

but this is a circular argument - it doesn't help -

what is the mind for Spinoza?

the answer he gives is in Proposition 1. -

'Thought is an attribute of God or God is a thinking thing'

and for attribute we must go back to E.I.D.4. -

'By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if
constituting its essence.'

the problem here is that in order to define attribute we have to presuppose mind - and
yet the very reason we looked to the question of attribute was to understand or define
mind

so it comes out like this - an attribute is a perceived essence of substance -

that is simply a description of the essence of substance by the mind

and here is the kicker -

one of the descriptions of the essence of substance (by the mind) is thought

and thought we know is an action of the mind

so - the mind conceives itself as an attribute of substance

so we have here a conception of mind by mind - as what?

the obvious answer here would be mind

in fact I wonder how this could be avoided

if the mind conceives itself as an attribute and an attribute is a conception of the mind

all you can say is the mind primarily conceives itself -

and therefore the idea of substance - or the idea of an attribute of substance - has to be
a further or secondary description that the mind gives itself

on this view substance or God is a conception of mind - and a description of mind

at this point we are clearly very tightly locked into Idealism

but we can take this a little further by asking - when mind conceives itself - what is it
conceiving?

we have already been told that conception is an action -

and in a straightforward sense this sounds good -

but now we are dealing with the idea of the mind conceiving itself

and we have to ask can the idea of conception as action hold up in this context?

that is can we say an act acts on an act - and the result is the mind conceiving itself?

the issue is really what is called self-consciousness

the idea that the mind conceives or is aware of itself

is this awareness an action?

yes - we might say

but will we here also say it is action on action

or is it rather that awareness is a unique kind of action?

if so - what can we say here?

we must remember that any thing we say here is an act of awareness itself

- which makes me think that awareness is just a phenomena that cannot be accounted
for

that it is essentially and necessarily - unknown

and that this is its defining characteristic

in any case Spinoza's notions of attribute and substance - cannot be used to explain his
idea of mind

for it is his very idea of mind out of which these notions take life

and I think this is pretty clear and uncontraversial - just from his definitions

strictly speaking - Spinoza - you could well argue leaves mind undefined -

and that even his minimal description of mind as the action of thought - tells us
nothing really

the question is - is this a good result or not?

from my point of view it is good -

but I don't think this is the conclusion Spinoza wanted to achieve or believed he had
achieved


08/03/08
Spinoza on mind II


an attribute is a perceived essence of substance

how do we distinguish attributes?

thought is an attribute of God (P.1) - extension is an attribute of God (P.2)

as I have argued Spinoza's argument for the nature of attributes presupposes mind

that is his argument for attributes presupposes one of the attributes

you could well argue from this that the idea of attributes crashes - given this
circularity

and with that of course the idea of substance - at least in the terms that Spinoza puts it

so we are in the position where mind perceives itself - as an attribute -

in what sense can we then say the mind perceives - the body?

in what sense can the body or extension - be anything other than an aspect of mind?

if there is no answer to this question we are condemned to idealism and the argument
stops

what I think Spinoza missed is that mind in perceiving itself perceives itself as
internal

as inside extension

certainly the mind does not see itself as outside - as a feature of the extended world

so mind is seen as an internal form

the fact of this is important

for the conception of internality can only be maintained given externality

the internal only has any sense given its logical opposite - the external

and this logic is not controversial -

our natural conception is that the mind is internal and that the external world is not
mind - whatever else it is

and what we describe it as - is matter - the physical world

this distinction of mind and matter is based firstly on the truth of self-consciousness

consciousness perceiving / conceiving itself

this conception of mind places mind inside the physical world

if so then the distinction between attributes that Spinoza needs to establish is a
distinction between internal and external attributes

the internal / external distinction gives the idea of attributes in this context some body

internality - in its self-awareness - recognizes its opposite - the external

the distinction I would say is finally based on logic

so indeed what we have is a conception - and the idea of its opposite

do we leave the internal in putting the external?

yes if we see this as a matter of logic - for the opposite of internality on this argument
- is the external - and this is to say that as a matter of logic the external by its nature
cannot be internal

that which the mind posits as being outside of itself cannot be itself

there is no sign in Spinoza of the internal / external argument

mind and matter are attributes - on his view this is enough

it is that reality has two perceived essences mind and extension - this is where he
begins

it is a clear starting point - but again this is all it is - there is no cogent argument as to
what the mind perceives as the difference between the attributes

if the argument is not about substance - but rather perception - intellectual perception -

we can rightly ask what is intellectually apprehended in the perception of essences

in D. II. we have -

'I say that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing is
necessarily posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other
words, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and in its turn
cannot be nor conceived without the thing'

as a definition of essence this is OK - but this 'thing' - that is essence - is left
undefined

now you can be mystical here or simply accept the fact that the logic of this argument
points to - results in skepticism

that the essence - if such exists or makes sense is unknown

these are the only two options open to Spinoza

and the first collapses into the second - so skepticism is unavoidable

so apprehending essences does not help us in identifying or distinguishing mind and
matter

by the way substance on this view is nothing more than the unknown writ large

how though do we approach the mind / matter issue if intellectual perception of
essences doesn't work?

my argument is a non-substance argument - a non-substantial argument

it is that mind and matter are dimensions of a single unknown reality

and as such mind and matter are in any essential sense - unknown

what we have though is the logic of internality and externality

it is to use a classical distinction - an argument of form - not substance

mind or consciousness is internality - matter or the physical world is externality

this is to describe reality in terms of its dimensions - internal / external

and I should point out here that it doesn't follow from this that all reality is two
dimensional

it is clear that two dimensional reality is in a quantitative sense - exceptional

as to why this is the case - is not the issue - it is simply how the matter stands

Spinoza does attempt to define mind in terms of action

he distinguishes active and passive modes of being -
.and determines the idea as a conception and a conception as active as distinct from
passive in nature

we can ask though - how is the action of mind on Spinoza's view different in any way
to the action of the body - or of extension?

if action is the essence of conception is it also the essence of the non-conceptual?

it is clear that the idea of action is more of a unifying than distinguishing notion

an action is an action

and yes we can place it differently - we can refer to internal action and external action

the nature of the action as action is not distinguishable - only the place or the
dimension of the action

in proposition 1. of the second part of the Ethics - Spinoza puts that thought is an
attribute of God - or God is a thinking thing

the idea of the idea - as a conception as an action is essentially the same argument for
the nature of man - A.II. - man thinks

man thinks - thought is an attribute of God

presumably we can say therefore God thinks

how then is the idea of God or substance to be distinguished from that of man?

on the basis of thought - there is no distinction

a thinking thing conceives be it man or God

the action of thought does not distinguish man and God

as we have seen thought is a perceived essence of substance - or God

but mind must be presumed for this argument to go forth

therefore mind perceives itself as an essence of God

which means God is a conception of the mind's conception of itself

it is a secondary or defining conception

the mind perceives itself - and this perception is a perception of the unknown

that is the mind perceives itself as unknown

this state of affairs cannot be left to stand

the world we live in - we operate in is a world of action -

the mind needs to characterize in order to create the pretense of knowledge - a
pretense necessary for rational - that is effective action

Spinoza's characterization is God

in general you can say - well anything will do here - so long as action is made possible

why not God?

the point is 'God' as put by Spinoza is a useless conception -

and the reason for this is that it distinguishes nothing

in fact you have to say right at the get go - it is not a valid concept

just simply because it has no limits - and therefore no content

what Spinoza has done is what I think the ancient Jewish prophets did - give the
unknown a name


08/03/08
Spinoza on mind III


P. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
things.

This is evident from Axiom 4, part 1. For the idea of anything caused depends
upon the knowledge of the cause of which the thing caused is an effect.

Corollary. Hence it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to his power of
acting; that is to say, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God,
follows from the idea of God (idea Dei), in same order and in the same connection
objectively in God.

Scholium. Before we go any farther, we must here recall to our memory what we have
already demonstrated, that everything that can be perceived by the infinite intellect as
constituting the essence of substance pertains entirely to the one sole substance only,
and consequently that substance thinking and substance extended are one and the
same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now that. Thus
also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing
expressed in two different ways - a truth which some of the Hebrews appear to have
seen as if through a cloud, since they say the God, the intellect of God, and the things
which are the objects of that intellect are one in the same. For example the circle
existing in nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same
thing, which is manifested through different attributes; and, therefore, whether we
think of nature under the attribute of extension , or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order, or one
and the same connection of causes; that is to say, in every case the same sequence of
things. Nor have I had any other reason for saying God is the cause of the idea, for
example, of the circle in so far only as He is a thinking thing, and of the circle in so
far as he is an extended thing, but this, that the formal Being of the idea of a circle can
only be perceived through another mode of thought, as its proximate cause, and this
again must be perceived through another, and so on ad infinitum. So that when things
are considered as modes of thought, we must explain the order of the whole of nature
or the conception of causes by the attribute of thought alone, and when things are
considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained
through the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes. therefor God is
in truth the cause of things as they are in themselves in so far as he consists of infinite
attributes, not for the present can I explain the matter more clearly.


the argument in general is that there is an underlying unifying logic of all existing
forms

in Spinozistic terms - the logic of substance is manifested in the logic of attributes

which is to say the essential logic of mind is the essential logic of extension

we have from Spinoza the assertion of metaphysical unity

the basis of his argument is his definition of substance -

E.I.D.III. 'I understand SUBSTANCE (substantia) to be that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself; I mean that, the conception of which does not depend on the
conception of another thing from which it must be formed.'

that which is in itself and conceived through itself -

that which is in itself we can understand as that which is not in anything else

therefore it is that in which everything else is in -

so what do we say here - existence?

substance is existence as such

OK - now conceived through itself -

a conception in the normal use is a conception of -

that is there is an object of conception -

on such a view that which is conceived is other than the conceiving

so existence as such as an object is conceived by - what?

a subject

the subject cannot by definition be outside of existence - yes

but is this to say existence conceives itself?

I think not -

clearly a conception is in existence -

what of the idea of existence in itself -

this is to say everything is the subject of this conception

but can this be?

can the conception itself be - both be a conception separate from its object - and inside
its object

can we hold the concept of - as of the object being conceived?

in simple terms - the conception if it is an object - is not a conception - it is that which
is conceived

so if conception is of the object - there is no conception in the sense of that which is
apart from the object

in such a view - yes you have unity - all that is - is the object

but there is no possibility of knowing this - there is no possibility of knowledge

therefore if substance conceives itself - there is no conception

so - we can't actually speak of substance conceiving itself - such is a misuse of terms

if this is what is being argued then there is no knowledge

another point to make is this -

a concept is a concept of -

a concept of something

and a something is that which it is not

that is it has definition

it is particular -

so the question must be asked - how can the idea of substance as Spinoza defines it
- as that which has no restriction - as that which is not something that it is not -
actually be formed?

my point is that there is no such concept

because no such concept can be formed

we can say the world is 'x' and '-x'

that is the world is an entity and all that the entity is not

the point is we can only make such a statement in the form of a conjunction

a conjunction based on a particularity - 'x'

the '-x' even if you are to say it refers - to all that 'x' is not - still is not the totality -

is not the idea of substance argued by Spinoza

the idea of unrestricted totality is a logical mistake

Spinoza's idea of substance is a logical mistake - it is a misuse of the notion of
conception

I began this discussion of substance to get to the idea of unifying logic that is
manifested in thought and extension - for this I suggest is the idea behind P.VII. that
the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things

my argument is that Spinoza's idea of substance does not provide a basis for arguing
that there is an underlying essential or existential unity

and the reason for it is that the notion of substance cannot be established in the first
place

so what of any holistic account?

the argument is clear - there is no conceptual basis for it

so just at this point we can say we must dismiss the proposal of P.VII - for it is a
species of the holistic argument - that we can conceive a totality or a complete picture
- or in this case a universal order?

the world impacts the body and this impact is internalized in the mind

that there is external impact is clear

therefore we can say the impact itself is the external internalized

the event of impact has an external and internal dimension

the event itself is the unity of these dimensions

but what sense can we make of the event itself?

in itself - it is unknown

and further it is only known via it's internalization

so the idea of it is all that is known-

can we go from here to speak of the event as it were outside of its internalization

we would need to if we were to speak of an order and connection that is outside of
thought

the point is we can't

but at the same time - because we can't we are always in a position of uncertainty

we may assume that how we are affected provides a true picture of the world outside
of our knowledge - outside of mind

but we have no way at all of being sure of this

we can for practical purposes proceed as if - and indeed we do all the time -

but this is pragmatics - not objective knowledge

some think this is where you sink into blissful solipsism

but that is not the case at all

as a matter of logic we know the external world exists

it is that which is not our internality

that which is not mind

and we understand as a matter of logic that the internal is affected by the external -

but we have no objective view of the relation - we cannot step outside of it and see it
for what it is

we are this relation

we can only operate with what it provides

and what it provides is an a two-dimensional world

and knowledge is just the arguments we make in relation to this world

there is no guarantee to these argument

they spring from necessity -

but are incurably contingent

the essence of our knowledge is uncertainty

we have no way of establishing in an objective sense if there is any order or lack of it
in this reality

we simply do not know

the other point to make is that the body is not the world

and that the clearest impressions the mind has - is of the body

things exist independently of the mind in the outside world

we can only know of these things via the body

their existence - their logic as things in themselves - is not anything we have access to
- if indeed it makes any sense to speak of them in such a manner


08/03/08
Spinoza on mind IV


my central question for Spinoza in relation to his account of the nature of mind is to
do with self-consciousness - what account does Spinoza give of self-consciousness?

to date his account of mind seems to simply be the act of conception -

that is the idea - and he defines it as mind

we can ask what is presupposed by idea - that is what is the ground for idea?

is there not in some sense a 'mind' behind the idea?

Spinoza defines mind initially as an attribute of substance - so it seems to have some
kind of substantial heritage -

that is it is not just an act - and as we have seen above his idea of the idea is that it is
active

the substance idea is that thought is an attribute of God or existence - and that
individual thoughts or thoughts of individuals are simply expressions of this attribute

God is infinite therefore the mind of God is the infinity of thought

perhaps too this means there is ultimately one idea and that idea is the idea of the
material world

but in so far as God is infinite - the idea is expressed infinitely

OK - the key point though is that for Spinoza mind is idea - the action of thought

what I find fascinating here is that on such a theory we can view mind as without
substance

that is there is just the act of thinking -

and there is nothing behind it - except the act of thinking

I don't think Spinoza sees it like this - but I do think his account can be legitimately
interpreted this way

especially when you understand - and this is definitely not Spinoza's understanding -
that his theory of substance fails - that what you really have - where he thinks there is
'substance' - is the unknown

the action of thought - of ideas - conceptions - in the unknown

rather elegant -

still there are questions -

what is this action - in what sense is it different from - distinguishable from external -
observable action?

I don't think Spinoza has an answer to this

he begins with the claim that thought is an attribute of substance - and proceeds as if
everything is now in place

that is the first premise is assumed

but the truth of it is we do not have a theory of mind from Spinoza

what we have is a juggling of terms - mind - thought - idea - conception etc.

I don't think Spinoza would have ever doubted the existence of mind

or for that matter anything -

in his own way he was very positive little fellow

if however we were to ask Spinoza - well what is this thing - the idea - or thought - or
mind - he would have to reflect

and what is this - reflection

what is it to reflect on the mind - what is happening when this occurs?

and this 'action' - is what we term 'self-consciousness'

mind reflecting on mind

what is the logic of this -

how can it be possible -

surely the object of mind is that which is outside of mind

how does mind - 'hold itself' as object?

can this actually happen - or is a mistaken analysis?

self-consciousness is not in doubt here - it is just how to explain it

the really complicating factor is that any explanation - any explanation at all - will be
an action of self-consciousness

self-consciousness - explaining self-consciousness

it's a bit like when the Victorian police had the job of policing themselves - you have
to wonder

it just occurred to me - the mind as an essentially corrupt entity -

perhaps some modern day post-deconstructionalist-nihilists might go for this

might make their day - put some hope into the nothingness

anyway enough with the laughs

proposition XXI might be a good place to get serious -

'P.XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself
is united to the body.

PXXI. - on this view the mind is or can be the object of the mind in the same way as
the body is the mind's object

Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body because the body
is the object of the mind (Propositions XII and XIII, part II); therefore, by the same
reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, the mind itself, in the
same way as the mind itself is united to the body. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is to be understood much more clearly from what has been
said in the Scholium to Proposition VII, part II, for we have shown there that the idea
of the body and the body, that is to say (Proposition XIII, part II) the mind and the
body, are one in the same individual, which at one time is considered under the
attribute of thought, and another under the attribute of extension: the idea of the mind,
therefore and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered under
one and the same attribute, that of thought. For, indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to
say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is considered
as a mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person who knows
anything, by the very fact that knows that he knows, and knows that he knows that he
knows, and so on ad infinitum. But more on this subject afterwards.'


PXXI. - on this view the mind is or can be the object of the mind in the same way as
the body is the mind's object

there is definitely an in here for the materialist

for if the body is the object of the mind and the object is material (extension) - then if
the mind can have the mind as object - the mind itself must be material

on the other hand - it might be argued there is an obvious problem here with the
notion of object -

what is it - is it body or is it mind

how could it be both - unless both are something else

the argument could well be that Spinoza's theory of mind collapses here

and it collapses because he cannot give a cogent account of self-consciousness

he can only speak of mind as a one dimensional thing

when it comes to explaining reflection - the idea of the mind somehow holding itself
as object

his notion of object is not up to it - it buckles under the weight - or you could say it
doesn't know whether its Arthur or Martha

OK - what can we do here?

the object as metaphysically stateless -

that is the object as being neither body or soul

as just what - a category -

but a category of what?

this is the question -

on such a view you would have to say - well we don't know -

we don't know what the object of the mind is

and it is really just a look over your shoulder to realize the mind has disappeared too

so what else can we do?

Spinoza's theory of mind has by and large hinged on the concept of idea

and as he presents it - this is where object comes in

the object of the idea is something other than the idea - it is outside the idea

but the idea is what we mean by 'mind'

his problem comes straight up - when he has to explain how an idea can have an idea
as an object

you can ask well such an idea is an idea of what - what is the content of this idea -
or is this just an idea - a special kind that has no content?

that is has no reference - outside itself?

if so what does it refer to?

in the scholium Spinoza says - 'For indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say the idea
of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of
thought and without relation to the object........'

so at least it is clear that - the idea of the mind is the form of the idea - and it is
considered without relation to the object

this doesn't deal with this issue - even though it is quite an ingenious attempt

what this amounts to is that the idea can hold the form of the idea as its object - in the
sense of that which it is considering

so the notion here is 'form of the idea'

neat - but what is this 'form of the idea'?

the idea without content -

what other option is there?

the idea of the idea -

this is as I said a very impressive move on Spinoza's part

what is an idea - outside if its content

the form of the idea - OK

in what sense then can this be the object of an idea?

the idea holds the form of the idea as object

the idea holds its form as object

this holding - this action presupposes the idea or mind is self aware

that it can hold itself as object

that it knows itself - as form

so the holding of itself as form can only occur if we have self consciousness -

Spinoza argues it holds itself as form

OK - but there seems to be no question in his mind that the idea can hold itself -
it is just a question of - as what?

his answer is 'as form'

but he has not explained how the mind or the idea can hold itself - never mind as what

that is the form argument presupposes self-consciousness - it doesn't explain or
account for it

Spinoza's argument of the idea of the idea is an account that presumes self-
consciousness -

so at the heart of Spinoza's theory of mind is an unexplained - and it is an unexplained
- crucial

the nature of self consciousness

if you cannot explain self-consciousness - you have no theory of mind

it seems clear to me that Spinoza never grappled with self-consciousness

he basically wanted thought to be of the same kind of thing as extension

self-consciousness destroys the symmetry

he recognizes it - and gives it a description - the description of form

but the description clever as it is doesn't really work

if you say mind is idea - and notion of idea makes sense only in terms of it having an
object and an object that is outside of itself

the idea cannot be outside itself - even if you want to call it form

so I think the approach of equating mind with idea does not prove very fruitful in the
problem of self-consciousness

certainly it hasn't helped Spinoza

of course this does presume that Spinoza is finally explaining reality - or attempting to

perhaps not

perhaps what we have form Spinoza is a description of what is

his 'argument' on self-consciousness is '...just as a person who knows anything, by the
very fact that he knows, and knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad
infinitum....'

it is clear that what precedes this no an argument about the origin and nature of self-
consciousness - it is a description - a description in terms of ideas of ideas

Spinoza is not troubled by self-consciousness - he just wants to include it into his
system of thought - to find a place for it


09/03/08
Spinoza on mind V


my argument of the last post was that all we really get from Spinoza in relation to the
nature of mind is its assertion

back tracking it to God appears to give it some flesh - but it is a back tracking to the
unknown

the mind is idea - and Spinoza has precious little really to say about this

we know the object of the mind is the body

the mind is its idea -

and even though we have this tight fit of mind and body - there is from Spinoza no
sense of the internality of mind

in fact you could very well ask of Spinoza - where is it?

his answer is going to be that it is substance viewed under the attribute of thought

and his idea here is that substance or its modifications is just what is

and we can regard it as either thought or extension

in fact there is technically no difference - it is just a matter of how you read what is
before you

as to substance - independent of these attributes - substance in itself is infinite

this idea of substance I have argued in fact cannot be conceived - it is not a conception
- for a conception has form - infinity does not

so what we are actually talking about here is the unknown

Spinoza calls it God

mind though is an attribute of this God

that is it is a perceived essence

that is to say it is a conceived essence

so mind logically speaking pre-dates substance

for without mind there is no such conception

and this conception is interesting - it is supposed to go beyond - outside of the
conceiving mind - and yet include the conceiving mind

so the argument we have is that the mind in conceiving substance conceives itself -
and everything that it is not

this conception of itself is what?

the mind's identification of itself as an essence of substance

so at the very start mind conceives mind

that is for Spinoza self-consciousness is not a discovery

for mind to identify itself as an essence of substance

it must already have identified itself -

as - mind - what it is

OK -

so what does this amount to?

the idea that the beginning of any awareness is the awareness of self

- is self-consciousness -

the mind is aware of itself

when we think of awareness of that which is outside of mind - we think of a relation
of mind to object - or in Spinoza's terms idea to object

this occurs because the object of awareness is outside of mind

but what of the case when the object is inside - is mind

can we distinguish awareness and awareness of awareness?

can you be aware and not aware that you are aware?

I don't mean in practice - as in being absent minded - but I mean in principle?

I think not

it strikes me that the nature of awareness - of human awareness is that it - for want of
a better phrase - holds itself as object

this is to say there is no difference between awareness and self awareness

human consciousness is the awareness of awareness

so the mind is that which holds itself as subject and object

and the collapse of subject and object into a unity - just is awareness

and perhaps this awareness is not awareness of

it is just awareness

when we introduce object we are talking about something other than mind

so subjectivity is awareness without an object

Spinoza made this point

and thus it can only be awareness of the subject

perhaps the term to use is 'reflective' -

awareness is just reflecting on -

be it that which is internal - or that which is not - that which is external

in this case the object of awareness has no particular ontological status

it is just 'that'

and reflection can turn inward - or outward -

if it turns inward it is just the focus or the knowledge of awareness

of the fact of awareness

if outward it - it is the focus on the non-aware - that which it isn't

so awareness is the kind of thing that turns in on itself

we need a kind of meta-geometry here

it is a form - the internal is a form that can explore itself

and this distinguishes it from the external - the external is linear - it has no reflective
dimension

perhaps we can just say the mind conceives - and to conceive it must have a
conception of itself -

otherwise it has no concept of that which it is not - which is the primary object of
conception

and in that case it could not conceive

so on this view self-consciousness is a logically necessary condition for knowledge

if you have knowledge - you have self-consciousness


09/03/08
Spinoza on mind VI


'P.XXII. the human mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but also the
ideas of the affectations.

Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of affections follow in God and are related to
God in the same way as the ideas themselves of affections. This is demonstrated like
Proposition XX, part II. But the ideas of the affections of the human body are in the
human mind (Proposition XII, part II) that is to say, in God (Proposition XI, part II,
Corollary), in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore, the
ideas of these ideas will be in God in so far as He has knowledge or idea of the human
mind; that is to say (Proposition 21, part II), they will be in the human mind itself,
which therefore, not only perceives the affections of the body, but also the idea of the
affections.'

the mind perceives the affections of the body but also the ideas of these affections

so a state of the body is perceived by the mind - which must mean the person is aware
of the state of the body

this awareness is an internalization of the surface event

on reflection the event has a double aspect - an internal and external dimension

a conscious - and as a matter of logic a non-conscious dimension

the experience of the affection though - is not divided -

the experience is unified

to say the event has an internal and external dimension is really to analyze it

and we do this in order to describe - so as to be able to understand it - and we have to
have some understanding of it in order to deal with it

prior to this analytical treatment the event - the unified event - is unknown

unknown in the sense that it is without character

the event is a result of the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness

underlying the unified event is this relation -

and the relation just is the meeting of mind and matter

characterization of the event is the reflective function of consciousness

you could argue from this that mind and matter are fundamentally explanatory
categories - whose function is to provide a basis on which the event of experience - in
itself unknown - can be tackled - and for all intents and purposes - be made 'known'

anyway such is a very radical view of things and it is not one I am going to pursue
right now

back to Spinoza

I would put that the awareness of the affection - just is the idea of it

Spinoza wants to say that the mind perceives the idea of the affection

and this is to say the affection has an ideational dimension to it - quite regardless of
whether the event is known

ideas - are conceptions of mind - and every thing - every event is thus a conception -
as well as an extended thing

so on this view - the mind - perceives conceptions - outside of itself

ideas are as objective as stones

this is quite a radical view of things

what it means is that for Spinoza - there is one dimension - what you would call the
outside -

everything is objective

mind is not as I have represented it an internal dimension

there is no internality for Spinoza

I can understand why his theory demands this - but I find it quite bizarre

it amounts to saying there is no inner life

everything is revealed

mind / matter - it's all out there -

if you are to argue such a view you must accept that as a consequence the idea of
internality and externality - must be abandoned

if there is no internality - then there is no externality

if there is no inside there is no outside - no surface

so where are you going to place your ideas or your stones?


10/03/08
Spinoza on Mind VII.


P.XXIII. The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the idea of the
affections of the body.

Demonstration. The idea of the knowledge of the mind (Proposition XX, part II)
follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the
body. But since (Proposition XIV, part 2) the human mind does not know the human
body itself, that is to say (Proposition XI, part II, Corollary), since the knowledge of
the human body is not related to God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
human mind, therefore the knowledge of the mind is not related to God in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind; and therefore (Proposition XI, part II,
Corollary) the human mind so far does not know itself. Moreover, the ideas of the
affections by which the body is affected involve the nature of the human body itself
(Proposition 16, part II), they agree with the nature of the mind; therefore a knowledge
of these ideas will necessarily involve a knowledge of the mind. But (Proposition
XXII, part II) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself, and therefore
the human mind so far only has a knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

the ideas of the affections of the body - the ideas of the states of the body

if the mind is idea - what we have here is the argument that the mind perceives the
mind

the physical states of the body are also ideas

Spinoza thinks the mind perceives - both the affections - and the ideas

the perception of the affection is a perception of what?

presumably it is an awareness - but an awareness of what?

- an awareness of the body or of a state of the body -

and is this awareness not an idea?

how does the perception of the affectation differ from the perception of the idea of the
affectation

the idea of the affectation we can say is the thought of it

is this to suggest that the experience of it is something different to the thought of it

you could say one presupposes the other - the idea follows the experience of it

the experience though is an awareness - and in that sense an idea

so the idea of the awareness is the idea of what - the idea -

now the idea of the idea - if that is possible - has no content

so - the affection is irrelevant

so can Spinoza distinguish the perception of affections of the body and the perception
of the ideas of the body?

my argument is the states of the body are not known outside of consciousness

awareness makes an unknown known - and we may not know how this happens but it
happens - we can on the basis of awareness deal with what has occurred

so we have in this case the affections of the body as unknown - and the affections as
known -

when known we can say we then have an idea of the state of the body

the idea was not what was perceived - the idea is the result

OK

the mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
affections of the body

so can the result - as I have represented it - be perceived?

we can be aware and aware of our awareness

we can focus on an idea - hold an idea - and make it the subject of further thinking

would you call this perceiving ideas?

it is being aware of ideas - perception as I understand it is the focus outside of ideas

the focus outside of mind

so I wouldn't use the term 'perceiving' here

it seems to me that P.XXIII. amounts to saying that the mind's knowledge of itself is
knowledge of the body

what knowledge we have of the mind comes off the body

the mind's knowledge of itself -

it's a question what you want to include here

but I would say the fact of awareness is the mind's knowledge of itself

awareness includes itself

it is the set that is a member of itself

it is at least this

and for this reason it is the strangest of things


NB.


what is it for the mind to hold anything as object - be that an affection of the body or
an idea?

it is to say the mind is aware of -

the object is represented in the mind

consciousness is thus representation

and so consciousness is thus that which enables representation

and this representation?

it is the showing or the revelation of

that which is outside of mind is reflected in mind

and so consciousness and its object -

a relation -

the relation that is appearance

so this reflection -

of object to subject

what I am saying is that appearance only occurs because of consciousness

so consciousness enables appearance

enables the world to appear

as I argue consciousness is an internal dimension of reality

it is a dimension - that reveals the external -

the world has this feature of revelation

it is nature - the world seeing itself

consciousness enables the seeing

it is not a feature of the external world - it is an internal attribute - the internal
attribute

it is in what you might call meta-evolutionary terms the evolution of internality

with the emergence of internality we have life - life is the internal / external relation -
it is what results

this emergence of internality - is in a logical sense the emergence of relation

prior to such an emergence - it makes no sense to speak of anything being related to
anything else

the fact of consciousness is the fact of relativity

in this sense - though the mind is not an external feature

it is nevertheless a natural fact

a fact of nature

and it is clear that appearance - the appearance of the world is predicated on the fact of
consciousness

therefore any account of the nature of the world - any science of nature

must reflect this fact

it is the fact that in any seeing there is a seer that is not seen

so any comprehensive understanding of the world must take into account this unseen
seer

this unseen seer is consciousness

and just because it is unseen - it remains in any scientific description

in any scientific theory - the invisible elephant in the room

the unknown that is at the heart of all knowledge


10/03/08
Spinoza on Mind VIII


P.XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts
composing the human body.

Demonstration. The parts composing the human body pertain to the essence of the
body itself in so far as they communicate their motions to one another by some certain
method (see Lemma III, Corollary, Definition), and not in so far as they can be
considered as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the
human body are individuals (Postulate I), composite to a high degree, parts of which
(Lemma IV) can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions
(Lemma II, Axiom I) to other bodies in another way, although the nature and form of
the human body itself is closely preserved. Therefore (Proposition II, part II) the idea
or knowledge of each part will be in God in so far as He is considered as affected
(Proposition 7, part II). The same thing may be said of each part of the individual
itself composing the human body and therefore the knowledge of each part composing
the human body exists in God in so far as he is affected by a number of ideas of
things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only: that is to say
(Proposition XIII, part II) the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind: and
therefore Proposition XI, part II, Corollary) the human mind does not involve an
adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. Q.E.D.


simple awareness in the sense of acknowledgment of the states of the body - is no
more than brute awareness -

it is not knowledge - in fact it is the ground of not-knowing

such awareness is the awareness that we do not know - we experience - but what is it
we experience?

in order to deal with this awareness - to operate with it - we must give it definition -
give it character -

we never start from scratch here - always we begin with the given of accepted
knowledge

that is whatever constructions - whatever imaginations - are regarded as true

and true here is what is useful - what functions

what is clear is that with any awareness of the body comes the awareness of just what
is not known -

my point is that inadequate ideas - point not primarily to what we know - but rather to
what is not known

in fact any idea is an inadequate idea just by the fact that it will always be a partial
representation of what exists

and this is all an idea can be

we operate not in knowledge - but in ignorance -

ideas themselves have no real epistemological value unless they are placed in the form
of an argument

or in a context and in relation to other ideas

any such argument will depend for its currency on its validity and the truth of its
premises - and these matters are never settled in a conclusive manner -

so in effect what we have when we speak of knowledge is really different
characterizations of the unknown

different ideas of the unknown

the value of any such idea or system of ideas is never certain -

to understand why people believe what they do about the unknown - that is how they
characterize it and why they hold to any such characterization one really needs to go
outside of logic and epistemology

it is here that power is the issue - it is not a question of logic - logic in this context is
only a tool of persuasion - one though that has the mark of respectability

we may never fully understand what forces operate on belief and therefore on action

but clearly we all come into a world ready made - there is not and never has been a
clean slate - the waters are always muddied - definitions are in place

understanding what we are dealing with - what has been imposed on us and why is a
life's work

and the understandings are not fixed - the search for truth is never finished - and in an
ultimate sense is quite hopeless - we in fact only engage in it out of the necessity to
deal with and survive in this world - it gives us method

the issue of life is not the end point - rather the next point -

and how we get there is the problem of knowledge

no doubt we would get somewhere anyway - and some would argue this is in fact all
that occurs

nevertheless consciousness gives us a sense of purpose even if this is illusory

- the immediate forces of our lives place us in conflict - and the point of a conflict is
that it be resolved

here is the fact of choice - choice in necessity - and the reality is we don't know in any
clear sense what is the correct or proper choice - nevertheless we must decide -

and decide in what we regard at the time to be in our best interests -

this is just where not-knowing gives us possibility - it is the source of possibility

and the fact of this possibility - the possibility that comes with not-knowing is the fact
of human freedom - and the source of human dignity

so long as one can think one can never be ruled - one can never be conquered

the illusion of knowledge is the ground of power - it is the source of corruption

not-knowing is the mark of a free man - it is the sign of an open heart



- Greg. T. Charlton.
(c) Copyright 2008. Killer Press.